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Using the case of Canada’s airport policy, this dissertation seeks to give an account of long-
lasting conflicts between key actors of a policy sector who otherwise do not challenge the core 
policies and orientations of their sector and share the same core representations. The argument of 
this dissertation offers a response to the paradoxical outcome where a long-lasting policy has 
remained stable over time, despite engendering momentous conflicts and tensions between actors 
(to the point of threatening the stability of the policy sector) and being attacked by virtually all 
actors. This objective is sought by analyzing the Canadian airport sector and its four main 
platforms: Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver and Calgary. The Canadian airport sector is highly 
puzzling, since long-lasting conflicts over the airport rent, the access to airport infrastructure and 
the funding and administration of airport screening have polluted the relations between the key 
stakeholders for years, while none of the key actors involved has challenged the main policy 
orientations and policy instruments used to regulate the sector. The study of the Canadian airport 
sector with a refocused and amended cognitive analysis of public policy framework developed by 
Muller and Jobert is really fruitful: it results in a comprehensive analysis of the conflicts, their 
nature, the possible ways to solve them, and it also considerably expands the explanatory power 
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This dissertation gives an account of long-lasting conflicts between key actors of a policy sector 
who otherwise do not challenge the core policies and orientations of their sector and share the 
same core representations. The empirical field of the dissertation is Canada’s airport policy. The 
dissertation will demonstrate that the key actors of the Canadian airport sector all share the same 
core objectives (the development of Canada’s four largest platforms on the American and 
international stages) and share the same core representations of their sector and the way it should 
be regulated. At the same time, a few specific policy aspects have created momentous conflicts 
and tensions between these actors, and while these conflicts have lasted for the past two decades, 
it is surprising that almost no change has happened to ease them and align the policy aspects at 
stake with the core policy objectives on which virtually all actors agree.  
This introduction will present background elements to the dissertation. First, it will briefly 
summarize the argument and the contribution of this dissertation. Second, it will present give an 
overview of the evolution of airports and air transport globally over the past 60 years in order to 
explain the puzzling situation of Canada’s largest airports. It will also highlight the relevance of a 
policy study of the Canadian airport sector. 
 
A – Setting the Scene: Argument and Contribution of the Dissertation 
 
The dissertation asks how key actors of an economic sector can share the same conceptions and 
ideas about their sector, while at the same time fundamentally disagree on significant policy 
aspects that frame and shape such sector, in a context where these disagreements engender 
momentous conflicts and threaten the stability of the sector. More specifically, it offers a 
 2 
response to the paradoxical outcome where long-lasting conflicts and tensions between key actors 
of a policy sector about specific and easily identifiable aspect of the sector’s policy have not led 
to changing these aspects, despite the fact that adjusting these policy parameters would ease the 
tensions and stabilize the sector. Responding to such paradoxical outcomes provides a new 
contribution to the literature, given that major existing public policy theorizations would rather 
expect that, in these situations, a policy change would occur at some point. Different theoretical 
perspectives would give alternative explanations (e.g. opening of a window of opportunity, 
consideration of actors’ economic interests, incremental changes that usually affect a policy, 
etc.), but they would all share the common expectation of a policy change. Empirically, however, 
there are many instances where there is no important adjustment of the policy parameters that 
engender conflicts, and conflicts and tensions are long-lasting and undermine the stability of the 
sector. 
This dissertation establishes a theoretical response to explain adequately the drivers of the 
conflicts among actors who share the same vision of their sector. By highlighting these key 
drivers, it analyzes why a policy that creates momentous conflicts and instability remains stable 
over a long period while all its key stakeholders attempt to change it. Our knowledge and 
understanding of the policy process needs to be expanded in order to answer adequately these 
questions, as current approaches do not allow addressing them satisfactorily. While the lack of 
policy change is often studied with the help of neo-institutionalist models, the dissertation rather 
embraces a theoretical framework closely associated to important policy changes: the cognitive 
analysis of public policy framework. More specifically, this dissertation reshapes the cognitive 
analysis of public policy theoretical approach in order to better equip it to handle the afore-
mentioned issue of conflicts in a context of policy stability.  
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It is proposed to refocus the cognitive analysis on a few specific parameters (so-called 
algorithms) to demonstrate that key actors of policy sector may share the same values, norms, and 
representations, but they may subsequently draw different causal relationships between policy 
objectives and policy effects. The core argument is that in situations of long-lasting conflicts 
between key actors of a policy sector who otherwise do not challenge the core policies and 
orientations of their sector and share the same core representations, the analytical focus should be 
placed on the causal relations between the vision actors have of their sectors and the content of 
the several policy instruments actually implemented to achieve such vision. A focus on both these 
causal relations (or ‘algorithms)’ and policy instruments’ content is key. Indeed, momentous 
conflicts and tensions during decades are created and perpetuated by the fact that actors may not 
agree on the specific causal relations between the content of policy instruments and their effect 
on their sector, while these key actors also share the same core values and agree on the general 
principles of the public action that ensues.  
 
B –The Empirical Field: a Study of Canada’s Airport Policy and the 
situation of the Four Largest Canadian Airports 
 
Canada’s airport policy and the momentous tensions and conflicts about some aspects of the 
regulation that targets the four largest airports provide a fruitful field to ground an analysis of 
long-lasting conflicts and policy stability. In order to understand what the situation of the four 
largest airports in Canada is and what the conflicts between the key actors of the sector are, this 
subsection first provides background elements on the evolution of airports and air transport 
globally over the past 50 years. It then explains the rationale behind the decision to study 
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Canada’s airport policy. Finally, it offers a brief outlook of the situation of Canada’s four largest 
airports that will be at the heart of the analysis.  
1. Background Elements on Airport and Air Transport Liberalization  
The time is long past when the nascent International Civil Aviation Organization defined airports 
as “the physical entity consisting of a landing place for aircraft with a number of buildings 
housing various facilities for the aircraft in question and their passengers, crews and loads”, and 
remarked that “it is probable that nearly all large airports on the main world air routes are 
publicly owned and publicly operated” (ICAO 1948, 9, 14–15). Airports have become 
multimodal and functional businesses which generate significant revenues not only for 
themselves but also for their region’s economic community: major airports of the world are now 
truly “airport cities” whose future lies significantly in the development of non-aeronautical 
activities (Reiss 2007). Further, major airports are “expansive aerotropolises” serving as 
connection transportation corridors for both aviation and non-aviation linked business which are 
at the heart of an integrated urban economic region (Kasarda 2010, 17). The concept of 
aerotropolises acknowledges that airports have not only become catalysts for employment and 
economic growth, but they have also attracted a full range of businesses to the airport vicinity, 
which are reminiscent of the way seaports and river deltas became centres of economic activity in 
past centuries (ICAO 2013a, para 5.15). Air transport is also one of the few economic sectors 
whose liberalization has widely been associated with the word democratization (Giblin 2007). 
Indeed, flying from New York to Paris in 1930s cost $750 (about $12,000 in today’s terms). 
Today, it can cost as little as $700. In just a few decades, air transport went from a luxury service 
to a global industry whose economic impact is estimated to be 7.5% of world’s GDP (McMillan 
2010). Airports are thus of paramount importance for the economic development of communities, 
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regions and countries. It is therefore crucial to understand and assess airport policy and the role it 
plays in helping or impeding airports becoming aerotropolises.  
1.1. Airports in a Business-Oriented Model….  
The transformation of the role of airports, from simple landing places accommodating aircraft to 
aerotropolises catalyzing economic growth and business development dates from the late 1970s 
and the 1980s. Air transport policy has undergone significant changes in the past three decades. 
Prior to these reforms, the “state-planning and control” approach to policy-making was clearly 
not market-oriented since states had direct control over fares, routes and ownership of airports, 
air traffic control and, often, of national flags carriers. The “state-planning and control” approach 
has given way to an era of deregulation. The United States initiated this shift through the 
deregulation of the airline industry, and it then spread with the deregulation and liberalization of 
the airline and the airport industries in Canada, in Europe and worldwide (Merlin 2002, 54–59). 
Merlin further characterizes this “era of deregulation” as the deregulation of commercial 
domestic air transport, more flexible international air policy, the privatization of aircraft operators 
and the commercialization/privatization of airport operators and air navigation services providers, 
resulting in hubbing strategies and alliances between airlines themselves and between airports 
and airlines. 
 Deregulation has contributed to a change in the structure of airports in the civil aviation 
system in two major aspects: the shift toward a hub-and-spoke air traffic operations, and the 
governance of corporatized airports. With regards to air traffic operations, airlines used to 
provide a point-to-point service between a pair of two airports. Since the deregulation and the 
related competition between air carriers, ‘hub airports’ have emerged in response to the need to 
make economies of scale and provide more efficient and competitive service to air travellers. To 
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accommodate large airlines, airports have been used as hubs by airlines, through which all traffic 
moves along spokes connected to the hub at the center. This means that hub airports have become 
the centre of a wheel where traffic moves along its spokes. This is visually represented in 
Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Point-to-Point vs. Hub-and-Spoke Model 
 
The hubbing strategy is understood to be more advantageous to airlines than the point-to-
point strategy as it delegates implementation of various civil aviation policies to functional 
networks. Economically, the hubbing strategy is said to promote better economies of scale and 
maximize profits. Politically, this strategy can be used as a tool by airlines to achieve a dominant 
position within a network and within a market (Varlet 1997). Major hubs
1
 compete against each 
other to attract airlines and passengers.  
The second change in the past thirty years pertains to the ownership, governance and 
control of major airports. There has been an undeniable trend of airport commercialization all 
over the world (Villard and de la Camara 2011), with an impressive movement of establishing 
                                                 
1
 Such as: Atlanta (ATL), Chicago (ORD), Los Angeles (LAX), New York (JFK) and Toronto (YYZ) in 
North America; London (LHR), Paris (CDG), Frankfort (FRA) and Amsterdam (AMS) in Europe; Dubai 
(DXB), Doha (DOH) and Abu Dhabi (AUX) in the Middel East; or Beijing (PEK0, Tokyo (HND), Honk 
Kong (HKG) or Singapore (SIN) in Asia. 
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autonomous entities (either public or private), functioning at arms-length from governmental 
authorities, to operate airports (ICAO 2013b). The commercialization of airports through the 
establishment of these autonomous entities has had a significant impact on the management, the 
efficiency and the growth of commercialized airports. Most notably, the following trends have 
been associated with commercialization of airports by ICAO: growth of a business culture (for 
example, closer control over revenues and expenses, quicker decisions and more responsive 
actions, and good governance), thereby increasing efficiency and improving the quality of 
services, in addition to enabling airport authorities to access private capital markets, and to make 
users of the airports contribute directly to the upkeep and development of the facilities they use 
through charges (user pays principle) (ICAO 2012a, 3–1,3–2). 
1.2. … Still Governed by States and Governments  
The liberalization of air transport remains paradoxical. On one hand, it is clear that airports have 
become business-oriented firms. The privatization of national flag air carriers and the removal of 
restrictions in terms of fares and routes have led to the rise of a market-oriented organization of 
air transport, notably through the implementation of hub-and-spokes networks for legacy carriers 
and the rise of low cost carriers competitors. Key actors have thus drastically changed in the past 
three decades: several airlines have disappeared (for example Pan Am), new airlines have 
appeared (South west, WestJet) and hub airports have been playing a far more complex role.  
 On the other hand, one key actor has remained omnipresent despite the waves of 
liberalization and privatization: air transport regulatory authorities. In legal terms, states have 
complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above their territories. When establishing 
the bases for international civil aviation in 1947, states incorporated in the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation (thereafter the Chicago Convention) that air transport would be 
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operated soundly and economically. They also stated key charging principles for airport charges, 
set up binding standards and recommended practices for safety and security that must be adhered 
to. The exchange of traffic rights and several commercial issues remained however outside the 
scope of the Chicago Convention and have been dealt with bilaterally since. 
 The Chicago Convention framework means that despite the waves of liberalization and 
privatization, states must still regulate air transport and comply with global standards and 
recommended practices. For instance, they are still ultimately responsible for the provision of 
airport services over their territory. The functions of safety, security and economic oversight of 
civil aviation are a state responsibility. States still decide bilaterally to allow foreign air carriers 
to operate routes to/from their airports. Air carriers cannot fly wherever they want, and airports 
are forbidden to receive flights from airlines that do not have the specific authorization to operate 
to/from such airports. Consequently, there are thousands of bilateral air transport agreements that 
are in force today, regulating access to airports for air carriers.  
The paradox is thus that airports and airlines have been privatized and their activities have 
been liberalized to an extent that has drastically changed the way they operate and they behave, 
but they are still heavily regulated by governments which interfere in their activities. Airports 
have become aerotropolises, airlines are the vector of the globalization, but governments and air 
transport regulation authorities are omnipresent in the organization of their activities, and they 
base their interventions on a framework established in 1947
2
. It should be noted that most 
research has not explored this paradox. On the one hand, economists and management scholars 
                                                 
2
 It should be noted that even though such a situation is not really unique to air transport, it is remarkable 
that a trade activity is still governed today by a framework established 1947 and outside the multilateral 
scope of the World Trade Organization. The degree of involvement of States in the affairs of air transport 
is quite unique. 
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have focused on the economics, privatization and competition aspects of air transport
3
, while on 
the other hand legal scholars have studied the Chicago Convention and its legal provisions 
(Carney et al. 2005; Dempsey 2005; Dempsey, Buzdugan, and Nyampong 2005; Abeyratne 
2007). They are not really interacting with each other: they publish in different journals, and they 
have their own, distinct research societies.  
 The field of public policy can play a leading role in bridging the gap between these 
research communities since the interaction between private and public sector actors has been a 
core focus in the discipline (Aucoin 1995; Osborne and McLaughin 2002; Verhoest, Bouckaert, 
and Peters 2007). What is indeed missing from the economic and management research on air 
transport is a careful analysis of the role that States and governments are playing and how such a 
role affects the economics and organization of air transport. What is also missing from a focus on 
aviation law provisions set up by the Chicago Convention is a dynamic understanding of the 
world of air transport. Public policy analysis can provide the tools and insights necessary to better 
understand the dynamic nature of the economic, organizational and strategic aspects of air 
transport. Because air transport has remained a heavily regulated political object, a 
comprehensive analysis has to encompass the role of States and political actors, and political 
science offers the tools to undertake such analysis. 
                                                 
3
 For instance Martin Dresner, David Gillen, Trevor Heaver, Tae Oum, William Stanburry, Michael 
Tretheway or W. G. Waters, as highlighted in the survey of the literature in the following chapter (cf. 
infra). 
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2. Significance of a Policy Study of the Canadian Airport Sector  
2.1. A Brief Outlook of the Canadian Airport Sector: Four Global 
and/or Regional Hub Airports  
In Canada, the 26 largest airports were commercialized in the late 1980s and in the 1990s. Their 
management was transferred to private, non-share, not-for-profit autonomous entities in charge of 
running and developing airports on sound commercial bases. Among them, only four airports are 
fighting for a place in the limited club of hub airports: either a global international hub for 
Toronto, and to a lesser extent Vancouver, or regional hubs for Montreal and Calgary. All other 
Canadian airports are simply the spokes of these hubs and serve local and regional needs through 
point-to-point service (Barros, Peypoch, and Villard 2011, 27). Furthermore, only these four 
airports are large enough to become aerotropolises, attracting more than 10 million passengers 
per year (table 1 refers).  
Table 1. Ranking of passengers by Canadian Airports4, 2010 and 2011 
     
RK Airports 2010 2011 
1 Lester B. Pearson (YYZ)      30,910,795       32,278,458  
2 Vancouver International (YVR)      16,254,016       16,394,986  
3 Pierre Elliot Trudeau International (YUL)      12,700,175       13,228,564  
4 Calgary International (YYC)      11,774,776       12,073,264  
5 Edmonton International (YEG)       5,981,206        6,156,730  
6 Ottawa International (YOW)       4,390,951        4,359,055  
7 Halifax (YHZ)       3,509,473        3,482,421  
8 Winnipeg Richardson International (YWG)       3,385,250        3,383,882  
9 Gander International (YQX)          97,772          115,382  
 Total      89,004,414       91,472,742  
 Source: ICAO DATA+ (Airport Traffic module)   
                                                 
4
 Passengers data includes domestic and international scheduled and non scheduled services as well as 
direct transit. Gander is part of the ranking for historic reasons, but some other Canadian airports are 
handling more traffic. 
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The picture is similar in terms of cargo, where the same four airports (Pierre Elliot Trudeau and 
Mirabel airports are operated by a single airport authority and therefore their data should be 




Table 2. Ranking of cargo5 by Canadian Airports, 2010 and 2011 
     
RK Airports 2010 2011 
1 Lester B. Pearson (YYZ) 340,563 339,065 
2 Vancouver International (YVR) 196,855 186,385 
3 Calgary International (YYC) 80,491 83,524 
4 Pierre Elliot Trudeau International (YUL) 77,230 76,623 
4bis Mirabel (YMX) 69,327 66,899 
6 Winnipeg Richardson International (YWG) 61,022 65,254 
7 Halifax (YHZ) 27,943 25,471 
8 Edmonton International (YEG) 22,882 22,955 
9 Ottawa International (YOW) 12,020 10,288 
10 Gander International (YQX) 371 377 
 Grand Total      888,704       876,842  
     Source: ICAO DATA+ (Airport Traffic module) 
 
This data is a clear and unequivocal indication that four Canadian airports are leading the 
industry both in terms of traffic passengers and cargo. 
2.2. The Puzzling Situation of Canada’s Four Largest Airports 
In most countries, governments regard hub airports as key players in a country’s internal 
competitiveness and economic growth (Reynolds-Feighan 2010; Bowen 2000). Hubs not only 
provide more direct destination at higher frequencies and lower priced fares, but also make 
                                                 
5
 Cargo data includes domestic and international scheduled and non scheduled services in tonnes. 
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countries and communities more competitive for investment, enhance productivity and 
connectivity and offer major economic gains. In many countries, the success of hubbing 
strategies has resulted from a close cooperation between airlines, hub airport operators and public 
authorities
6
. “Hub airports” have been established with governmental support to secure economic 
growth and competitiveness for the countries in which they are located. Moreover, the hubbing 
strategy has been successful in producing economic benefits for their local communities, 
industries and national economies. By driving economic benefits on the global and local stages 
and by offering enhanced connectivity, hub airports have therefore become the catalysts of 
economic growth and have been able to attract in their vicinity a whole range of economic 
activities beyond aviation, thereby becoming aerotropolises.  
In Canada, hub airports have been less successful than their American and European 
counterparts in securing these economic benefits, and most stakeholders interviewed for the 
purpose of this dissertation believe that it is the government policy that hinders the development 
of Canada’s hubs. On the basis of 50 interviews with stakeholders of the Canadian air transport 
sector, the research in this dissertation demonstrates that actors have a strong belief that the 
content of Canada’s airport policy instruments are the most important hindrance to the 
development of Canada’s largest airports. The dissertation will demonstrate that air transport 
stakeholders firmly believe that the content of some of these instruments undermine the 
competiveness of Canada’s airports and airlines and divert traffic to other hub and network 
carriers. These stakeholders believe that they prevents airports to expand their route network and 
offer destinations required by Canada’s communities. Finally, it will also be shown that they 
believe they unfairly extracts money from a sector with low profit margins to fund non-related 
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government activities. They share the same core conception and representation of what the 
airport sector should be: a cost-efficient business able to grow and expand through the support of 
a market-oriented airport and air transport policy. 
 Such beliefs, which are at odds with the effects caused by current content of Canadian 
airport policy instruments, are not new. They have created numerous long-lasting conflicts and 
tensions between and among actors over more than two decades, with the shared perception that 
the effects of the government policy is catastrophic (such shared perception is clearly visible in 
most of the interviews conducted for this dissertation – excerpts will be presented in the 
following chapters as well as from the literature). The situation of these four Canadian airports is 
thus highly puzzling, as the airports of Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver and Calgary are facing 
several hindrances that prevent them from developing their full potentialities.  
Indeed, the policies implemented by the government and the content of several policy 
instruments it uses not only impede the growth of the four hubs and the business opportunities 
they foster, but also threaten their position in global and regional civil aviation markets (Lazar 
2011). Based on 50 interviews with the stakeholders of the Canadian air transport sector (policy-
makers, regulators, airport operators, airlines and trade associations), all agree that the main 
policy orientations and the content of the policy instruments used to regulate the airport sector 
should help the four airports to develop their potential. Nonetheless, they have been in sharp 
disagreement with respect to the content of the instruments used to govern the airport sector. 
Disagreement, discontent and tensions have lasted for more than two decades and have all 
targeted Canada’s airport policy and the content of the policy instruments it uses. Surprisingly, no 
major policy change has occurred and a policy that all non-government actors perceive as 
drastically impeding their development and threatening their sustainability is still in place. 
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Despite considerable discontent and tensions as well as attacks against Canada’s airport policy, 
there remains inertia with respect to airport policies.  
2.3. Three Cases of Conflicts and Tensions in the Sector 
Three policy instruments are particularly illustrating this puzzle, because their content appears to 
contradict fundamentally the goal of favoring the development of Canada’s four main airports, 
therefore creating the dissensions and tensions. Their content appears almost irrational to all non-
government stakeholders, as they are perceived as directly contradicting the core objective of 
Canada’s airport policy.  
The first of these policy instruments is the rent policy. The rent policy is a taxation-type 
instrument by which the major airport operators must pay the federal government a lease-rent 
(not paid by airport operators in Europe or in the U.S) for occupying the land on which the airport 
infrastructure was built. According to figures released in 2010 by Transport Canada (Transport 
Canada 2010), the airport operators of Toronto, Montréal, Vancouver and Calgary pay more than 
90% of the total rent collected by the federal government. These airport authorities and their 
users argue that this levy puts these airports in competitive disadvantage and the money levied by 
the government is strongly hindering the development of these airports and the growth of their 
networks. They argue that it is also at odds with the general market-oriented environment in 
which airports evolve. The rent payment is an artificial addition of the cost-base of the Canadian 
airports, which in turn makes them more expensive to use: it is a competitive disadvantage for 
these airports and it increases the cost of air transportation in Canada (mechanically decreasing 
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the economic benefits of aviation)
7
. Airports, airport users and air transport organizations have all 
advocated the termination of the rent policy, but the federal government has nevertheless 
consistently maintained the content of this instrument.  
The second policy instrument whose content is at stake is the air services agreement 
(ASA), which is a soft law-type instrument by which the government allows and restricts 
Canadian airports to serve foreign air carriers. ASAs are bilateral agreements between two 
countries, in which they define how their respective carriers can access airports (de Mestral and 
Bashor 2005). Canada has experienced a unique situation with regard to the content of this 
instrument, which has not occurred in any other Western country: in 2010, the federal 
government refused Emirati air carriers to double their services to Toronto and to serve the 
airports of Vancouver and Calgary. Airports consider this refusal as governmental interference 
which prevents them to attract new air carriers, to expand their routes network and to grow their 
business. It is also perceived to be at odds with a market-oriented policy framework for air 
transport, according to which airports and airlines should be free to enter into business if it makes 
sense economically. It is also highly relevant to note that because it refused landing rights to 
Emirates and Etihad, Canada faced fierce retaliatory measures from the United Arab Emirates 
(U.A.E.). The Canadian Forces were ousted from the Emirati Camp Mirage military base that 
they had been using for nine years to supply the Afghanistan war and the U.A.E imposed a 
$1,000 visa fee on Canadian visitors (Jang 2011b).  
The third policy instrument whose content is contentious is the security charge (again, a 
taxation-type instrument), consisting of a charge levied on all passengers using or transiting at 
                                                 
7
 In total, it is more than $214 million that was extracted from the airports of Toronto, Montreal, 
Vancouver and Calgary for rent payments in 2010 (Transport Canada 2010). The Greater Toronto Airport 
Authority alone has paid $1.82-billion in rent to the federal government since 1996, while its book value 
at the time of its transfer in the mid-1990s was evaluated at $263-million (Jang 2011a). 
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Canadian airports, which is intended to fund the Canadian Air Transportation Security Agency 
(CATSA) created in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. In Europe, private companies provide airport 
security. There has not been any movement to bring the provision of airport security services 
under the control of the state. In the United States, a federal agency is responsible for airport 
security, but security fees are dramatically lower as compared to Canada. Similar to the rent 
policy instrument, the content of the security charge policy instrument appears to be at odds with 
the general market-oriented policy framework: this security fee increases the cost of using 
Canadian hub airports and decreases the competitiveness of Canada’s airports, but it also raises 
the question of how airport security should be funded. 
The content of these three instruments and the way they are used by the federal 
government is therefore particularly interesting. They seem not only to be at odds with the 
general market-oriented environment in which airports and air transport have evolved in the past 
two decades, but they also crystallize the considerable discontent and tensions in the airport 
policy sector that have taken place for two decades. The content of such instruments has not 
evolved in order to be in line with a market-oriented philosophy or ease the tensions between 
actors.  
All of these instruments influence the charges billed by airport authorities to users, the 
funds available to develop and expand their activities and the access to infrastructure for 
domestic and foreign air carriers in need of scarce infrastructure resources. They dramatically 
affect the various situations of the four Canadian hub airports and their capacity to develop their 
infrastructure and to accommodate both their users and air travellers. The presence of multiple 
actors and government agencies in the policy community as well as the multiple and often-
conflicting policy objectives and policy instruments have significantly hindered the outcome of 
the hubbing strategies at Toronto, Vancouver, Montreal and Calgary and the potential of these 
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airports to become truly aerotropolises. Other countries have hosted powerful regional and global 
hubs, securing competitiveness and growth, and have done so because of symbiotic relationships 
uniting the based airline, hub operator and public authorities. In Canada, there is on the one hand 
a public discourse of competitiveness in general as well as for civil aviation in particular. 
Nonetheless, this discourse is limited by the concrete, empirical use of airport policy instruments 
and the content of the airport policy they highlight. 
 
C –Conclusion: Overview of this Dissertation 
  
Chapter 1 surveys the literature in order to consider how key actors of a sector may share the 
same core conceptions of a policy sector and the same core representations of how it should be 
framed and shaped by policies, but would still be in conflict over the policies. It demonstrates 
that existing public policy approaches are not able to give a satisfactory theoretical account of 
such situations. After introducing the main analytical framework employed in this dissertation 
(the cognitive analysis of public policy), it demonstrates that such conflicts are caused by the fact 
that actors do not draw the same causal relations (the so-called “algorithms”) between the core 
ideas about the sector and the outcome of the use of policy instruments on the same sector. 
Chapter 2 contextualizes the theoretical framework in a Canadian setting. 
Chapter 3, 4, and 5 focus on the most contentious policy instruments of the Canadian 
airport policy. They each constitute a case empirically grounding the dissertation and 
demonstrating the validity of the theoretical proposition made in Chapter 1.  
Chapter 3 studies the airport ground lease rents and the user charges at the largest 
Canadian airports. Taking into account the numerous conflicts over the rent the largest airport 
operators have to pay to the federal government, the chapter establishes that the “user-pay” model 
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for funding Canada’s largest airports by which airlines are funding airport operation and 
development is a core element of the Canadian airport sector. What is at stake is the content of 
the related taxation-type instrument which is perceived as being in contradiction with the “user-
pay” philosophy. While all actors, including government, share the same idea that airport 
operators have to transform their platforms into competitive regional and international 
aerotropolises, the significant amount of money diverted through the rent prevents them from 
achieving efficiently such objective.  
Chapter 4 analyzes the access to the four largest airports that are granted to transborder 
and foreign air carriers by the federal government through the air service agreement instrument. 
There have been momentous dissensions between key actors of the airport sector over the issue of 
granting access to foreign air carriers to some or all of the four Canadian largest airports, and 
such dissensions have led to one of the most important commercial air transport-related dispute in 
recent history. The chapter demonstrates that what is at stake is not the access per se, because all 
stakeholders agree that the largest Canadian hub airports should be able to grow their network. It 
is rather the inconsistent and ever-changing content of the soft-law instrument used by the 
Government that is discordant with the stakeholders’’ shared vision and has engendered 
momentous conflicts.  
Chapter 5 focuses on the administration and the funding of the provision of security and 
screening services at Canada’s largest airports. It demonstrates that all actors do agree on the 
following core elements: “security and screening oversight at Canada’s largest airports is a core 
State function” and the “user-pay” model is the best for airport services funding, including 
security, and for ensuring the sustainability of the Canadian air transport sector. Nevertheless, 
there have been momentous conflicts between key stakeholders of the airport sector, and the 
chapter demonstrates that it is the content of the taxation-type instrument by which airport 
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security is funded that it is really at stake. Many actors of the airport sector perceive that it not 
only increases the costs of Canada’s largest airports and undermines their ability to grow their 
business, but that it also contradicts the market-oriented philosophy that has shaped and framed 
the Canadian airport sector. 
Finally, the conclusion reviews and compares the three cases by presenting a detailed 
analysis of theoretical propositions presented in Chapter 1. It also reflects on the applicability of 
the theoretical framework to other cases and suggests further avenues for research and 
investigations. 
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Chapter I: The Cognitive Analysis, Airports, and Canada 
 
This dissertation seeks to understand long-lasting conflicts between key actors of a policy sector 
who otherwise do not challenge the core policies and orientations of their sector and share the 
same core representations. This is done through the lens of the Canadian airport policy. Existing 
public policy approaches are not able to satisfactorily give a theoretical account of situations 
similar to Canada’s airport policy. Indeed, most existing theorizations of the policy process 
would expect that, in a situation similar to the Canadian airport policy, policy changes and 
reorientations would occur at some point. This has not occurred in the Canadian case. This 
chapter surveys the four most prominent public policy approaches: decision-making and 
rationality-focused approaches of public policy, agenda-focused approaches of public policy, 
institutions-focused approaches of public policies, and finally ideas-focused approaches of public 
policy. Of course, such a categorization of public policy theories into four families does not make 
justice to their subtleties and complexities, and it is often the case that a given theory would 
combine two or more of the above-mentioned focus. Nonetheless, such a grouping is necessary to 
highlight the common ground of public policy theories and identify why they do not give an 
accurate account of situations such as Canada’s airport policy. 
 Part A of this chapter surveys the three first approaches (namely, the decision-making and 
rationality-focused approaches, the agenda-focused approaches, and the institutions-focused 
approaches). Part B analyses ideational approaches. The premises of this dissertation are that it is 
necessary to understand actors’ ideas and their perceptions about their environment in order to 
understand why they act the way they do, how they react to policies that affect them, and how 
they try to adjust and change situations in which they find themselves in. Indeed, it is both beliefs 
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about the way the world works and perceptions of actors’ actions that impact the reality (Braun 
and Busch 1999). The role of ideas in the policy process and their impact on actors’ actions has 
been widely debated in the social sciences literature. Three broad approaches were developed: the 
paradigm approach, the advocacy coalition framework approach and the cognitive analysis 
approach. Part B of this chapter therefore details the so-called cognitive analysis of public policy 
and puts it in perspective with other frameworks that relate to the role of ideas in the policy 
process: the discussion about and comparisons of ideational approaches is conducted through 
numerous illustrations from the literature related to air transport and airport policy in Canada. It 
concludes that the cognitive analysis of public policy is best able to give an account of the policy 
process in general and of Canada’s airport policy in particular. Finally, Part C details some 
weaknesses of the cognitive analysis and summarizes the theoretical contribution of this 
dissertation.  
 
A – Approaches to Public Policy Studies and Limits in their Ability to explain Canada’s 
Airport Policy 
 
1. Decision-Making and Rationality-Focused Approaches of Public Policy 
The question of who decides is at the core of policy studies. Who decides? What? Why and 
How? With whom? Such questions have been momentous because they allow to both focus on 
key decisional moments and to cover the various stages of the policy process, from issue 
definition to implementation and evaluation. Decisions are also the most visible part of the policy 
process because decision-makers often attempt to project an image of power, resources and 
arbitration capacity (Gaïti 2008). Decision-making studies are often grounded in methodological 
individualism, whereby the explanation of any social phenomenon lies on individual actions that 
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can always be explained and objectivized (Olson 1978). From that standpoint, several types of 
analyses of decision-making and rationality-focused models have emerged.  
A first stream analyzes decision-making in terms of public policy sequences. Laswell 
originally demonstrated that decision-making should be understood within a broader policy 
process made of several stages: the decision is only one of the stages and is therefore less 
momentous than it seems (Lasswell 1956). The stages of the policy process were later formalized 
(from the emergence of the issue to the problem definition, the decision, the implementation, etc.) 
(C. O. Jones 1970). Nonetheless, such an approach in terms of stages is of limited relevance to 
give an accurate account of the Canadian airport policy. Indeed, formalizing the policy process in 
terms of stages and studying the key decisional moments assume that policies have a beginning 
and an end and are terminated at some point. In the Canadian case, the first stages of the 
Canadian policy process are easily identified: the next chapters will demonstrate the emergence 
of several momentous issues (with respect to airport rent, air carrier access to airports, and 
security) and their association with a policy problem (Canada’s airport policy). There has been no 
subsequent policy decision that would address such issues, even though all key actors have been 
requesting a decision to be taken. Conversely, unsolved issues have divided key actors and led to 
momentous conflicts between and within sectoral and government actors. Nonetheless, all actors 
agree that the policy should be changed and in line with the market-oriented reality of the air 
transport world. A stages approach to the Canadian situation does not allow to explain 
theoretically what is going on (it would result in a circle between two stages: the issue definition 
and association to a policy problem to the absence of decision, resulting in the issue not being 
solved and being associated to a policy problem with no decision, etc.).  
Another research stream focused on decisions has proposed to look at policies as the 
aggregation of individual rational decisions that can be explained by referring to actor’s 
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preferences in a context where they are time- and information-constrained (Weber 1971). The 
tenants of the rational choice school have argued that public policies result from individual 
choices and decisions that are calculated in terms of opportunities and cost-benefit analyses. 
Individuals seek to maximize their interests, and their preferences are stable and hierarchized: 
politicians seek to win elections, voters cast their ballots according to their policy preferences, 
bureaucrats want to maximize their budgets, and interest groups seek regulations that favor their 
constituents (Downs 1967; Niskanen 1971). Such a model has some explanatory power for the 
Canadian situation. The next chapters will indeed demonstrate that many actors have an interest 
in a policy change that will increase their utility. Simply put, airports and airlines actors believe 
that a policy change will maximize their interests (for instance increasing the competitiveness of 
airports, reducing airlines’ operating costs, increasing the routes network of the airports, etc.). 
Politicians have also an interest in a policy change (as offering more air destinations to their 
voters and business communities will increase their satisfaction). Even bureaucrats have an 
interest in changing the policy: renouncing to the rent they extract from airport or to the 
restriction on foreign airlines will increase the economic contribution of air transport and 
subsequently increase taxes and government’s income. The issue is that, in spite of the 
converging interests of several actors, such change is not happening. Such a model would be 
perfect to analyze a change in Canada’s airport policy, but it fails to explain the maintenance of a 
policy that has created so many tensions, that virtually all actors want to change, and that is even 
not the second best-policy choice of the actors involved.  
A third research stream focused on decision-making and rationality would rather 
emphasize that the decision-making is completely dissolved in the broader policy action. An 
illustration is the “organized anarchy” model of March and Olsen which argues that decisions are 
taken incoherently and unintentionally: problems, solutions, opportunities and actors are 
 24 
independent from each other and it is their random interactions that result in policy decisions 
(Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972). This approach could explain the absence of any decision to 
change the Canadian airport policy because, in spite of the existence of problems in the policy 
there has not been any window of opportunity that has been opened in order to solve the issue (by 
any kind of solution that would present itself). Such an approach has nonetheless two main issues 
that limit its ability to explain the puzzle at stake. First, Canada’s airport sector does not meet the 
criteria for an “organized anarchy”. The cases will indeed demonstrate that  the boundaries and 
decision-makers of the sector are clearly defined and that actors have very clear preferences. This 
dissertation demonstrates that with respect to Canada’s airport policy there was a clear and 
coherent project to commercialize Canada’s airports and to re-orient Canada’s airport policy to 
align it with the market-orientations of the air transport sector. It is the idea of having a market-
oriented airport policy that led to a change of policy, and the argument of this dissertation is that 
it is this idea of a market-oriented policy and its meaning in the real world of air transport that has 
created tensions and conflicts (cf. next chapter). Second, there have been several windows of 
opportunity that should have led to re-orient Canada’s airport policy. For instance, between 1993 
and 2013, there were 7 federal general elections
8
, three different prime ministers
9
, and 10 




), Even if elections are not necessarily 
windows of opportunity, they often create the possibility of changes and policy reorientations 
(List and Sturm 2006; Jeffrey 2000). In addition, the dissertation demonstrates that key 
stakeholders of the airport sector led several advocacy campaigns and provided several solutions 
to amend Canada’s airport policy. Finally, it is surprising that in a contentious context there has 
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 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2011. 
9
 Jean Chrétien, Paul Martin and Stephen Harper 
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 Doug Young, David Anderson, David Collenette, Tony Valeri and Jean Lapierre. 
11
 Lawrence Cannon, John Baird, Chuck Strahl, Denis Lebel, and Lisa Raitt. 
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been no opportunity to address the issues at stake. In fact, there were so many opportunities to 
actually re-orient Canada’s airport policy that it is puzzling that no change happened, and the 
organized anarchy model cannot give an account of such a situation. 
2. Agenda-Focused Approaches of Public Policy 
Another popular approach of public policy research has analyzed policy stability and policy 
changes by emphasizing the importance of agenda setting. Instead of analyzing decisions and 
decisional processes, the emphasis has been put on the construction of policy issues and the way 
they become visible. The first studies in that research stream highlighted that issues become 
visible because there are entrepreneurs that are defining what the problems are and are bringing 
them to the policy stage (Cobb and Elder 1972). The concept of “window of opportunity” 
explains how an issue can be on decision-makers agenda and lead to policy change (Kingdon 
1984). 
From that standpoint, a first research stream has focused on studying and giving an 
account of the emergence of public issues. Downs established a five-step process in which public 
interest is suddenly piqued by an existing problem, and then gradually declines when the costs of 
addressing the issue is considered and other issues emerge and attract interest. In this approach, 
effective change can happen provided that public attention remains sufficiently focused on the 
issue at stake and will therefore generate enough political pressure (Downs 1972). This landmark 
study has been refined and amended in order give an account of complex situations. For instance, 
a connection was established between the salience of an issue and how much legislative attention 
it gets: policies are more likely to evolve when there is an increase in salience and issues are 
being redefined as change is occurring, notably through the medias (Soroka 2006). Such models 
would explain the lack of change in the Canadian airport policy by its lack of salience: it fails to 
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attract public attention, it fails to get legislative attention, and therefore it does not change. These 
answers are nonetheless unsatisfactorily. Indeed, it is true that Canadian citizens may not be 
preoccupied with the issues associated with Canada’s airport policy, but these issues have 
nonetheless been regularly in the news over the past two decades. For instance, the chapter on 
airport access to foreign air carriers shows that medias have largely covered the issue at stake. 
Parliamentarians, as shown in the chapter on airport security, have also discussed these issues in 
depth. Furthermore, the issues at stake are extremely salient for the stakeholders of the Canadian 
airport sector, and they have made sure that their concerns are regularly heard. Finally, the 
following chapters also demonstrate that the issues at stake have attracted significant legislative 
attention over the past decade. Nonetheless and contrary to the expectation of the above-
mentioned theoretical family, no change has occurred. 
Instead of focusing on issue emergence, a second research stream has rather focused on 
the redefinition of existing issues in order to assess related policy change and policy stability. The 
punctuated equilibrium theory supports the idea that there is an alternation between long periods 
of policy stability and period of more or less radical changes. Punctuated equilibriums are 
determined by the dynamics of issue (re)definition and institutional venues and tenants of this 
theory consider crucial to take into consideration the competition between policy subsectors to 
explain how issues can attract attention (Baumgartner and Jones 1991). The punctuated 
equilibrium seems interesting in giving an account of the stability of Canada’s airport policy over 
the past two decades: it would assume that there has been no change because air transport 
stakeholders have failed to put their issues forward, while other groups would have been more 
successful in redefining their issues and having them addressed by the appropriate forum. 
Unfortunately, such theorization of public action does not resist an empirical verification with the 
Canadian airport policy for several reasons. First, the punctuated equilibrium model is grounded 
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in a pluralist approach – that suits very well the United States system and its multiple and 
competing venues – that is not appropriate with the cases at stake. The Canadian federal 
government has the exclusive jurisdiction over air transport, and the fusion – rather than 
separation – of powers within the cabinet and the prime minister office, severely limits the 
number of available venues and empirical testing of the model in a Canadian setting was 
subsequently unsuccessful (Savoie 1999; Savoie 2004; Howlett 1997). Second, the punctuated 
equilibrium model assumes a competition between policy subsystems in order to access the 
higher agendas. This dissertation will conversely demonstrate that in the case of Canada’s airport 
policy there has rather been collaboration between various policy subsystems (from airports and 
airlines to tourism, hotels, provincial governments, local communities, etc.) which have allied to 
put forward the issue of airport policy.  
Finally, a moderate constructivist stream of research has produced interesting agenda-
focused developments. For instance, a phenomenological or interpretive stance has led analysts to 
examine how social actors construct their own social reality through the use of language and 
focused on the sociological aspects of problem definition and agenda setting (Fischer 2003). Such 
a moderate constructivist stream appears to be relevant and appropriate to give a partial account 
of the Canadian situation, but it cannot give a full theoretical understanding of the issue at stake. 
Indeed, the dissertation will show that what has gathered actors of the Canadian airport sector in 
requesting a policy change is a common ideational representation of what their sector should be. 
Nonetheless, the focus will be on actors’ representations in relation to their values (rather than on 
agenda considerations) in order to understand and explain the numerous tensions and conflicts 




3. Institutions-Focused Approaches of Public Policy 
Another set of approaches that needs to be looked at before discussing how a moderate 
constructivist stream can be used to give a relevant and appropriate account of the Canadian 
situation is institutions-focused approaches. Institutionalist reasoning is supported by the belief 
that the structure of political institutions exerts an influence on governmental actions and the way 
these actions are led (Steinmo 2006, 292). Three dominant approaches have emerged in the new 
institutionalist field: the historical, rational choice and sociological institutionalism. To 
summarize, the rational choice institutionalism postulates that actors have preferences and behave 
instrumentally through strategic calculation. Institutions are thus voluntarily created to facilitate 
and structure interactions (Shepsle 1989; Hall and Taylor 1997, 476–481; Ostrom 2007). 
Conversely, sociological institutionalism argues that there is no pure and strict rationality 
regarding the existence and the shape of institutions: institutions themselves are defined in terms 
of “frames” that have a cognitive influence on actors (and reciprocally) and are culturally valued 
within a society (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Hall and Taylor 1997, 481–486). Finally, historical 
institutionalism puts forward the concept of path dependence. Political situations are thus 
determined because of institutional arrangements that can lead to a path dependence 
phenomenon, but also because of other factors such as ideas. Institutions affect individual 
behaviour in two ways: first, individuals adopt calculus behaviour and use institutions for 
estimating degrees of certainty and obtaining information. Second, individuals consider that 
institutions provide moral and cognitive frames in which there are familiar patterns of behaviour 
(Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992; Hall and Taylor 1997, 470–476; Saint-Martin 1998). 
 All three new institutionalisms would examine the Canadian situation by focusing on the 
structuration of its institutions and stressing its stability: changing Canada’s airport policy would 
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lead to undesirable uncertainties and would be difficult to implement given the existing 
configuration of policies and power relations. Nonetheless, such an approach cannot be 
considered for at least two reasons. The first one is that most actors of the Canadian airport sector 
want changes and had clear opportunities to put forward such changes. While the most common 
observation from institutionalism is that change is infrequent and difficult because both actors 
and institutions are reluctant to initiate changes, the dissertation will demonstrate that airports-
related institutions have changed in the past and that key actors have been pushing to continue 
changing them. Actors have clear ideas about what the airport sector should look like and they 
have related policy preferences with opportunities to implement them. Rational choice and 
sociological institutionalism cannot offer a clear explanation of the origin of these preferences, 
their emergence and their questioning. The focus on structural or institutional variables to explain 
these preferences is simply not enough, and it will be the argument of this dissertation that policy 
preferences of the actors can be traced in how they perceive their sector in relation to other 
sectors (Smyrl 2005). Historical institutionalism offers very interesting insights on that end, 
which will be discussed in the next section under ideas-focused approaches. Another reason for 
which institutionalism may be of limited value is that while Canada’s airport policy has generated 
many long-lasting conflicts and tensions without being addressed, the situation has been much 
different in most comparable countries such as the United Kingdom, New Zealand or Australia 
(Corbett 1965). Airport policy has tremendously changed in these Westminster democracies with 
similar institutions: the policy situation has been regularly re-assessed through the re-setting of 
the airport economic regulation frameworks (Villard and de la Camara 2012) and it is surprising 
that no change has happened in a similar institutional setting in Canada. Looking at institutions to 
explain stability in the Canadian case may hide the fact that comparable situations have led to 
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drastic changes elsewhere, and therefore it is necessary to look at elements beyond the 
institutional setting to have an understanding of the Canadian case. 
 
 
B – Analyzing the Cases: Contributions and Limits of Ideas-Focused Public Policy 
Analysis Theories 
 
Decision-making and rationality-focused approaches of public policy, agenda-focused 
approaches of public policy and institutions-focused approaches of public policies have made 
tremendous contributions to the literature and have drastically expanded the knowledge about the 
policy process in Canada and elsewhere. Unfortunately, they have some weaknesses that prevent 
them to make the most of the Canadian airport situation. Simply put, they cannot resolve the 
Canadian airport policy’s puzzle and give an account of long-lasting conflicts between key actors 
of a policy sector who otherwise do not challenge the core policies and orientations of their sector 
and share the same core representations. In each of these approaches, it has nonetheless appeared 
that theorizations emphasizing the role of ideas would offer the most accurate insights, 
confirming the premises of this dissertation: it is necessary to understand actors’ ideas and their 
perceptions about their environment in order to understand why they act the way they do, how 
they react to policies that affect them, and how they try to adjust and change situations they find 
themselves in. 
Ideas-focused approaches can be divided into three families: the paradigm approach, the 
advocacy coalition approach and the cognitive analysis of public policy approach
12
. This division 
comes from the fact that these three families define the role and the power of ideas in the policy 
                                                 
12
 Stephane Nahrat provides an accurate and relevant comparison of the three main branches of the ideas-
focused approaches in policy research (Nahrath 1999). 
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process differently. They also refer to different core concepts and they do not identify the same 
drivers to policy stability and policy change. Table 1 summarizes the core elements of each of the 
three approaches. These elements are further discussed and elaborated below, with the objective 
of differentiating these approaches and demonstrating the utility of the cognitive analysis 
approach to address the puzzling Canadian airport case. 
Table 1. Analytical Summary of the Ideas-focused Approaches. 
Approach Paradigm Advocacy coalition  
 
Referential 
Core concepts Scientific theories, set 
of ideas, paradigms 
Ideology, belief 
systems 




Role of ideas One set of variables 
among other, ideas 
are distinct from 
actors’ interests and 
do not intervene in 
their definition 
Beliefs contribute to 




from the collective 
identity of actors and 
from collective and 
individual interests: 
ideas essential to 
maintain cohesion 
 
Policy process Ideas exercise a real 
direct and specific 
power on actors 
Actors sharing the 
same set of beliefs 
compete to influence 
the decision-making 
process and impose 
their policy goals 
 
Ideas (or referential) 
contribute to the 
coherence-building 
within and between 
policy sectors 
Policy change Accumulation 
scientific and political 
factors under the form 
of enduring anomalies  
Major change in the 
policy core aspects of 
a policy subsystem 
(and minor policy 
change as a change in 
the secondary aspects 
of a policy subsystem) 
 
Dissonance between 
the norms, values and 
algorithms of a policy 






1. Ideas-Focused Approaches: Hall and Sabatier  
1.1. The Paradigm Approach 
The first ideas-focused approach is the paradigm approach. It is grounded in Thomas Kuhn’s 
analysis of scientific revolutions which were understood as a period of change in the social 
construction of the scientific reality (Kuhn 1972). It is most notably with Peter Hall’s works that 
this perspective has been used in the field of policy analysis (Hall 1989; Hall 1993). Hall’s point 
of departure is that the policy process is determined by the institutional setting, which shapes the 
configuration of interests and ideas. It thus distinguishes between three distinct sets of variables: 
the ideas, the interests, and the institutions. In this perspective, actors’ ideas are distinct from 
actors’ interests and do not intervene in their definition (Nahrath 1999, 48). Hall’s main 
contribution consists in demonstrating that ideas, which take the form of scientific and policy 
paradigms, exercise a direct power of persuasion on actors and can lead to policy changes. Such 
changes depend on the degree of legitimacy actors recognize to the action of the state. The author 
then categorizes three orders of policy change. A first-order change is very small: technical 
learning by civil servants and specialists leads to a marginal change in the instrument settings of 
policy. A second-order change is slightly more important, but is still incremental: societal 
learning can lead to changing the strategies of a specific policy that are pursued to attain 
objectives that remain more or less unchanged. A third-order change is a general paradigm shift 
resulting from a crisis or an anomaly (for instance the incapacity of Keynesian economic policy 
to solve the economic crisis in the United Kingdom in the 1970s, which resulted in replacing this 
policy by neo-liberal economic policies) (Hall 1989; Hall 1993).  
 Such an approach is focused on analyzing either periods of radical changes, where there is 
an accumulation of anomalies and in the expected results of a policy as well as new scientific and 
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political factors that participate in the formulation of a competing paradigm, or to analyze minor 
policy changes resulting from the first or second order of change. Ultimately, the specific power 
of ideas lies in the their capacity to persuade (Nahrath 1999, 49). While this approach has found 
significant success in the field of policy analysis, it would not be effective in explaining the 
dynamics behind Canada’s airport policy. For instance, the content of the instruments used to 
regulate the sector is controversial. The rents paid by airport operators (taxation-type instrument) 
are accused of impeding the development and the competitiveness of Canada’s airports and air 
carriers. The granting of traffic rights (soft law-type instrument) is accused of being partial and 
impeding the development of their airports of Vancouver and Calgary and their communities. 
The cost and administration of airport security and screening services and its funding through 
charges (again, taxation-type instrument) is accused of undermining the sustainability of 
Canadian air transport. In a paradigmatic approach, a first-order or a second order change would 
be anticipated. But such change of instrument settings has not occurred.  
Furthermore, Hall assimilates ideas to economic theories, and these ideas are formulated 
and put forward by “intellectuals” (for instance academics or journalists) who create an external 
market of ideas: ideas are only a set of variable among others and are clearly distinct from actors’ 
interests (Hall 1992). Hall does not therefore attribute a lot of importance to beliefs and values in 
explaining the logic of actors’ actions” (Braun and Busch 1999, 48). Such a stance is neglecting 
the role of sectoral actors’ beliefs and values whose origin can be traced within the sector. It is 
indeed imperious to take into consideration the ideas that are from within the sectors and analyze 
how they contribute to paradigmatic ideas in order to offer a comprehensive analysis. Such a 
stance is also neglecting the fact that ideas can be an intrinsic component of the collective 
(sectoral) identities of key actors that shapes and frames the definition of individual and sectoral 
interests. In the issues at stake, sectoral actors have – and share – their own ideas of what their 
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sector should be that come from their own understanding of their sector in relation to other 
sectors and a more global ‘paradigm’. In addition, the change in paradigm (from statism to 
market-based solutions) has not led to a complete change of policies in this direction. 
1.2. The Advocacy Coalition Approach 
The advocacy coalition framework (ACF) approach is based in Simon’s bounded rationality 
theory, which argues that actors’ decisions are based on heuristics rather than rational behavior 
because they have limited resources and information (Simon 1997). While the paradigm approach 
reduces ideas to economic policies, the ACF conceptualizes ideas in terms of belief systems. 
Belief systems are the primary heuristic on which individuals rely for political decision-making. 
The central elements of these belief systems are the deep core beliefs of actors, which are 
fundamental to them and often inherited from their early socialization. Such deep core beliefs are 
difficult to change. Other elements are the policy core beliefs, which are resistant to change but 
more malleable than deep core beliefs. They are usually limited in scope, and they are the basis of 
advocacy coalitions, which gather actors who share the same policy core beliefs. Finally, the 
secondary beliefs are much narrower in scope and the most likely to change overtime because of 
social learning, new experiences and new information (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999).  
 The ACF conceptualizes the policy process in terms of policy subsystems, composed by 
actors being concerned by the same policy problem. Actors sharing the same policy core beliefs 
are grouped in advocacy coalitions which compete for the capacity to influence the policymaking 
process and impose their policy goals. It is thus capable of explaining complicated issues 
involving conflicts over policy objectives and between actors from different levels of 
governments (Sabatier 2006).  
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 In line with theoretical expectations developed by the ACF, the case studies demonstrate 
that all key actors of the Canadian airport and air transport sector share the same core beliefs, 
including government actors. However, contrary to the expectations of the ACF model, key 
actors have been unable to influence the airport policy-making process. Under the ACF, the 
Canadian airport sector represents the policy subsystem and its actors (airports and airlines senior 
managers as well as representative organizations) compose the advocacy coalition. Furthermore, 
in line with the ACF, there is a favorable environment to facilitate policy change (as 
demonstrated later there have been a number of lawmakers favorable to the orientations and that 
conjectural events such as changes in governments or the 9/11 attacks could have opened a 
window to advance the cause at stake). Despite the presence of these potent variables that should 
have led, over a decade, to a change in Canada’s airport policy, nothing has happened. A 
potential reason behind this disconnect between expectations and outcomes may originate from 
the fact that the ACF is rooted in the American pluralism and the organization of interests in the 
United States. This leads to the same weakness that is found in other American approaches that 
share the same pluralist stance (e.g. the punctuated equilibrium theory). Such pluralism is less 
evident in Canada, where centralized and majoritarian structures of power within the national 
government frustrate the territorial pluralism (Smiley 1987, 59–60): while federalism in Canada 
was supposed to accommodate the plurality of regional interests in Canada, the majoritarian 
dispositions of the Westminster model of parliamentary government has had an opposed effect. 
2. The Cognitive Analysis of Public Policy: Theory and Concepts 
This section first describes the theory and core concepts associated with the cognitive analysis of 
public policy. It then gives concrete illustration of the cognitive analysis drawn from the literature 
employing this analytical framework. 
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2.1. The Cognitive Analysis of Public Policy: Theory and Core 
Concepts. 
The third ideas-focused approach is the cognitive analysis of public policy. It is grounded on 
Nizard’s neo-Marxist works on the establishment of norms that ensure the coherence of the 
different sectors in increasing fragmented societies and public policies (Nizard 1975). In such 
perspective, ideas are non-dissociable from the definition of actor’s individual and collective 
interests. Bruno Jobert and Pierre Muller developed the cognitive analysis of public policy 
approach, in L’État en action (Jobert and Muller 1987). They define cognition as being the 
process through which ideas frame actors’ individual and collective perception of the world. 
Ideas are essential to maintain cohesion within and among the sectors of a polity. Public policies 
are then used both to interpret reality and to define normative actions congruent with this 
interpretation of the reality, thereby ensuring cohesion between different sectors and different 
fragments of a society. Public policies are thus the concrete way actors make sense of the world 
they live in, because they allow actors to draw causal interpretations (“if the reality is this way, it 
is because of such and such”) and normative interpretations (“to change such aspect of the reality, 
it is necessary to do so and so”). (Muller 2000, 194–195; Knoepfel et al. 2011, 290–291; Gouin 
and Harguindéguy 2012).  
The notion of “referential” is at the core of the cognitive analysis. A referential is both a 
cognitive process that limits the complexity of reality and a normative process that permits one to 
act on this reality. For instance, a “market referential” would allow actors to interpret the world 
based on its congruence with market mechanisms and philosophy (e.g. user-pay for public 
services, liberalization of commerce) and to formulate actions that will ensure such congruence 
(e.g. such industry has not been liberalized, it should be done in order to improve its efficiency). 
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In this perspective, actors formulate and apply sectoral frameworks (sectoral referential) to 
specific sectors that are congruent with the global referential, and thus congruent with actors’ 
interpretation and perception of the reality. It is of paramount importance to note that the notion 
of referential should not be confused with the concept of frame as developed by the frame theory. 
The latter has been developed with the objective of evaluating the production of new 
representations within new frames: “frame theory is rooted in linguistic studies of interaction and 
points to the way that shared assumptions and meaning shape the interpretations of a particular 
event” (Oliver and Johnston 2000, 37). If the cognitive analysis also studies shared assumptions 
and representations that are used to make sense of the sectoral and the global realities, it also 
provides tools for analyzing the meaning of the referentials themselves and the ideas that support 
them. Conversely, the frame theory does not focus on the stage of frame emergence per se and 
does not give an account of ideas beyond linguistic studies (Entman 1993). 
In a cognitive analysis of public policy perspective, a referential is a cognitive image 
created by actors through which they perceive problems as well as solutions. It is a “structure of 
sense” which articulates four analytical levels of perception (Nahrath 1999, 43–44; Muller 2007, 
62–63): 
- The values are the most general and fundamental aspects that structure public action, 
and it is through values that actors define what is desirable or not for their sector or a 
society as a whole. For instance, a value of the market referential would be the notion 
of free enterprise, and thus if a firm finds itself into bankruptcy, actors would not 
even think about the possibility of transforming it into a Crown corporation to rescue 
it. 
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- The norms represent the difference between how actors perceive the reality and what 
they think the reality should be: norms are thus explicitly acknowledged principles of 
actions that are compatible with the dominant values. 
- The algorithms are the elements that constitute a causal relation between a perceived 
problem and a solution to fix it congruently with the norms and values of a 
referential. For instance, algorithms in a market referential would be: “for an 
enterprise to avoid bankruptcy, it must be able to compete freely, and therefore 
barriers to trade should be reduced”. Another algorithm would be: “for an enterprise 
to avoid bankruptcy, it must control its costs, and therefore wages should be adjusted 
according to the broader economic context”  
- The images are the cognitive shortcuts that carry meanings and ideas, as well as 
values, norms and algorithms of a referential: they are a concentrated definition of a 
situation. For instance, images of a market referential would be dynamic enterprises, 
economic prosperity, etc.  
In practice, a symbolic dimension colors the values, norms, algorithms and above all the 
images, a dimension that can be decoded and interpreted to give coherence to, and legitimize, 
policy approaches. Policy stability occurs when the four elements are in line with each other and 
with the referential. Actors feel that the policy is legitimate and appropriate because it is in line 
with individual and collective expectations. If an element becomes contentious, or dissonant with 
the others, then it is more difficult for actors to have a sense of what the policy should be, 
resulting in policy instability. Indeed, actors may not have the same understanding of dissonant 
elements. Actors will solve this cognitive dissonance by reframing the policy and its four levels 
in order to make the whole referential coherent and consonant again. A referential operates at two 
levels (global and sectoral) and they each require their own analysis. The global referential is a 
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general representation around which all sectoral representations will be defined and aligned with. 
The global referential is constituted by the fundamental values, norms, algorithms and images of 
a society. For instance, the current global referential can be defined in terms of liberalism, free 
markets and globalization. On the other hand, a sectoral referential applies only to a sector, a 
subsystem, a specific area, etc. The sectoral referential defines the sector, its boundaries, its 
internal coherence as well as its coherence with the global referential. It is when the sectoral 
referential and its specific norms, values, algorithms and images are consistent with norms, 
values, algorithms and images of the global referential that sectoral policy stability is achieved 
(Muller and Surel 1998; Nahrath 2010; Gouin and Harguindéguy 2012).  
Theorists of the cognitive analysis identified a limited succession of stable global 
referentials since the beginning of the 20th century (Muller 1984; Faure, Pollet, and Warin 1995; 
Paulhiac and Kaufmann 2006; Daune-Richard 1999; Marques and Moal 2014). First, a referential 
of equilibrium characterized the first part of the 20th century, during which sectoral policies 
aimed at maintaining the social world (with the protection of domestic markets for example). 
Then, from the 1940s to the late 1970s/early 1980s, it is argued that a global referential of 
modernization structured the understanding of the role of the state in the social world: this global 
referential was grounded in the idea of modernizing the industrial productive apparatus to 
strengthen the economy in a Keynesian perspective
13
. Sectoral policies were elaborated and 
implemented in order to conform to the general ideas carried by this global referential, where the 
                                                 
13
 While Hall would explain the emergence of a Keynesian referential by the level of economic, 
administrative and political viability of Keynesian economic policy, Muller and the cognitivists would 
rather emphasize Keynesianism as a social construction of the understanding of the social world by key 
actors, which would inevitably lead to the adoption of Keynesian economic policy for all sectors of the 
society. 
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market forces were conceived as being a constraint among other more significant coercive forces, 
such as technological or industrial constraints. 
 The third global referential emerged in the early 1980s, with a new system of norms and 
values that were an increasingly apparent rupture with the referential of modernization. The new 
system of norms and values was centered on the norm of market and is congruent with what 
authors of the cognitive analysis of public policy would call the ‘neo-liberal turn’ (Jobert 1994; 
A. Smith 1999; Surel 2000a; Braun and Busch 1999). The change of referential did not occur in 
one night, but it is apparent that this period signals the emergence of a new global referential: the 
market referential. This led to a progressive change in the perception of the legitimate modes of 
public action: recognition of the role of the private sector and diminution of administrative and 
tax burden imposed on it; diminution of the scope of industrial policies; introduction of private-
sector logics and practices into the public service; reduction of weight of the state and of its place 
in the economy (privatization of public enterprises, modernization of the public service, etc.) 
(Muller 1992, 282–284). 
The articulation between the global referential and sectoral referentials (what Muller calls 
the “global/sectoral report”) sheds light on a significant difference with the paradigm approach. 
Changes and adjustments in the paradigm perspective are caused by social learning and 
experimental investigations. Hall defines learning as a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or 
techniques of policy in response to past experiences and new information. Learning is indicated 
when policy changes as the result of such a process (Hall 1993, 278). There is thus a dialectical 
relation between the ideas and the institutions and interests that can be distinguished. Changes in 
the cognitive analysis perspective are conceptualized in a radically different way: policy changes 
‘must’ happen when there is a dissonance between the sectoral and the global referentials. This 
dissonance is understood as an overall discrepancy between the global and the sectoral 
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referentials that makes actors unable to make sense of the reality. The dissonance appears 
intolerable to actors because “the referential that structures the meaning of the policy and the 
behavior of the actors involved no longer allow them to understand their connection to the world 
and to act on it: reality becomes deprived of meaning” (Draelants and Maroy 2007, 15).  
 The focus of the cognitive analysis of public policy is less on the emergence of a 
global referential, which is not currently contested, but rather on the impact of the global 
referential on sectoral policies and sectoral referential and on social interactions as a key variable 
in explaining the diffusion of a given ideological vision of society into the policy community. 
This impact is analyzed  with the notion of “global/sectoral report”. In each policy sector, the 
mediators are those actors who elaborate the sectoral referential of a policy through a double-
movement: (1) mediators decode and translate the role of their sector in the global referential to 
make it understandable for all actors of the sector; and (2) mediators also produce norms by 
recoding the “global/sectoral report” through the organization into a hierarchy of its norms, and 
through the definitions of policy intervention to adapt the features of the sector to the norms of 
the global referential
14
. Mediators can therefore represent a broad range of actors, from elected 
officials to public servants, academics, experts, industry leaders, etc.
15
 This can be visually 
represented by figure 2 below with an illustration from Canada’s air transport sector (a generic 
                                                 
14
 In Muller’s words: “Le rôle des médiateurs consiste donc en deux opérations combinées qu’il est 
possible de dissocier par l’analyse, mais pas dans la réalité : les médiateurs décodent le monde, le rendent 
intelligible, lui donnent du sens ; puis ils le « recodent », ils définissent des objectifs et des actions 
destinés à accélérer cette transformation du monde qui est présentées comme inéluctable. (…) L’exemple 
des politiques de dérégulation est tout à fait parlant à cet égard. Dire aujourd’hui « Air Inter doit s’adapter 
à la concurrence parce que le monde a changé et que l’arrivée de nouveaux concurrents est inéluctable » 
cela revient à la fois à produire un effet de connaissance (on met en évidence une relation causale d’autant 
plus forte qu’elle est « évidente ») et à définir une norme stratégique de comportement.” (Faure, Pollet, 
and Warin 1995, 164). 
15
 The next chapter will identify three sets of mediators in the Canadian airport referential, either elected 
officials or academics and experts).  
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and exhaustive illustration is also provided in Annex D). Chapter 3 presents a detailed accounts 
of the Canadian sectoral referential for air transport. 
  
Figure 2. The cognitive analysis of public policy 
 
Source: Rapport global-sectoriel selon l’approche des référentiels de politiques publiques (Nahrath 2010, 
17) 
It should finally be noted that the cognitive analysis of public policy analyzes the 
“interpretation” of the values, norms, algorithms and images by actors, but it should not be 
assimilated to the interpretive approaches to policy analysis
16
. Interpretive approaches focus on 
                                                 
16
 Translation issues between French (the language in which the cognitive analysis of public policy was 
developed) and English (the dominant language for publishing policy research) also probably explain part 
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meaning-making processes (rather than on the policy-making processes) in a phenomenological 
perspective: much attention is dedicated to language and to non-verbal communication. 
Interpretive policy analysis methods are both participant-observer ethnographic methods and 
textual/language focused methods (Yanow 2000; Yanow 2007). If one of the objectives of 
interpretive approaches is the comprehension of verbal and non-verbal expressions of beliefs and 
intents and the identification of the meaning at stakes, the cognitive analysis rather focuses on the 
comprehension of policy change processes in relation to the organization of the sectors they 
regulate. While the former analyzes micro and macro discourses, the latter rather focuses on the 
meso level. In terms of methodological implications, interpretive approaches are oriented towards 
interviews, observations and ethnographies, often with a perspective of analyzing public policy to 
facilitate deliberative practices, while the cognitive analysis of public policy is rather based on 
semi-directive interviews in a record-keeping perspective (Rumpala 2008, 35).  
 
2.2. The Cognitive Analysis of Public Policy: Illustrations 
Bourque and Leruste provides a good illustration of the dynamics of the cognitive analysis of 
public policies and global/sectoral report though the case of health policy in Quebec (Bourque 
and Leruste 2010). After associating the health public regime to the referential of modernization, 
they demonstrate that the recent evolutions in the Quebec health regime results from the works of 
mediators who have been able to formulate policy recommendations aimed at adapting the 
Quebec health regime to a global, market-oriented referential. The system appeared to be 
dysfunctional, and the formulation of market-oriented logics and dynamics for the health sector 
                                                                                                                                                              
of the possible confusion between the interpretation of norms and algorithms and the interpretive 
approaches. 
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has aimed at adjusting to a new global market reality. Bourque and Leruste highlight how some 
groups (CIRANO research group, Arpin-Rochon report, Castonguay working group) have been 
able to make sense of the market-oriented global referential, its norms, its values, its images, in 
order to prescribe a new health policy whose norms, values and images are congruent with the 
global referential. They proposed to policy-makers new solutions that are both congruent with a 
new market-oriented logic and seen as able to solve all the issues of the public health policy. 
With respect to the analytical values of the sectoral health referential, they identify as a value 
“collective and individual risks”, as a norm “efficiency” and “responsibility” and as algorithms 
the following elements that will make the system more efficient and more affordable: 
“reorganization the management and delivery of health care”, “private insurance”. 
 Another illustration is provided in Bernatchez’s study on the academic research sector 
(Bernatchez 2010). Bernatchez gives an account of the emergence and strengthening of a new 
sectoral referential for academic research in Quebec and in Canada, which is labelled as 
“commercial valorization of university research”. He analyzes a parallel formulation of the 
parameters at the Quebec and federal level at the same time by different groups of mediators 
during the 1990s, which all defined similar values (economic prosperity), norms (the U.S. model 
of research funding and private partnerships) and algorithms (which relate to innovation and the 
university-government-enterprise “triple helix”). The “commercial valorization of university 
research” sectoral referential is clearly articulated and in line with a global, market-oriented 
referential, while the vast majority of the sectoral referential stakeholders adhere to its sectoral 
norms, values, and algorithms. 
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C. Explaining Conflicts between Actors who Share the same 
Representations, or the Contribution to Knowledge of this Dissertation 
This dissertation seeks to understand the dynamics of long-lasting conflicts between key policy 
actors of a sector who share the same understanding of the core elements of the global referential 
and share the same core representations about their sector. Giving an account of such situations 
has been a challenge for ideas-focused approaches of public policy. 
 
1. Persistent Conflicts within an Unchallenged Referential: A Challenge 
The cognitive analysis of public policy gives a partial explanation for the persistence of conflicts 
within unchallenged referentials. Indeed, Muller argues that different interests referring to 
incommensurable logics of action can be in confrontation in the public space (e.g. protect the 
provision of service in remote communities vs. opening the provision of public services to 
competition), leading to a situation of “hyperchoice”. This notion of “hyperchoice” means that 
the different options in confrontation do not belong to the same structure of sense. It is the global 
referential that is the structure of sense in which “hyperchoices” are overcome and through which 
shared values, norms, and algorithms are framed, thus producing a collective cognitive and 
normative frame of action (Muller 2005, 162). This constitutes a fundamentally different 
conception of conflicts as compared with Hall’s paradigm approach. The paradigm approach 
allows for conflicts between the supporters of competing paradigms in the case of policy failures 
that precipitate a shift in the locus of authority over policy (Hall 1993), which means that 
momentous conflicts would arise after first and second order changes. In a cognitive analysis of 
public policy perspective, the escalation would be reversed and be caused by a dissonance with 
the global referential. The fact that it is the global referential that is the structure of sense in 
which “hyperchoices” are overcome means that long-lasting conflicts among key stakeholders of 
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a policy sector should not occur or persist if there is an adjustment between the sectoral 
referential and the global referential. Disagreements, tensions, and conflicts among the elites of 
the policymakers and practitioners are to be solved by a change of referential at the sectoral level, 
with a new referential able to reconcile contradictory imperatives (Jobert 1992, 223–224).  
Neither the cognitive analysis of public policy nor other ideas-focused approaches have 
been able to explain the persistence of conflicts among key actors of a sector in the absence of 
policy changes. For instance, Muller argues that if it is possible that key actors argue about the 
values of a sectoral referential, the conflicts would be quickly resolved by a common 
reinterpretation of the sectoral referential (Muller 2007, 64–65). In the same way, Surel argues 
that sectoral referentials have an identity dimension. Actors identify themselves through the 
referential and share the same representations because they have the same understanding of the 
parameters of the referential (on which their social positions and collective identity are 
grounded), and therefore intense conflicts between actors would necessarily have to lead to 
redefining the sectoral referential (Surel 2000b). For instance, empirical illustrations of this 
phenomenon can be found in Charlier and Sall’s study of Senegal, where the religion sector was 
reformulated in order to integrate nationalist claims along with a more liberal vision of the links 
between religion and society (Charlier and Sall 2008). 
Nonetheless, this conception of sectoral referentials as structuring identities as well as 
solutions to problems, meaning that long-lasting conflicts would be either avoided or as a last 
option solved through a change of referential, was criticized in the literature. For instance by 
Chevalier, who identifies this as a weakness of the model, but does not propose to amend the 
theoretical model in order to overcome this weakness (Chevalier 2008). 
The empirical field of this dissertation is constituted by a double puzzle which highlights 
the weakness of the cognitive analysis of public policy: first, the presence of conflicts despite 
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agreements on global and sectoral referentials; and second, the absence of major reforms despite 
the presence of conflicts. The Canadian airport sector illustrates this double-puzzle, as long-
lasting conflicts among key actors of the policy sector have occurred without leading to any 
important policy changes or reorientations. These tensions have mainly arisen around the issues 
of airport costs and rents, access to infrastructure, and the cost and administration of airport 
security, creating long-lasting conflicts over a limited number of very specific elements of the 
sectoral policy. The conflict is thus not about the global referential nor the sectoral referential, but 
about some aspects of sectoral policies that are shaped by how actors make sense of these 
referentials. There is not a single “site of conflict” that can be identified, but rather several 
elements that crystallize tensions and conflicts among and within actors (industry actors vs. 
government, and within industry actors airports vs. airlines, and within airlines flag carrier vs. 
foreign airlines, etc.). The cognitive analysis of public policy as it stands cannot make sense of 
such highly complex and long-lasting conflicts. 
Other ideas-focused approaches are facing the same weakness in explain long-term 
persistent conflicts among key policy actors in the absence of policy changes or policy 
adjustments. For instance, the advocacy coalition framework explains the emergence and 
persistence of value-conflicts because stakeholders are motivated to convert their beliefs into 
policy: the impediment to conflict resolution then lies in the diverging values of key actors 
(Weible 2007). Nevertheless, the ACF has not developed any tools to analyze conflicts among 
key actors who share the same core values. As regards the paradigm approach, it allows for 
conflicts between the supporters of competing paradigms in the case of policy failures that 
precipitate a shift in the locus of authority over policy (Hall 1993). But like the advocacy 
coalition framework model, it does not explain long-lasting conflicts between the tenants of the 
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same paradigm, for instance long-lasting conflicts over first order or second order parameters, 
especially when the paradigm is not even challenged. 
2. Contributing to Knowledge: Explaining Persistent Conflicts within an 
Unchallenged Referential 
By analyzing three cases of long-lasting conflicts between key actors of the Canadian airport 
sector, this dissertation proposes to improve the cognitive analysis of public policy as formulated 
by Muller and Jobert with a renewed focus on the notion of algorithm. Indeed, some 
contributions to the literature have already highlighted that misunderstandings can occur among 
key policy actors regarding specific parameters of a referential. For instance, it was demonstrated 
that different “politically active cultures” can produce different interpretations of specific aspects 
of a sector, leading to policy arguments and disputes between key actors of a sector (Douglas and 
Ney 1998, 126–128). These disputes can even lead to real political struggles over the cognitive 
content of a policy and may engender deadlocks within specific policy sectors (Braun 1998 cited 
by Schiller 2008). In the Canadian case, a specific contribution suggested that among competing 
policy conceptions of a sector, one could dominate the other and be imposed upon all the 
members of a policy sector, thus producing a long-lasting crisis (Inwood 2005). 
 The contribution of a cognitive analysis of the Canadian airport policy with a specific and 
renewed focus on algorithm – a parameter that has not been central in previous cognitive analyses 
– is to demonstrate that key actors may share the same values, norms, and images, but they may 
subsequently draw different causal relationships between policy objectives and policy effects. In 
other words, actors are thus sharing the same core values and agree on the general principles of 
public action that ensue, and they all have the same vision of what their sector is and should be. 
Nevertheless, they may not agree on specific causal relations between public action and how their 
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sector should be. A specific contribution of the dissertation and a novelty in cognitive analysis 
studies is to examine the algorithm through the actual content of policy instrumentation. The 
content of policy instruments are the best entry to study algorithms, as this dissertation will 
demonstrate that it is not the instrument per se but rather its content which is misaligned with the 
algorithms of the referential. Lascoumes and Le Galès define a policy instrument as being “a 
device that is both technical and social, that organizes specific social relations between the state 
and those it is addressed to, according to the representations and meanings it carries. It is a 
particular type of institution, a technical device with the generic purpose of carrying a concrete 
concept of the politics/society relationship and sustained by a concept of regulation” (Lascoumes 
and Le Galès 2007). In a cognitive analysis of public policy perspective, it thus appears that an 
instrument is the empirical side of an algorithm, as both encompass a general representation with 
a specific regulation. 
If there are any persistent tensions or conflicts within a policy subsector (a situation that is 
unexpected by the core theoretical cognitive analysis literature), it is because there are several 
issues with the content of policy instruments. Instruments of public action, and more precisely the 
content of such instruments, are indeed the best point of entry to study the disagreements of some 
parameters of the referential. Disagreements in the objective of a policy often leads in a conflict 
over the content of the instruments intended to fulfill this policy’s objectives (Bradford 1999). 
Conflicts also arise from the growing role of an instrument (Bezes 2007). Policy instruments 
carrying strong representations and meaning can finally evolve and create a context of permanent 
conflict over legitimation (D. King 2007).  
Figure 3 synthesizes how the cognitive analysis of public policy would explain Canadian 
airport policy. All the elements that are not consistent with cognitive analysis theory or that 
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directly contradict its assumptions are circled. The figure presents the conceptual challenges this 
dissertation attempts to address and highlights the theoretical contributions it intends to make. 
 
Figure 3. Explaining Canadian airport policy: the challenges of the cognitive analysis, and 




Another important contribution of this dissertation is to further “Canadianize” the 
cognitive analysis of public policy as developed by Muller and Jobert. Indeed, the cognitive 
analysis of public policy has often been assimilated to the “French approach to policy studies” 
(A. Smith 1999; Hassenteufel and Smith 2002), and it is true that such an approach has mainly 
been used in a French or European context. In a French context, one can think of policy studies 
on administrative reforms (Bezes 2000), education (Morel 2002), or transport such as transport 
security (Reigner 2004), railway (Faure 2007) and airport (Villard 2011a). In Europe, one can 
think of the policy studies on aeronautics (Muller 1989), political integration (Surel 2000b), the 




scholars have also established on solid grounds the cognitive analysis of public policy in Canada, 
reviewing its most influential theoretical works (Jalbert 1988; Landry 1991; Villard 2009) and 
introducing its concepts in Canadian public policy textbooks (Lemieux 2002; Bernier, Paquin, 
and Lachapelle 2011). A certain number of Canadian policy studies are also based on this 
theoretical framework, for instance on Montreal’s internationalization policy (Plasse 1991), on 
children policies (Saint-Martin 2002), on cultural policies at the municipal level in Quebec 
(Béliveau-Paquin 2008), on social investment in Canada (Dufour et al. 2008), on labor policy in 
Canada (Bernstein et al. 2009), on health system privatization in Quebec (Bourque and Leruste 
2010) or on university research in Quebec and in Canada (Bernatchez 2010). Nonetheless, all 
these studies have in common that they simply apply the cognitive analysis of public policy to a 
Canadian setting, but they do not allow the specificities of the Canadian setting to feed the 
theoretical evolution of the model. Unlike France where the cognitive analysis was born, Canada 
has experienced a strong regionalism that has affected its policy-making (Banting 1987; Bakvis 
and Skogstad 2008) and makes a convergence between different interests complex (Boychuk 
1998; Ladner 2005): how these elements may feed the cognitive analysis model has not been 
considered by Canadian scholars. 
One of the contributions of this dissertation to the literature is to refocus the cognitive 
analysis of public policy in order to make the most of it for an analysis of a Canadian policy 
setting. The nature of the Canadian polity leads homogeneous actors (e.g. airport executives, be it 
in Montreal or Calgary) to share the same values, norms, and images, but to subsequently draw 
different causal relationships between policy objectives and policy effects. The tenants of the 
cognitive analysis did not anticipate such a situation. The refocus of the analysis around the 
notion of algorithm, as I propose to do in this dissertation, is an innovative way to give an 
account of the Canadian situation. It is an important contribution to the literature as it reshapes 
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the cognitive analysis in order to allow it to give accurate and relevant analyses of extra-French 
or extra-European situations. 
To conclude, for the purpose of this research, I will build on two sets of literature on 
public instrumentation. The first one deals with the reduction of the size of the state and the 
management of the hollow state (Howlett 2000), or regulatory state (Majone 1994; Majone 1997) 
through the development of new instruments. The research will trace the origin of airport reform 
in Canada in this movement, which appears to be the best fit to understand the implementation of 
new instruments in airport policy. A second perspective is the moderate social constructivist 
approach, which seeks to explain how policy tools shape a policy and organize relations among 
its stakeholders. Three theories of public instrumentation can be gathered under the label of social 
constructivism: a social constructionist approach (Schneider and Ingram 1990), a “constituitivist” 
approach (Linder and Peters 1989) and a sociological approach (Lascoumes and Le Galès 2005). 
Despite major differences, these approaches all focus on the target of a public instrument, 
including how the target is perceived by either the policymakers or by the elite of a policy sector, 
and how this explains both the choice of and the content of an instrument.  
3. Cases Selection and Methodology 
3.1. Cases Selection 
The Canadian airport sector appears ideal to study how key policy actors who agree on almost 
everything and have the same goals for their sector may still have specific disagreements that 
have led to long-lasting conflicts that appear unsolvable. The dissertation focuses on Canada’s 
major airport operators, namely Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver and Calgary. These cases are 
similar in the fact that they constitute the heart of airport activities in Canada: these airports are 
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the only Canadian hubs, they handle together more than 70% of the domestic and international air 
passengers travelling or transiting in Canada, pay more than 90% of the rent collected by the 
federal government, and collect more than 84% of aeronautical revenues accumulated by 
Canadian airport members of the National Airport System (Annex A refers). They are the only 
Canadian airports that are or have the capability to become global and regional hubs and to 
expand as aerotroplises (Annex B refers). The cases also present a certain degree of variance. 
Key airline actors vary from one airport to another. For instance, the largest airports are not the 
operational bases of the same carriers (Toronto is the hub of Air Canada and Calgary is the hub 
of WestJet) and do not attract the same type of international air traffic (transatlantic for central 
Canada airports, transpacific for Vancouver). Consequently, users differ and have different 
interests according to the platform they are operating (which does not mean this should result in 
sectoral conflicts). 
In conjunction with these airport cases, I will study the content of three instruments: the 
rent (taxation-type instrument) paid by these airport operators to the federal government, the 
access granted to these airports to foreign airlines (soft law-type instrument), and security charges 
collected on primary and secondary users of airports’ infrastructure (taxation-type instrument). 
These instruments’ content are in contention and reveal the tensions and conflicts engendered by 
the actors’ different understanding of how to enhance the growth of Canada’s most important 
airports. The content of regulatory instruments by the federal government remains extremely top-
down, it engenders several conflicts that seem to have no solutions and it impedes the four hub 
airport operators to grow their activities. Other instruments (such as municipal taxes, noise 
regulation, etc.) do not have the same financial and structural effect on the provision of airport 
services in Canada.  
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The cases of rent, access and security and the content of the related policy instruments 
represent a clear illustration of the symbiotic relation between a policy instrument and a sectoral 
referential’s algorithm. The case studies will show that what is at stake is much more than the 
simple settings of the instruments (e.g. the level of rent, the type of access, etc.): it is the 
representation carried by the content of the instrument and its meaning which are cognitively 
dissonant with the causal relationships carried by an algorithm. A study in terms of instrument 
settings would examine the content of instruments and the possible adjustments in terms of 
resources and or in terms of level of incentives and coercion (Hood 1986; Bemelmans-Videc, 
Rist, and Vedung 1998; Savas 2000), while the contribution of this dissertation is to closely 
associate the causal relationship induced by algorithms with the representations and empirical 
meaning of related policy instruments. In that perspective, the three cases represent a gradation, 
as the dissertation will demonstrate that there is a different degree of dissonance according the 
object of study. 
To conclude, the above-mentioned instruments are therefore the best entry to study the 
puzzling Canadian situation because the presence of conflicts has actual impacts on the airports 
and their user airlines to grow their businesses in a sustainable manner.  
3.2. Methodology 
The research setting took the form of a multiple-cases study. The rationale behind the choice of 
the cases is a theoretical sampling. Cases were selected according to the possibilities and 
potentialities to deploy the theoretical perspective (Eisenhardt 1989). More specifically, these 
cases provide a thorough explanation of the features of the Canadian civil aviation system in 
terms of instrument’s contents effects, actors’ representations and stakeholders relations and 
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conflicts; they encapsulate the key actors and the most important issues of this civil aviation 
system. 
I have conducted semi-directive interviews with key decision-makers of Canada’s airport 
sector, as conducting an interview remains the best way to capture elements, facts and data that 
cannot be directly observed (Patton 2002, 340). For the purpose of this dissertation, interviews 
are crucial for understanding the underlying nature of the conflicts since policy documents would 
likely share the same language as the sectoral referentials – making it difficult to trace conflicts 
and, more importantly, comprehend their origins. A purposeful sampling of actors (by which 
interviewees were selected because of their positions within their respective organization) 
informed the questions (Lincoln and Guba 1985). Access to the more exposed actors within each 
of these organizations was gained through this purposeful sampling
17
, which was then extended 
through the snowball technique: each interviewee was asked to recommend other actors who 
could best explain Canada’s airport policy and its impact in the four airport systems there were 
selected for the purpose of this dissertation. I proceeded to a thematic analysis of each interview 
Interviewees came from the airport sector, the airline sector, industry representative 
organizations as well as domestic and supranational regulators. As regards the four largest 
airports, I interviewed at least two senior executive managers in addition to senior executive 
managers of domestic airlines based at these airports and transborder and foreign airline 
representatives operating flights to these platforms. I also interviewed senior executive officers of 
the trade associations for the Canadian airports, the Canadian domestic airlines, and the 
international airline industry. This gave me the opportunity to have comprehensive coverage of 
key actors of the Canadian airport sector. It should be mentioned that no representative from the 
                                                 
17
 LinkedIn, the social networking website for people in professional occupations, also proved to be a very 
helpful resource for the identification of senior and middle managers in each of these organizations. 
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Calgary Airport Authority accepted to be interviewed, despite the guarantee of anonymity that 
was given to the respondents. Nevertheless, it was still possible to interview all the main users of 
the airport as well as the trade association representing the Calgary Airport Authority. 
I also interviewed several policy actors at the national and international levels. At the 
national level, interviews were conducted with several officials (including a ministerial aide) in 
charge of Canada’s airport policy at Transport Canada, but also at Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade Canada and at the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority. At the 
international level, interviews were conducted with senior officers of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization. 
In total, I conducted 50 semi-directive interviews in 2012, with 13 respondents from the 
airport industry, 20 respondents from the airline industry (both domestic and international), 14 
respondents from the regulation authorities and a few interviews with other key actors. The full 
list is available in Annex H.  
Interviews were semi structured: the interviewees were given the opportunity to describe 
as freely as possible their perception of Canada’s airport policy and the dynamics of the Canadian 
airport sector. Key questions regarding the role, the beneficiaries (in terms of organizations and 
activities) and the impact of the airport policy instruments, as well as the international trends in 
the airport industry, were asked. Actors’ words allowed me to deconstruct a monolithic and 
monopolistic airport policy into its various components, while giving empirical evidence 
supporting the analysis (Bongrand and Laborier 2005). Other material was also collected, 
including published documents (annual reports, government and agencies publications, etc.) and 
confidential material gathered in interaction with the interviewees. This collection of information 
from various sources gave me the opportunity to triangulate the data and to ensure the credibility 
and the reliability of the findings. 
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The analysis followed an inductive logic. A systematic comparison of data, classified 
according to the institution/organization where they were collected, permitted the gradual 
construction of categories. I identified the themes through which phenomenon are described, 
through the identification of a pattern of recognition within the data (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 
2006, 3–4). With regard to documents, I conducted a thematic analysis in which I looked for 
recurring themes that underline the characterization of the referential and how actors perceive and 
interpret it. These categories and their properties led to the identification of the core 
characteristics of the economic regulation framework and of the relationship system that 
surrounds it. Finally, theoretical concepts were integrated using a grounded theory strategy. The 
grounded theory approach not only refers to inductive theorization, but it also formally 
incorporates a succession of integrated steps (Patton 2002, 127–128). First, small units of data 
need to be isolated and systematically compared: in the case of this dissertation interviews 
excerpts were isolated according to the interview’s position in the airport system and to the topic 
discussed (e.g. costs, access, foreign airlines, etc.). Second, a system of categories describing the 
phenomena observed was gradually constructed (for each of our three cases, the gradual 
construction of categories progressively highlighted the algorithms). Third, as the categories were 
developed, data that was verifying these categories was sought, notably through additional 
analyses of the interviews and other materials in order to refine and verify the algorithms. This 
allowed the researcher to deeply and firmly root or ground the theorization around the concept of 
algorithms in the original empirical evidence (Langley 1999). After much iteration between the 
observations and the theorization, existing literature was used to deepen and strengthen the 
findings emerging from the inductive analysis. 
In order to increase the quality and the credibility of the research, a critical number of 
observations were reached, despite a limited number of cases to be studied. The combination of 
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the evidence of these numerous observations increased the leverage of this study (G. King, 
Keohane, and Verba 1994). This research has also adopted a critical epistemology in the sense of 
Guba and Lincoln (Guba and Lincoln 1994) and has relied on “trustworthiness criteria” (which 
are credibility, transferability, dependability, confirmability, and generalizability), that have been 
met through the triangulation of the sources, data and methods (Lincoln and Guba 1985, 301). 
The research also presents a certain degree of generalizability, due to the fact that the 
relationships among governments, airport operators and airlines are present throughout the world 
and are discussed in several countries and on the international stage through ICAO. 
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Chapter II: The Canadian Airport Sector: A Promising Field 




A –Identifying the Global Referential  
1. The Market-Oriented, Global Referential in Theory 
Muller and the tenants of the cognitive analysis approach showed that sectoral referentials have 
been gradually aligned with a market-oriented global referential. This market-oriented global 
referential has emerged in the 1980s. It is centered around market norms, such as the recognition 
of the role of the private sector and diminution of administrative and tax burden imposed on it, 
the diminution of the scope of industrial policies, the introduction of private-sector practices into 
the public service, and the reduction of the weight of the state and of its place in the economy 
(privatization of public enterprises, modernization of the public service, etc.) (Muller 1992, 282–
284). This market-oriented global referential influences the way key actors perceive both the 
reality and the policies that should be applied. The global referential cannot be simply assimilated 
to a corpus of neoliberal ideas. It rather articulates a vision of the economy (around the notions of 
free enterprise, competition, etc.) and a vision of the society (around the notions of liberty, 
responsibility and democracy). Such global referential is the core cognitive frame through which 
key actors make sense of the world they live in and through which they build sectoral policies for 
all economic and social sectors (Muller 2005). 
It is not the intent of this dissertation to gather evidence and demonstrate that the current 
global referential is a market-oriented referential. Such undertaking would bring this research too 
far from its objective, which is to explain why actors who share the same general vision of how 
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their sector should be structured are still in persistent disagreements over the policies that are 
supposed to implement this shared vision. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning a few elements 
that provide evidence of the existence of such referential. The notion of globalization has become 
the norm in analyzing many market-oriented policy changes that have occurred worldwide since 
the early 1980s and an impressive number of researches have empirically demonstrated a global 
shift towards market-oriented reforms. A new academic discipline has specifically studied the 
market-reorientation of policies and States’ actions worldwide: the new international political 
economy (Paquin 2005). Canada has been part of this paradigm shift like many other countries, 
its policies have been realigned according to market-oriented standards since the 1980s, and such 
policy changes have been undertaken both by Conservative and Liberal governments (Albo 2002; 
McBride 2005).  
2. A Specific Market-Orientation of Airport and Air Transport Policies 
Worldwide 
Globally, the air transport sector provides a clear illustration of the domination of a market-
oriented referential, which has shaped the cognitive and normative frames of interpretation of this 
sector in relation to other sectors and to global trends. The aforementioned “state-planning and 
control” era in air transport policy-making, in which most states retained control on fares, routes 
and market entry of commercial aviation and ownership of airports, air traffic control and most of 
national flag carriers
18
, has given way to an era of deregulation that has seen the emergence of a 
new competition between airlines, a change in the structure of airports in the civil aviation system 
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 The United States was one of the few exceptions to the public ownership of a national flag carrier. 
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(from a point-to-point to a hub-and-spoke organization) and a substantial growth in air traffic 
(Merlin 2002, 54–59). 
Following the deregulation and the liberalization of air transport at the global stage, 
almost all public-owned airlines in Western countries were privatized, such as Air Canada in 
Canada in 1988 (Monteiro and Robertson 2007), air carriers of the European Union 
(Scharpenseel 2001), or airlines in Eastern Europe and ex-USSR (Shibata 1994). In addition, a 
new generation of aviation financiers such as pension and mutual funds, private strategic 
investors, airlines themselves (by taking strategic equity interests in other airlines), private 
entrepreneurs, and conglomerates, took over airlines and have managed air carriers in a market-
oriented perspective (Carney and Dostaler 2006). Several open skies agreements have been 
signed, opening civil aviation markets to competition and liberalizing airfares. For example, 
Canada signed an Open Skies Agreement with the United States in 1995 to replace the previous 
Bilateral Agreement of 1966. Under the new agreements restrictions on air travel were removed, 
the Canada-U.S. fare approval process was liberalized, restrictions to code-sharing were 
eliminated, and Canadian carriers were included in the domestic “buy-sell” rules for slot 
allocation at congested US airports. As a result, the number of new services and of carriers 
serving more than one airport increased after 1995, resulting in an increase in the volume of 
passengers and a sharp increase in the volume and value of transborder air cargo (Monteiro, 
Krause, and Downs 2002).  
 With regard to airports specifically, there has been an undeniable trend of airport 
commercialization and/or privatization all over the world, well documented by several case 
studies conducted by ICAO (Villard and de la Camara 2011). Commercialization is the approach 
to management of facilities and services in which business principles are applied or emphasis is 
placed on development of commercial activities, while privatization refers to the transfer of full 
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or partial ownership of facilities and services from the public sector to the private sector (ICAO 
2012a, xii–xiv). Both approaches constitute a significant market-oriented move which are similar 
in nature but somehow different in degree (commercialization does not necessarily involve a 
change in ownership). Even ICAO, who sets global norms and standards for aviation, 
acknowledges the impressive movement of establishing autonomous entities (either public or 
private) to operate airports, and it further recommends that states adopt such a policy (ICAO 
2013a). In the most recent case studies on the commercialization of airports published by ICAO, 
all states of the 25-country sample commercialized their airports and, in most cases, this involved 
the participation of a private-sector partner (either as concessionaire, shareholder, etc.) (ICAO 
2013b). The privatization of airports started in 1987 with the decision of the Government of the 
United Kingdom to fully privatize the operator of London-Heathrow airport: the shares in the 
British Airport Authority (BAA plc) were offered for sale and the company has since been listed 
on the London Stock Exchange. In most European countries, major airports were partially 
privatized (Asia has followed a similar path), while major airports in Latin American countries 
were commercialized through their concessions to private consortia (Villard and de la Camara 
2012).  
To conclude, this movement towards airport commercialization and privatization is part of 
a greater movement of network industries
19
 privatization (Zembri 2005, 21–23; Finger and 
Varone 2006) and of air transport liberalization. There is thus evidence of a market-reorientation 
of air transport and airport activities and policies worldwide that is congruent with the global 
referential identified by Muller and the tenants of the cognitive analysis of public policy. 
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 Network industries are those industries in which a fixed infrastructure is required to deliver goods or 
services to end users, such as telephone or electricity cables and wires, railroads, and airport runways 
(OECD 2000, 151), whose privatization has been possible thanks to the implementation of new forms of 
economic regulation (Curien 1993; Currier 2008). 
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B –The Global Referential and the Canadian Air Transport Sector 
This section demonstrates that this global referential is applicable to the Canadian air transport 
sector. It highlights that the vision of the economy and the society carried by the global 
referential has influenced key Canadian policy actors, to the extent that they have reshaped 
Canada’s airport policy so that it would become market-oriented. In other words, it identifies a 
Canadian airport sectoral referential which is congruent with the global, market-oriented 
referential. 
1. Adjusting the Canadian Airport and Air Transport Sector to the Global 
Referential: Highlights from the Mediation Process  
The cognitive analysis of public policy body of literature posits that a sectoral referential is 
defined and redefined by key actors of a given sector. The “mediators” are the actors that have 
“the power and the intellectual resources allowing them to do this work of articulation between 
the ‘sectoral’ and the ‘global’ level and, therefore, to elaborate the definition of the [sectoral 
frame of reference]” (Nahrath 1999, 45). They have both the symbolic resources and the 
positions of power to decode, interpret and reformulate the sectoral frame of reference in order to 
adjust it to the global referential. The concept of mediator is thus different from the related 
concept of ‘advocacy coalition’ in which actors are pushing their own core ideas (Sabatier 2007, 
189), or from the concept of ‘epistemic community’ which relies on the notion of expertise (Haas 
1992). Mediators are rather the actors who decode the global referential in order to recode 
sectoral referentials accordingly: their role is broader than the role of an expert or of an advocate, 
since they are those who transform a socioeconomic reality in a policy program (Jobert 1992; 
Faure, Pollet, and Warin 1995; Muller 2000; Surel 2000a). Mediators in the sense of Muller and 
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Jobert therefore resemble Sabatier’s “policy broker” Kingdon’s entrepreneur, as these concepts 
refer to actors having their capacity to facilitate the integration a subsystem’s policy with global 
public sphere (Bouriaud and Bancu 2008). Mediators are actors that have the ability to decisively 
act at several levels at the same time (e.g. intellectual, advocacy, policy-making and expertise), 
either to change directly the course of a policy or exert a determining influence for change to 
happen. Mediators are those who interpret the world (cognitive and normative functions) as well 
as reduce the possible dissonance between the global and a sectoral referential.  
The next sections of this chapter will illustrate that in the case of Canada’s air transport 
sector, three mediators can be identified
20
. In each case, mediators felt that it was both necessary 
and ineluctable to give a new or reinforced market-oriented impulsion to Canada’s airport policy. 
This perception that change was ineluctable comes from the global referential through which 
actors perceive the reality and the actions they have to undertake in order to keep up with this 
reality. The following three subsections identify the mediators: former Transport Ministers Lloyd 
Axworthy and Doug Young as well as a group of scholars from the University of British 
Columbia.  
1.1. The Precursor: Lloyd Axworthy’s Redefinition of Canada’s 
Transportation Policy 
Lloyd Axworthy was the Minister of Transport from 1983-1984 in the Liberal government led by 
Pierre Elliot Trudeau. Many studies have underlined the momentous role played by Axworthy in 
redefining transport in Canada (Lazar 2000; Ellison 2002; Clancy 2004). It is acknowledged that 
a political initiative was needed at that time to boost the popularity of the incumbent government, 
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 Identification of the mediators was made through a systematic review of the literature (cf. infra). 
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and Lloyd Axworthy put forward a new agenda of transport liberalization, including air transport 
liberalization (Lazar 2000, 3). The idea to liberalize air transport came from Axworthy’s feeling 
that the heavy bureaucratic structure of the Ministry of Transport would have to change and adapt 
to a more “modern” era: Axworthy felt that it was the right time to change transport policy, and 
he also felt that such change would attract the vote of air travelers (Ellison 2002, 31–32). 
Axworthy was determined to put forward a new commercial and business orientation for air 
transport services provision as it felt that such a programme had to be done (Madar 2000, 137–
138). The minister had not only the political motive to change air transport policy, but he also 
possessed the resources and the symbolic position to empirically foster this change. The changes 
he implemented were symbolic (such as cancelling the complimentary airline passes held by 
certain Ministry of Transport and Air Transport Committee staff) but most of the policies he 
changed significantly impacted the development of air transport, for instance by constituting a 
task force to consider ways of adapting U.S.-style deregulation to Canada, by reviewing the 
airfare policy and by looking very favorably on any appeals by air carriers where applications for 
fare or route competition had been denied. It is interesting to note one of the conclusions of 
Clancy’s research on airline policies in Canada. Clancy mentions that “it was only after the 
appointment of a new transport minister, Lloyd Axworthy, that the paradigm began to shift
21
. 
[…] This constituted a de facto deregulation” (Clancy 2004, 213–214). This indicates not only 
the market-oriented nature of Axworthy’s reforms, but it also highlights that these reforms were a 
starting point toward a more systemic shift in air transport policies.  
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 Emphasis added. 
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1.2. Enrolling the Experts: The deregulatory Plea of the UBC School 
The UBC School and authors such as Dresner, Gillen, Heaver, Oum, Stanburry, Tretheway, or 
Waters are the second mediators. Muller defines a “group of mediation” as a group of actors who 
not only theorize a change and demonstrate that such change must happen, but who also push for 
such change in liaison with decision makers (Muller 2005, 185). Authors of the UBC School 
fulfill these two criteria. First, academics of the UBC School oriented their research on the 
benefits of a market-oriented air transport policy and pleaded for increasing competition, 
minimizing government spending and involvement, and deregulating the air transport sector and 
privatizing Air Canada. Their research implied a certain ineluctability on moving toward market-
oriented policies for air transport. Some titles of their publications demonstrate this ineluctability, 
for instance “Privatization of Air Canada: Why It Is Necessary in a Deregulated Environment” 
(Gillen, Oum, and Tretheway 1989) or, “Canada and the Changing Regime in International Air 
Transport” (Dresner and Tretheway 1992)22. 
 Second, authors of the UBC also pushed for a reorientation of air transport policies in 
Canada in liaison with decision makers. They directly fed the government of Canada with “ready-
to-implement” policies. The authors participated in several committees, commissions and 
hearings, and they wrote a high number of reports advocating market-oriented policies. Studies, 
accompanied with new policy orientations, were for instance submitted to the Treasury Board of 
Canada in 1985 (Gillen, Oum, and Tretheway 1985a), to Consumer and Corporate Affairs 
Canada in 1985 (Gillen, Oum, and Tretheway 1985b) and 1986 (Gillen, Oum, and Tretheway 
1986a), or to the Ministerial Airport Task Force in 1986 (Gillen, Oum, and Tretheway 1986b). 
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 A more exhaustive literature review of the UBC School publications appears in Chapter 1. 
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 The UBC School played a momentous mediation role. They linked the global referential 
to the Canadian air transport sector by demonstrating that Canada’s air transport policies had to 
change and to adapt to a new reality. They went on both academic and public forums to spread 
this message. Furthermore, they also framed a detailed policy program on how to change the 
sectoral air transport policies in order to adapt them, which fed the government of Canada’s 
actions. To conclude, it clearly appears that the UBC School was a key “mediation group” which 
decoded the global referential in order to recode the Canadian air transport sectoral referential. 
The mediation group demonstrated that a change must happen in order for the airport sector to 
‘make sense’ within a market-oriented global referential and put forward policy propositions that 
were felt as being indispensable. 
1.3. The Final Push: Doug Young and the Formulation of the NAP 
The third mediator is Doug Young, who was the first Minister of Transport of Jean Chrétien’s 
Cabinet. Despite his elected official status, Young was a true mediator able to act within two 
levels at the same time: the policy level and the business level. Young had a real “business sense” 
with experience in marketing and private law practice (DeMont and Fulton 1996). He was elected 
to the federal Parliament under the Liberal Party of Canada’s flag in 1993 and was categorized as 
a business (or a “hard-right”) Liberal who was fully committed to Prime Minister Jean Chrétien 
and Finance Minister Paul Martin’s budget-cutting agenda (Barlow and Campbell 1996, 120). 
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 For instance Michael Tretheway was appointed director of research of the Ministerial Task Force on 
International Air Policy 
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 Young was also in position to influence decisively the airport and air transport sector 
policies. Appointed Minister of Transport in 1993, he was one of the few ministers who had real 
control over the national agenda of his portfolio. The Liberal Red Book did not mention any 
promise related to air transport, giving Young the freedom to set his own agenda within the 
government fiscal conservatism frame (DeMont and Fulton 1996; Dobbin 2003, 176). 
 On one hand, Young inherited from the Conservative government of Brian Mulroney a 
situation where Air Canada was already privatized, the air transport sector was already 
deregulated and a few airports were already commercialized. He continued and accentuated this 
policy. All airports were commercialized under the National Airport System or divested to local 
and/or business communities. Further, air navigation services provision was granted to a private 
company incorporated in 1996 under the name of Nav Canada
24
. On the other hand, Young 
systematized the philosophical reorientation of Canada’s air transport sector by imposing the 
notion of “user-pay” to the provision of air transport services, be it airport or air navigation 
services. In particular, Young saw the commercialization of airport and the cut of any 
government funding as a way for airport users to get the services they wanted at a cost they 
would be ready to pay for, thus introducing an efficient offer-and-demand market logic in the 
provision of services and its cost-recovery through user charges. The “user-pay” model was seen 
as the best way to get higher quality and better services at a cost assumed solely by the users and 
not by the government which subsequently cut all funding to major airports and to Nav Canada. 
In his own words, Young explained in a landmark speech that
25
: 
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 No other countries went as far as Canada in the privatization of its ANSP, except Thailand for historical 
reasons, and more recently the United Kingdom through the establishment of a public-private partnership 
under NATS (ICAO 2013b). 
25
 The speech is available in French only. 
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Le Canada a besoin d’un réseau de transports que les utilisateurs 
et les contribuables peuvent se payer. Le Canada a besoin 
d’industries et d’entreprises de transport qui soient solides, 
viables et compétitives. […] Il nous faut un réseau où les besoins 
du client déterminent les points de repère, où l’on retrouve un 
juste équilibre entre l’utilisateur-payeur et l’utilisateur-qui-a-son-
mot-à-dire. Nous avons besoin d’un réseau où tous les modes 
couvrent leurs frais. Le Canada a besoin d’un réseau qui s’adapte 
aux changements, pas d’un réseau qui se réfugie dans son passé 
[…]. La commercialisation veut dire que les utilisateurs dictent 
les services qu’ils désirent et comment les coûts peuvent être 
contrôlés. La commercialisation veut dire que, peu importe 
l’option retenue, elle doit permettre aux forces du marché de 
vendre un service plus efficaces, plus souple, et moins dépendant 
de l’argent des contribuables (D. Young 1994, 6–7). 
 
 To sum up, among all actors and groups of actors who were influential in the Canadian 
airport and air transport sector in the 1980s and 1990s, three can be identified as “mediators” in 
the sense of Muller, because of their decisive role in reshaping and reframing Canada’s sectoral 
air transport policies and adjusting them to a market-oriented global referentials. Lloyd Axworthy 
played a pioneer role in shaping a new vision for air transport and eliminating symbols of 
government interventionism. The UBC School spread the idea that a market reorientation of 
airport and air transport policy in Canada was both necessary and ineluctable, and they fed the 
Mulroney Government with several policy proposals that were implemented. Finally, Doug 
Young systematized a business vision of “user-pay” throughout the whole air transportation 
system: user charges became the favorite mean to fund the provision of airport, air transport and 
air navigation services. 
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2. The Features of the Canadian Sectoral Air Transport Referential 
2.1. A Broad Reorientation of Airport and Air Transport Activities in 
Canada 
The actions of the three mediators were successful in giving a strong market-orientation to the 
Canadian airport sector. In addition to the policy moves undertaken by elected officials in the 
1980s and the 1990s, a closer look at the air transport sector in Canada clearly shows the spread 
of a market-oriented logic to all its branches and subsectors. 
 Besides the implementation of the NAP and the systemic commercialization of airports, 
real commodification of the provision of airport services occurred in the 1990’s, with Canada’s 
firms competing on the global market to provide such services. For example, ADC (Airport 
Development Corporation, based in Toronto) holds shares in airports in Ecuador and Costa Rica; 
the Caisse de Dépôt et Placement du Québec, jointly with Ferrovial, owns Airport Development 
& Investment (Holdings) Ltd, which is the investment vehicle set up to acquire the London-
Heathrow operator (it has shares in several other smaller airport operators); Aéroports de 
Montréal Capital Inc. (owned by Aéroports de Montréal) was a member of a consortium that 
oversaw the financing, construction and operation of the new terminal at Budapest Airport and 
also won the concession for the Vatry cargo airport in France as a member of the S.E.V.E. 
consortium
26; AECON Group, Canada’s largest publicly traded construction and infrastructure 
development company, owns 46% of Quito Consortium that builds and will operate the new 
Quito Airport; Quebec’s engineering champion SNC-Lavalin manages and operates a network of 
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 ADM decided in 2000 to focus on the management and the development of Montréal-Trudeau and 
Montréal-Mirabel airports. ADM International and ADM Capital are not pursuing new ventures, although 
they honour their existing contracts. 
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12 airports (such as Malta, Vatry, Tarbes-Lourdes, and Mayotte-Dzaoudzi); GTAA is a proposed 
partner for the BOT
27
 project of Lagos Airport, Nigeria; and finally YVRAS/Vantage, a for-profit 
subsidy of the Vancouver Airport Authority, currently operates 19 airports in seven countries on 
three continents and provides consulting services to clients worldwide (ACI 2011, 28–81). 
Second, new mechanisms were created to implement a “user-pay, user-say” philosophy in 
the sector. Such mechanisms were designed during the air navigation services provider (ANSP) 
privatization process. The Canadian ANSP was facing tremendous financial and organizational 
challenges that were impeding the safe and orderly development of air navigation in the late 
1980s and early 1990s (Kernaghan, Borins, and Marson 2005, 108; McDougall and Roberts 
2008, 49), and Doug Young decided to privatize it and to subject it to a user-pay model 
(McDougall 2004, 20). It was decided to implement a model of ‘shared governance’ through 
which stakeholders were invited to manage the structure of the not-for-profit ANSP corporation 
through direct participation to the Board of Directors. Among Nav Canada’s 15 Directors, 5 are 
appointed by aircraft operators represented by the Air Transport Association of Canada (ATAC), 
2 by the employee’s unions, 3 by the federal government, the remaining being co-opted (Aucoin 
2006, 117), thus creating a real ‘stakeholder board’ in which interested parties have to reach a 
significant level of agreement in order to govern the corporation (Poole and Butler 2002). With 
regard to user charges, charging principles are stated in the Air Navigation Services Act in very 
broad and general terms (such as ‘no discrimination among routes and carriers’) (A. Jones and 
Guthrie 2008, 28; Lovink 1999). Several comparative studies highlight the global move toward 
the commercial orientation of the provision of air navigation services while mentioning Nav 
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 Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT): “an ownership and management system by which a private entity 
obtains the right to finance, build and operate a certain facility (including land and/or buildings) over a 
long period, and on expiry of the right returns it to the owner” (ICAO 2012b, 29). 
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Canada as a worldwide reference with respect to its engagement with users (Curchod, Dumez, 
and Jeunemaître 2004; Lewis and Zolin 2004; A. Jones and Guthrie 2008). This shows the strong 
entrenchment of a market-oriented sectoral referential for air transport and its emphasis on a user-
pay philosophy.  
Another empirical element that demonstrates the presence of a market-oriented logic in all 
subsectors of air transport in Canada lies in the opening of Canadian skies through new bilateral 
air services agreements and Open Skies agreements. If Canada has not been at the forefront of the 
liberalization trend with respect to bilateral agreements (Janda, Flouris, and Oum 2005, 76), it 
signed Open Skies agreements with its two most significant international air markets: the United 
States in 1995, and the European Union in 2009. A number of Blue Sky and liberalized bilaterals 
have also been signed and/or have been being negotiated with a number of other countries 
(Monteiro and Robertson 2009, 71–72). Finally, a look at the statements surrounding airport and 
air transport policy change also indicates a real change of philosophy. An analysis of Canada’s 
Statement on National Transport Policy from its first inception in 1967 to today interestingly 
shows an evolution of the wording of the statement, which has been progressively rephrased in 
order to increasingly reflect the importance of competition and market forces (Waters 2006). 
To conclude, if the three mediators adjusted the broad policies as well as the philosophy 
underpinning airport and air transport activities in Canada, various actors within in all branches 
of the sector implemented numerous market-oriented changes and developments. It demonstrates 
that there has been a real alignment of airport and air transport activities in Canada with a global, 
market-oriented logic. The sectoral Canadian airport and air transport referential appears to be 
market-oriented, similarly to the global referential.  
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2.2. The Canadian Sectoral Referential for Air Transport 
Similarly to the global referential, sectoral referentials are defined by four parameters: the values, 
the norms, the algorithms and the images. These elements are the sectoral reflections of the same 
elements at the global level. A synthesis the role and deeds of the mediators, of the changes in the 
Canadian airport and air transport policies, and in the provision of airport services and facilities 
allows to define the parameters of the sectoral referential for Canada air transport. Such sectoral 
referential, which is coherent with the global, market-oriented referential, can be characterized as 
follows: 
- Values (the most general and fundamental aspect of the referential): market-
oriented, consumer-oriented provision of air transport services (including 
transportation, infrastructure, and navigation) sustained by a “user-pay” 
philosophy 
- Norms (principles of action): autonomy of air transport facilities and services 
providers through the privatization of air carriers and the privatization 
(commercialization) of airports, light-handed economic regulation, and opening of 
markets: airports are empowered to organize their own development. 
- Algorithms (causal relations): ‘If the provision of air transport services is market-
oriented and market-driven, than the sector will be efficient’; ‘If the air transport 
infrastructure are privatized/commercialized, it will be funded though user 
charges’, ‘Since airports and airlines are private entities, they enter into 
commercially-oriented relationships with no federal interference’; 
- Images (simplified/concentrated representations of the situation): the market of air 
transport, airports as aerotropolises. 
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The cognitive analysis of public policy gives an excellent account of the alignment of the 
Canadian sectoral referential for air transport with the global, market-oriented referential. 
Nevertheless, the theoretical framework is at fault when explaining the conflicts and tensions that 
have characterized the airport sector in Canada over the past decade.  
The introduction to this dissertation illustrated a paradox in airport policy: the federal 
government is using several instruments under its airport policy framework, and such uses of 
instruments have created enormous tensions among key actors of the airport sector. Can the 
cognitive analysis of public policy provide an explanation for these disputes that threaten the 
stability of the referential? The theoretical model as formulated by Muller and Jobert is 
disempowered to explain persistent specific disagreements between actors who nonetheless share 
the same cognitive representation of their sector. This dissertation proposes to overcome this 
disempowerment of the cognitive analysis by focusing on how actors understand the algorithms 
of their sectoral referential. 
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Chapter III: The Airport Ground Lease Rents and the User 
Charges at the Largest Canadian Airports 
In this chapter, I focus on airport Crown rent that the four largest airports are paying to the 
federal government and on the user charges for the provision of airport services at these facilities. 
These indeed provide a promising empirical field to ground the theoretical assumptions described 
in the introductory chapters. Indeed, the chapter shows that there have been momentous 
dissensions between key actors of the airport sector over the issue of rent and charges for the past 
20 years while there has been almost no policy change intended to ease theses dissension. If 
ideas-focused approaches do not give an appropriate theoretical account of such a situation, the 
cognitive analysis of public policy as developed by Muller and Jobert gives a set of analytical 
tools on which a meaningful empirical investigation can be established. 
 In order to ground the analysis, I will first give background information on the funding of 
airport services and on user charges in order to clearly identify the algorithm that relates to rent 
and charges in the Canadian sectoral airport referential. I demonstrate that all actors agree on the 
following algorithm: the “user-pay” model is the best for airport services funding and for 
ensuring the sustainability of the Canadian air transport sector. I subsequently link the 
dissensions over the rent and charges to the algorithm to highlight that the cognitive dissonance is 
grounded in a different understanding of what the algorithm means in terms of public policy 
instrumentation. I show that the content of the rent policy instrument by the government of 
Canada is puzzling in that it seems to hinder the ability of the four largest airport operators to 
grow their business, expand their activities and offer competitive operating costs to their users. It 
indicates a cognitive dissonance in the Canadian referential for air transport, highlighting the fact 
that some prominent actors within the referential do not interpret its algorithms in the same 
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manner. This leads to different interpretations of what Canada’s air transport policy should be. 
Subsequently, a policy change that would further align the sectoral referential with the global, 
market-oriented referential is not to be expected, but it is rather an adjustment in the policy 
instrumentation that will be able to solve the cognitive dissonance and ensure the stability of the 
Canadian sectoral referential.  
 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Part A gives background 
information on airport services funding before and after the emergence and the strengthening of 
the market-oriented sectoral referential for the Canadian airport sector; Part B analyzes the 
dissensions over the crown rent and demonstrates that it highlights the presence of a dissonance; 
Part C establishes the cognitive dissonance over the user-pay algorithm; and Part D concludes 
that such dissonance can be solved by a change in the public policy instrumentation that relates to 
rent and charges. 
A – The Impact of Canada’s Airport Policy on the Costs 
1. Airport Funding and Financing before the Change of Referential 
1.1. A Brief History of the Funding of Canadian Airports 
Historically, municipal governments developed aerodromes in Canada. In several cases the 
government of Canada took over control of airport fields during the Second World War. It 
subsequently decided to pay operating subsidies to cover a portion of the potential operating 
losses and it established an assistance policy for capital expenditure. A major change occurred in 
1972, when the Department of Transport took responsibility for developing, operating and 
maintaining national airports, including funding infrastructure and capital development. The 
government was the owner, the manager and the regulator of the airports of Toronto, Montreal, 
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Vancouver and Calgary (McGrath 1992, 19–20). As such, the federal government assumed the 
funding of Canada’s major airports for the greater part of the second half of the twentieth century, 
meaning that the taxpayer was directly paying for the development of the country’s airports. 
 Nevertheless, in addition to taxes, user charges levied at the airport level were also a 
source of revenue that funded the operations of Canada’s airports. As defined by the Council of 
ICAO, “a charge is a levy that is designed and applied specifically to recover the costs of 
providing facilities and services for civil aviation, while a tax is a levy that is designed to raise 
national or local government revenues, which are generally not applied to civil aviation in their 
entirety or on a cost-specific basis” (ICAO 2012c, vii). These aeronautical charges are generated 
by air traffic operations (e.g. landing charges, parking and hangar charges, security charges, etc.), 
but they were largely insufficient for covering both the operations and the development of 
Canada’s major airports: it was thus necessary to bridge the gap between revenues from user 
charges and airport expenses, and the federal government covered that gap through taxes and 
general appropriations to the Department of Transport. Consequently, government expenditures 
on aviation infrastructure were considerably in excess of the receipts collected from users 
(Waters 1977, 27). 
1.2. The Necessity of Change: Toward a “User-Pay” Model 
The change of referential highlighted in the introductory chapters was, in part, supported by the 
challenge of the funding for Canada’s airports. It was estimated that in 1989 the whole 
transportation system caused a net drain of $1.4 billion on the Treasury (Brooks and Prentice 
2001, 14). At that time, the mediation process led by the UBC School and then by Doug Young 
highlighted the general perception that public funding for air transport infrastructure was not a 
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sustainable solution, and that new market-oriented mechanisms should be implemented to 
provide funding for airport infrastructure and services. 
 Many academic contributions documented this perception in studying the chain of events 
that led to the policy change in the early 1990s. For example, an Airport Inquiry Commission was 
constituted in the early 1970s. It was in charge of reporting on a potential new airport in the 
Toronto area, and it concluded that new airport infrastructure needed to be self-funded and that 
the self-financing rule was to apply to the airport system as a whole (Waters 1977). Another 
example is the Task Force on Airport Management, which emphasized in the late 1970s the 
financial viability and local autonomy of the most important airports of the country, which would 
thus be able to fund their own development (Valo 2001, 27).  
Interestingly, if public bodies agreed on the necessity of change the funding and financing 
model, the idea was also supported by the airline industry. Research on air navigation services 
infrastructure demonstrates that representatives of the air transport chain were not only requesting 
a change in the funding and provision of services, but were also willing to pay for it. In the case 
of air navigation services (ANS), four distinct groups recommended that the Government study 
the commercialization of ANS in order to create an entity that would be financially self-
sufficient: the Canadian air carriers (through the Air Transport Association of Canada, ATAC); 
the Canadian commercial pilot association; the business aircraft association; and the air traffic 
controllers’ union28 (McDougall 2004, 14–15). Among the options29, all parties agreed on the 
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 The air traffic controllers’ union surprisingly supported the commercialization, because it felt that it 
would gain freedom from what was perceived as government restrictions on their bargaining rights. 
29
 Seven options were proposed. The four government-owned options were as follows: creation of a 
separate, commercial organization within Transport Canada (a special operating agency), contracting for 
the operation of the service (government-owned, company-operated), and two types of state-owned 
enterprises (appropriations-dependent and financially independent). The three privatized options were as 
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creation of a commercial entity which would collect revenues from user fees rather than 
depending on finance from taxes and general appropriations from government (McDougall 2004, 
19). The airlines using the Canadian air transport infrastructure agreed to use it on a user-pay 
basis and thus finance directly its operations and its development: in a market-driven perspective, 
clients agree to pay the price for the services they buy or use. 
This agreement on a user-pay mode of financing was achieved not only for ANS, but also 
for the provision of airport services. Indeed, a representative of the Canadian airline industry 
stated in an interview that: “ça relève de la philosophie du user-pay. Le réseau aérien, c’est du 
réseau qui devait s’autofinancer, par rapport à Via Rail par exemple, et par rapport aux routes qui 
sont financées par les contribuables, et pas par les usagers. Et au début, l’industrie était d’accord 
avec ça, car avec user-pay, il y a aussi user-say : l’usager paie, mais il a aussi un mot à dire.” 
Research also showed that airport personnel were on board with such a change (Heaver and Oum 
2000). In other words, a user-pay philosophy to support the airport system has been agreeable to 
all actors. 
1.3. The “User-Pay”: An Algorithm of the Canadian Frame of 
Reference 
The cognitive analysis of public policy postulates that a referential is constructed, supported and 
reinforced by four key elements. The algorithms are one of these key elements (cf. supra) and are 
the direct results of the mediation process. In his work on labor policy, Colomb further specifies 
                                                                                                                                                              
follows: mixed enterprise (some share in private company), non-share, not-for-profit, private corporation 
and a share-capital, for-profit, private company.  
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that an algorithm of a policy focuses on specific topics; it carries both a perception and a 
prescription onto a sector (Colomb 2007).  
 The “user-pay” model for funding Canada’s largest airports is an algorithm of the 
Canadian referential for air transport. It indeed focuses on a specific aspect, which is the 
financing of air transport infrastructure and the respective participation of users and public 
authorities. In addition, it carries a perception of and a policy prescription on the air transport 
sector. It identifies the stalemate of the previous policy (the funding), proposes a solution 
(involve the users) that will solve the stalemate (users pay to fund the system). Subsequently, the 
algorithms related to the “user-pay” model can be summarized by the following: 
- “Users have to pay for the provision of airport service: this will ensure the financial 
viability of airport operators”,  
- “If airports are financed by users, then the Government can withdraw from the airport 
system”; 
- “In a market-oriented perspective, airports are funded through charges and not through 
taxes”. 
There is some evidence that a new referential emerged in the late 1980s, which subsequently 
imposed a shared conception of what airport policy should be in Canada. First, there has been 
some continuity in Canada’s airport policy since the creation of LAAs by the Conservative 
government of Brian Mulroney. The Liberal Government of Jean Chrétien, elected in 1993, 
formalized the policy reorientation made by its predecessor by formulating and implementing the 
NAP and establishing the NAS. The transfer of NAS airports to local, non-share, not-for-profit 
CAAs followed the model elaborated by the Progressive-Conservative government of Brian 
Mulroney, allowing policy-makers to disseminate an airport policy that was in line with the 
Canadian referential for air transport. For all these airports, including the four largest airports, the 
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NAP was partly structured by the “user-pay” model, emphasizing that airports meet the needs of 
users, while these users would pay their fair share of the cost of providing facilities and services 
through charges (Transport Canada 1994, 8–9, 12). 
Further evidence of the importance of the “user-pay” algorithm within the Canadian 
referential is found in the transfer of the Toronto-Lester B. Pearson airport. In the midst of the 
1993 election campaign, the Progressive Conservative government signed a public-private 
partnership (PPP) with the consortium Paxport/Claridge (Pearson Development Corporation, 
PDC) that would grant it the development and the operations of Terminals 1 and 2 with a 57-year 
lease and a minimal $28 million annual payment to the federal government. But this PPP-type of 
agreement, in which the private sector funds airport development and subsequently seeks a 
return, gave rise to protests and contestations. The concern was that the Pearson agreement would 
grant a monopoly to a private company, in addition to generating limited revenues for the 
government (Lerner 1997). Right after the 1993 election, the incoming Liberal government 
cancelled the Pearson agreements and transferred the airport to a not-for-profit airport authority 
to be funded through a “user-pay” model. The PPP model of airport commercialization30 was at 
odds with the Canadian referential for air transport: it gave rise to protestations (while the 
divestiture of airports to CAAs and LAAs was unchallenged), it focused on funding through a 
                                                 
30
 With respect to airport commercialization, PPPs are indeed defined as “an ownership and management 
structure in which the private and the public sectors both participate. PPPs refer to arrangements where the 
private sector supplies infrastructure assets and services that traditionally have been provided by the 
government. This technique provides private financing for infrastructure investment without immediately 
adding to government borrowing and debt, and can be a source of government revenue. PPPs also present 
business opportunities for the private sector in areas from which it was in many cases previously 
excluded” (ICAO 2012a, xii). 
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private concessionaire and not users, and it was not supported by any general mediation process 
but was rather implemented in a hurry during an electoral campaign
31
. 
 To conclude, the transfer of Canada’s airports to non-share, not-for-profit entities 
responded to the formulation of a Canadian referential for airport policy, which is market-
oriented and supported by a “user-pay” algorithm. While not-for-profit is not usually associated 
with network industry businesses, it does constitute in the Canadian airport case a market-
oriented move as the not-for-profit model is a form of private participation that allows a 
commercial operation with private sector corporate structure of facilities and services that are 
taken out of the scope of government’s direct involvement and operations (Kernaghan, Borins, 
and Marson 2005, 105–109; ICAO 2012a, 3–3). 
 
B – The Airport Crown Rent as the Source of a Profound Discontent 
The conception of a new Canadian referential was accompanied by a “user-pay” algorithm, but it 
also included other elements. While the government decided that it would not be financing the 
development and the operations of the largest airports, it also decided that it would not give up 
the ownership of airport fields. The management and the development of infrastructure was 
divested to not-for-profit corporations, but the Government of Canada decided that the ownership 
of the land would remain with the Crown. It means that airports own the infrastructure, which 
will in principle be reverted to the federal government at the end of the lease period. Furthermore, 
the leases are to be in effect for a 60-year period and the amount of rent to be paid for occupying 
the land varies by airports. 
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 Lerner provided an excellent case study on the conclusion of the Pearson PPP agreement and its 
cancellation in the Annals of Air and Space Law (Lerner 1997). 
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Other features of the ground leases are the absence of requirements to make service 
contracts available to the public or to submit their business plans to the Minister of Transport; the 
absence of any form of economic oversight for airport charges and fees (i.e. airports, which were 
in a monopoly/dominant position within their market, had full authority and power to establish 
charges); and the possibility for Transport Canada to audit LAAs’ finances. 
1. The Rationale behind the Rent 
1.1. The Rationale 
The rationale behind implementing a rent instrument at the time of transfer was threefold. First, 
the government of Canada considered that it had invested considerable sums in the development 
of Canada’s most important airports and that implementing such an instrument was the 
appropriate compensation for this long-term funding. In addition, this instrument was also 
supposed to allow Transport Canada to collect the money it would have received had it continued 
to operate the airport prior to improvements (Gough 2004, 190). As noted by the Auditor-
General: 
“As owner/landlord of transferred airports in the National Airports 
System, the government is entitled to receive rent from each 
airport authority for the use of land and airport facilities. [… In 
addition,] The NAS airports transferred so far represent billions of 
dollars in airport revenues and other business opportunities such as 
hotels, restaurants and retail concessions. Airport authorities can 
also create subsidiaries with the ability to generate even more 
revenue from "off-airport" business activities. […] Airport 
authorities pay Transport Canada nothing up front for either the 
use of the airports or the rights to attendant business opportunities 
- which include the power to set their own user fees. Instead, the 
intent is that the government will receive its due consideration in 
rent payments over the 60-year term of each lease.” (Auditor 
General of Canada 2000, 10–7) 
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The second rationale behind the design of this instrument is that the Government of 
Canada decided to retain ownership over the 26 airports identified as LAAs/CAAs at the time of 
the transfer. According to the NAP, this aimed at enabling the federal government to “guarantee 
the integrity and long-term viability of the vital NAS system” (Transport Canada 1994, 9). By 
retaining legal ownership of large airports, the federal government’s objective was to ensure that 
Canada would keep an efficient, secure, and safe network of airports. And because the 
government retains ownership, it is entitled to receive a rent. Put simply, according to a public 
servant in Transport Canada: “there is the rationale of the ongoing use of land owned by someone 
else, it is a license to airport operators. And I think this is a reasonable rationale. It is a good 
system here, where Treasury Board’s guidelines make sense. These companies use someone 
else’s land, so it makes sense32.”  
 The third element is that in all countries in which commercialization of airports has taken 
place, governments have been able to generate money from the commercialization process. This 
has systematically been the case so far in all case studies on airport commercialization developed 
by ICAO (ICAO 2013b). Governments have requested various forms of payments and have 
implemented policy instruments that allow them to collect such payments. For instance, Australia 
requested an up-front payment with the privatization of its main airports, while France or 
Belgium received cash payments from selling shares of Aéroports de Paris or of the Brussels 
Airport Company, respectively. A popular instrument associated with a model relatively close to 
the Canadian commercialization of airports has been concession fees associated with the 
establishment of concessions. ICAO defines a concession as the right to operate a certain 
commercial activity at an airport, commonly on an exclusive basis and usually at a specified 
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 Respondent from Transport Canada, interview conducted on 13/03/2012. 
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location (ICAO 2012a, xi). It generally involves a private, for-profit concessionaire in charge of 
developing and operating the facility, which is often requested to pay the government either an 
upfront payment or an annual concession fee (or a combination of both). The specificity of the 
Canadian model is that the government commercialized and divested its airports without selling 
them, but nevertheless requests a payment. This is well described by an interviewee involved in 
airport policy at the global level: “Au Canada il y a eu une privatisation sans vendre. Alors que 
les loyers reflètent cela, c’est logique. Quand il y a une vraie privatisation comme avec BAA, ils 
ont payé cash le gouvernement. Alors tu payes pour ce que tu achètes, et tu récupères ton 
investissement à plus long terme. Ici c’est différent car le gouvernement n’a pas vendu, mais il 




This thus appears to be in line with the global referential, where governments have 
withdrawn from direct management of airport operations, have commoditized airport services 
and infrastructure and have generated profits from such operations. 
 
1.2. Some Data and Background Information 
At the time of the first transfers, the federal government negotiated directly with each LAAs the 
terms of the ground lease, leading to major differences among LAAs, and later on among CAAs, 
with respect to the rent formula they were subject to. There were inequities in terms of rents paid, 
both in absolute numbers and in terms of amounts per passenger, amounts per acre and amounts 
per million dollars of historical net book value. Formulas differ with regard to participation rents, 
rent rates on different types of participation revenues and rent capping. The instrument – the rent 
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 Respondent from ICAO, interview conducted on 28/02/2012. 
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– was similar, but its content varied. Indeed, most rent formulas were more or less based on 
passenger throughput (Tretheway and Andriulaitis 2008, 143–144). Even the Auditor General 
criticized the absence of consistency among the rent formulas and the absence of sound 
justification to support these formulas.  
The airport rent formula was subsequently revised in 2005. The Minister of Transport 
announced that airports would be subject to a unique ground rent formula that would replace the 
prior formulas. The new rent formula is based on growth gross revenue and is graduated by the 
level of revenue (Cherniavsky and Dachis 2007, 4)
34
 : zero percent on the first $5 million, 1 
percent on the next $5 million, 5 percent on the next $15 million, 8 percent on the next $75 
million, 10 percent on the next $150 million, and 12 percent on any amount over $250 million. 
The new formula thus constitutes an ad valorem tax applied before interest, depreciation and 
property tax, which was justified as a way to simplify and harmonize the ground rent formula 
while reducing the burden imposed upon airport operators
35
. The other advantages of such 
formula were, according to Transport Canada, the following: the variability of rent with revenues 
provides some flexibility to deal with all phases of business cycle; there are incentives to reduce 
costs; it requires a minimal amount of administrative effort (only slightly less than the passenger 
option) and provides the earliest availability of final figures; and it is the best option from the 
standpoint of equity among airports and public perceptions of equity among airports (i.e., 
percentage could be the same for all airports) (Transport Canada 1999). 
                                                 
34
 Canada’s four largest airports, that are the focus of this dissertation, are all in the 12 percent bracket. 
35
 According to then-Minister of Transport Jean Lapierre: “The bottom line — every one of the 21 rent-
paying airports across Canada will benefit financially every year that they are to pay rent over the life of 
their leases. Under the old system, they were scheduled to pay $13 billion. This will be reduced to $5 
billion over the course of existing leases. This represents a reduction of $8 billion, or more than 60 per 
cent. In addition, the new rent formula will address concerns related to fairness and equity among airports 
of similar size and activity. The original process of negotiating lease arrangements resulted in 21 separate 
deals, each with its own peculiarities.” (Morrison 2008, 11). 
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The revision of the rent formula and its simplification in 2005 lightened the burden 
imposed upon airport operators. According to a study published in 2008 comparing the effects of 
the two formulas, the new formula clearly provides relief to Canadian airport operators, as the 
chart below indicates (Tretheway and Andriulaitis 2008, 146): 
 
Nevertheless, if the new formula was intended to prevent the amount of collected rent from 
increasing too rapidly, it remains that it has not decreased the rent that airports operators have had 
to pay. 
According to figures released in 2010 by Transport Canada, the airport operators of 
Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver and Calgary together pay more than 90% of the total rent 
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collected by the federal government from NAS-airports paying rent
36
. In total, it is more than 
$214 million that was extracted from these four airports in 2010 (Transport Canada 2010). The 
Greater Toronto Airport Authority alone has paid $1.82-billion in rent to the federal government 
since 1996, while its book value at the time of its transfer in the mid-1990s was evaluated at 
$263-million (Jang 2011a). 
2. A Growing Critique of the System 
Despite Transport Canada’s justification over the legitimacy of the ground lease rent, there has 
been more and more criticisms about the content of this instrument. It has come from almost all 
stakeholders of the Canadian civil aviation system (see next section), and the public dispute over 
the rent issue between the federal government on one side, and all other stakeholders on the other 
side, has been growing since 2005 and the revision of the rent formula. For instance, the Greater 
Toronto Airports Authority launched a campaign entitled: “Let's Get a Fair Deal” in 2007. The 
objective was to urge the Canadian government to eliminate airport rent. At the launch, GTAA 
President & CEO Lloyd McCoomb argued that the rent placed an unfair burden on Canada's 
airports. It is especially interesting to note that representatives from IATA, the Air Transport 
Association of Canada, national and foreign airlines as well as local businesses attended the 
launch of the campaign and supported the GTAA approach (Nguyen 2007), thus demonstrating a 
wide and shared discontent over the government’s rent policy. The rent appears to crystallize an 
enormous frustration against the federal government collecting this money from the four largest 
airports, and thus has attracted the attention of the media. This major disagreement between the 
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 Other NAS-airports paying rent are the following: Edmonton, Ottawa, Winnipeg, Victoria, Halifax, 
Saskatoon, Kelowna, Québec City, Regina, St. John’s, Thunder Bay. Remaining NAS-airports (London, 
Moncton, Saint John, Gander, Charlottetown, Fredericton, Prince George) as well as all other airports in 
Canada do not pay rent to the federal Government. 
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stakeholders seems to indicate that the Canadian air transport referential has become contentious. 
The following sections review the criticism of the rent according to several stakeholders’ points 
of view.  
2.1. A Critique from the Auditor General 
In a report released in 2000, the Auditor General criticized in the inconsistencies between the 
different lease agreements: they have different specific terms, but they also do not even bore a 
resemblance to each other (Valo 2001). Specifically, the Auditor General reported in its October 
2000 report that before it started the lease negotiations, Transport Canada did not determine the 
fair market value of the airport assets and business opportunities it was transferring, therefore 
significantly impairing an informed decision-making over the fair basis to establish these rents 
(Auditor General of Canada 2000)
37
. Its conclusion about airport transfer was that Transport 
Canada should clearly define its role as landlord
38
 and that Transport Canada should urgently be 
more diligent in handing Canada’s largest airports including by renegotiating lease agreements39. 
2.2. A Critique from the Airports 
Canada’s four largest airport operators and their representatives (and most notably the Canadian 
Airports Council, CAC), have been vocal in their criticism of the rent system. The former 
President of the CAC, Jim Facette, said publicly in an interview that: “Canada's civil aviation 
sector already suffers a serious competitive disadvantage to other modes of travel and airports 
across the border in the U.S. due to airport rent and other forms of high taxation […]. To pump 
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 Paragraph 10.2 refers. 
38
 Paragraph 10.156 refers. 
39
 Paragraph 10.158 refers. 
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millions of dollars into a competitor is inexplicable” (Wilson 2007). He went further in another 
interview, publicly stating that: “Rent elimination is the ultimate. Our airports have more than 
paid the asset value; airports in Canada have invested more than $9.5 billion in their 
infrastructure without any tax assistance. We say, you've gotten your money back [but] you're 
still collecting $280 million a year on airport rent. Imagine how that can be used back into the 
system?” (Infanger 2009). From the interviews with airport executive managers, three lines of 
criticism appear against the rent policy instrument, whose design and use are not in line with the 
Canadian referential for air transport.  
The first line of criticism regards the design of the rent policy instrument. A former actor 
of the airport industry considered, in line with many other points of views collected from airport 
representatives, that: “Now you have a system similar to a tax system, with exaggerated scales. 
Airport operators receive no funding from her majesty, they have to generate their revenues, and 
the formula says that, starting to a certain level, for every penny you earn, you will pay a portion 
of this penny to the Government. And the more activity you generate, the more pennies you earn, 
the bigger the portion of the penny you have to pay. Airport operators have increased their 
activities, they have successfully marketed their city on the map, and now they are in a win-win 
system for her majesty: she wins on every front: she increases the portion she receives from 
airport revenues, while airports grow their activities and thus contribute to the economy
40”. It was 
indeed perceived by many actors that, despite the implementation of a new rent formula in 2005, 
the amount collected from the four largest airport operators has remained disproportionately high. 
Foreign airlines have vocally shared this view (Bisignani 2011). Actors feel that it is unfair and 
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 Respondent from the Canadian airports trade association, interview conducted on 22/02/2012. 
 91 
inefficient that the government could simply extract a rent of more than $214 million in 2010 just 
for providing the land on which airport infrastructure is located.  
 This criticism also appears to be in line with ICAO’s Policies on Charges for Airports and 
Air Navigation Services (ICAO 2012c). The policies contained in Doc 9082 are the worldwide 
holy book for airport and air navigation services charges. ICAO policies contained in Doc 9082 
are developed through international conferences organized by the United Nations agency. They 
are then endorsed by the Assembly and the Council of the organization. There is thus a strong 
moral obligation for states to conform to the policies and philosophy set out in Doc 9082, which 
reflects the global norms and standards. It has incorporated market-orientations and user-pay 
focus for the past two decades. Doc 9082 clearly mentions that states permit the imposition of 
charges only for services and functions which are provided for, directly related to, or ultimately 
beneficial for, civil aviation operations (Section I, paragraph 2 refers), plus a reasonable rate of 
return. For the actors of the four major airports and their representatives, the rent is far too high to 
represent a fair and reasonable rate of return. This clearly highlights that airport actors’ concern 
does not lie with the instrument per se (i.e. the rent as a taxation-type instrument) but with the 
content of such an instrument (i.e. the amount of the financial burden). 
 The second line of criticism concerns the rent formula. Actors from the airport industry 
perceive the rent formula as being a hindrance to their development and a disincentive to grow 
their activities. The rent is based on gross revenue and increases according to the level of revenue 
(cf. supra). The value of the rent is positively correlated with the revenue of the airport operator 
and has thus no correlation with the value of the land on which airport facilities are located. This 
has drastically impacted the four largest airports. Major airports usually collect two types of 
revenues. First, revenues from aeronautical sources are collected from airport charges. They aim 
to recover the cost of providing airport services dedicated to air traffic (they are usually collected 
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from landing charges, passenger service charges, cargo charges, parking and hangar charges, 
security charges, noise-related charges, aerobridge charges, etc.
41
. Second, revenues from non-
aeronautical sources are “any revenues received by an airport in consideration for the various 
commercial arrangements it makes in relation to the granting of concessions, the rental or leasing 
of premises and land, and free-zone operations (…). Also intended to be included are the gross 
revenues, less any sales tax or other taxes, earned by shops or services operated by the airport 
itself.” (ICAO 2013a, xv).  
Revenues from non-aeronautical sources are crucial to major airports. Research has 
demonstrated that with growing pressure to control levels of aeronautical revenues, there has 
been an increasing focus placed on expanding commercial revenues (Graham 2009). For 
Canada’s four largest airports, non-aeronautical revenues in 2010 were $649 million, while 
aeronautical revenues were of $874.5 million. Moreover, ICAO’s policies on charges contained 
in Doc 9082 recognize the continuing importance of revenues from non-aeronautical activities 
and recommend in Section II (paragraph 2 and 10 refers) the full development of such revenues 
to offset aeronautical revenues, except in the case of concessions directly associated with the 
operation of air transport services such as fuel, in-flight catering and ground handling (ICAO 
2012c). An actor from the airport industry explains the effect of the rent on collecting revenues: 
“even if you accept the principle of the rent, the formula remains perverse, because there is no 
incentive to invest and develop the business. Everywhere airports tend to increase non 
aeronautical revenues in order to decrease the share of aeronautical revenues, they use ancillary 
                                                 
41
 For an exhaustive definition of these charges as well as to determine the cost basis for charges on air 
traffic, refer to Part A – Accounting and Part B – Determining the Cost Basis for Charges on Air Traffic in 
Chapter 4 of the Airport Economics Manual (Doc 9562). 
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service to limit user charges. But in Canada the formula is based on the revenue, so it is a 
disincentive to grow revenues. It is a perverse disincentive.
42”  
In addition, the fact that the operator of Toronto-Pearson operates under a single-till 
regime, and the three other airport operators are operating under a model close to the single-till as 
well, accentuates the perverse effect of the formula. The single-till refers to an approach used to 
describe how an airport recovers the full costs associated with the airport and its essential non-
aeronautical services. It is stated in Doc 9562 (paragraph 4.121 refers) that under the single-till 
approach, the full costs associated with an airport and its essential ancillary services, including 
appropriate amounts for cost of capital and depreciation of assets, as well as the cost of 
maintenance and operation, and management and administration expenses, are included in the 
cost basis attributed to air traffic. These costs are then adjusted to reflect non-aeronautical 
revenues that accrue for the airport. In general, in exchange for sharing the risk associated with 
the airport’s operations, aircraft operators and/or end-users benefit from a cost basis that is 
adjusted to reflect non-aeronautical revenues (ICAO 2013a). The perverse effect of the formula 
appears clearly, as explained by an actor from the GTAA “Canadian airports operate under the 
single till model. All the money, aeronautical and non-aeronautical, goes in the airport revenue 
and is subject to the formula. In that respect, because the formula treats all revenues equally, it is 
a disincentive to invest in non-aeronautical activities. We pay 12% on every dollar we make in 
rent, so we subcontract to concessionaires many activities of the airport, and they generate money 
on their own. We don’t pay rent on the activities, but the GTAA does not see the money either43.” 
Indeed, as it is described in Doc 9562 (paragraph 5.1 refers), revenues from non-aeronautical 
sources constitute the principal means by which airports that apply the single-till regime are able 
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 Respondent from the Canadian airport industry, interview conducted on 13/04/2012. 
43
 Respondent from the GTAA, interview conducted on 02/04/2012. 
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to recover their total costs, because their profits from these non-aeronautical activities more than 
cover the shortfalls that they incur on their airside operations (ICAO 2013a). Again, more than 
the instrument per se, the discontent is about the content of the rent instrument. Indeed, it is the 
rent formula that has the perverse effect on the four largest airport authorities disincentivizing the 
growth non-aeronautical revenues. This is perverse because increasing these revenues would 
offset user charges paid by air carriers for the use of airport services, thus diminishing the cost of 
operating Canada’s four largest airports. 
Finally, actors of the airport industry have developed a third line of criticism addressed to 
the content of rent instrument and its impact. This third line is less important, as many 
representatives of foreign airlines operating to/from Canada and several actors from the airport 
industry ignored it. The concern is about the allocation and use of the money collected by the 
federal government. The NAP stated that the rent would be reinvested in the airport system 
(Transport Canada 1994). This element was reemphasized in 2005 in the House of Commons 
Standing Committee on Transport’s Interim Report on Air Liberalization and the Canadian 
Airports System, whose recommendation 1 b) was that the rent received by Transport Canada 
should be reinvested in the Canadian airports system (Gallaway 2005). The policy proposal 
would thus imply a cross-subsidization of Canadian airports, through which the airports paying 
the larger share of the rent collected by the government (thus Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, and 
Calgary) would subsidize loss-making and unprofitable airports that constitute the network of 
Canada’s air transport infrastructure. This is the argument made by an actor from the GTAA: 
“The original purpose was to offer a fair return on the investment made in the past. I can 
appreciate what the government was trying to do. But today it puts us at a competitive 
disadvantage. I don’t support it, because it is not fair to tax aviation. If the rent is not put off the 
table, at least it should be spent on other airports in Canada.” Nevertheless, this element is not 
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totally in line with ICAO’s policies on charges, which state that airport charges should be cost-
related and that users should not be charged for facilities they do not use (Section II, paragraphs 2 
i) and ii) refer). In that sense, it means that carriers and travelers coming from foreign country to 
Toronto or Montreal should not pay for unprofitable Canadian airports they will likely never use. 
These concerns are, again, about the content of the instrument and not necessarily about the 
instrument itself. 
To conclude, the representatives of the four largest airports in Canada have largely 
criticized the Crown rent because of its impact on the competitiveness and the potential to grow 
of the Canadian airport industry. If the apparent concern is about the rent, the content of this 
taxation-type instrument is really at stake. Indeed, the rationale behind the use of a taxation-type 
instrument is not at stake. A rent or a similar concession fee or levy is part of the user-pay 
philosophy that has supported the core values associated with a market-oriented airport sector. 
The source of the numerous tensions is rather with the content of the rent instrument (e.g. the 
formula, the level, the allocation). The rent was designed and implemented as part of the airport 
divestiture process, but no actor from the airport industry is questioning the devolution of airports 
and the emphasis on a sound commercial management and operation of airport infrastructure and 
services. Conversely, all airport managers, senior executive and representatives refer to notions 
such as competitiveness, growth, taxes and profits: they all refer to the core norms and values of a 
market-oriented referential for air transport. All actors are in agreement over these norms and 
values, and support the associated taxation-type instrument that supports the user-pay philosophy 
of the whole system. But all these actors are in disagreement with the content of the rent 
instrument that they perceive as running counter to the referential it is supposed to accompany. 
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2.3. A Critique from the Air Carriers 
Canada’s four largest airport operators and their representatives have strongly raised their 
opposition to the rent instrument (or rather to the content of such an instrument), but they have 
not been alone in doing so. They have indeed been joined by their users and their representatives. 
Giovanni Bisignani, Director General and Chief Executive Officer of the International Air 
Transport Association from 2002 to 2011, had these words to describe the rent issue when 
addressing the Montreal Council on Foreign Relations: “the Crown rent bill that was $257 
million in 2009 is an unnecessary competitive disadvantage. No other country in the world uses 
this archaic scheme to tax infrastructure” (Bisignani 2011). Mr. Bisignani further added a few 
weeks later in The Globe and Mail that, in the battle of global air hubs, Toronto, Vancouver and 
Montreal were slipping in competitiveness because they paid high federal taxes in the form of the 
airport rent, which in turn showed up in hefty landing fees charged to airlines, specifying that: 
“the Canadian government doesn’t understand that cashing in on Crown rent is a short-term 
vision.” (Jang 2011a). After succeeding Giovanni Bisignani as Director General and Chief 
Executive Officer of IATA, Tony Tyler also went to the Montreal Council on Foreign Relations 
to state that “the Crown rent charged for Canada’s airport infrastructure is a $250 million 
competitive disadvantage. The pain is not only felt by the Canadian air transport sector which 
suffers from passengers opting to start their journeys from US airports. All those extra cars on the 
roads can’t be very good for the environment either! And every business that relies on 
connectivity shares the burden.” (Tyler 2012). If IATA leaders have attracted strong media 
coverage on the issue of airport rent through the amount of the financial burden it creates, users 
of the hub airports of Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver and Calgary have all developed their own 
criticism against the content of this policy instrument. All representatives from airlines using one 
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or several of these four airports that were interviewed, ranging from the domestic air carrier with 
a point-to-point network and from the Canadian charters airlines and the former national flag, to 
major international airlines from the United States, Europe and Asia, opposed the rent policy. 
Again, three lines of criticism were developed. Again, these criticisms indicate that actors from 
the airline industry perceive the content of the rent policy as being at odds with the Canadian 
referential for air transport.  
But before going into the specifics, it appears necessary to respond to a fundamental 
question: why do air carriers oppose the content of the rent instrument? The answer is 
straightforward: the four largest airport operators project their annual revenues to anticipate the 
level of ground lease rent they will have to pay to the federal government and they subsequently 
pass it on as user charges. In the end, the cost of paying the rent is integrated to the cost structure 
of the airport, and it thus has repercussions on user charges paid by air carriers. The content of 
the instrument artificially increases airport charges. Passing the rent costs onto the cost base for 
user charges is in line with ICAO’s policies on charges in Doc 9082, which state that the cost to 
be allocated to airlines through charges is the full cost of providing the airport and its essential 
ancillary services (Section II, paragraph 2 i) refers). This full cost includes any rent or concession 
fees payment made by the airport operator to the government.  The repercussions of the rent 
instrument, and more specifically of the amount of such rent, on user charges are important. A 
manager from the GTAA stated that “if I remember correctly, it is about 1/3 of the landing 
fees
44”, while a representative of the Canadian airline industry mentioned that “as it is today the 
airline industry is paying $300 million of these rents through landing and terminal fees.
45” 
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 Respondent from the GTAA, interview conducted on 16/03/2012. 
45
 Respondent from a Canadian airlines trade association, interview conducted on 08/03/2012. 
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Consequently, this increases the cost for airlines that operate at Canada’s four largest airports, 
and this explains why airlines oppose the rent policy. 
The first of line of criticism, and a recurrent argument used by air carriers when opposing 
the content of the rent instrument at Canada’s largest airports, is that it represents a threat to their 
profitability because it increases their costs without increasing their revenues. Representatives of 
airlines and of the airline industry that were interviewed were all extremely frustrated by this 
artificial increase in cost, because they perceived that the Government of Canada would extract it 
irrespective of their financial health and of their contribution to the economic wealth of Canada. 
The following excerpt from an interview of an airline manager involved with an air transport 
professional organization reveals this frustration: “Là il y a zéro [contreparties aux loyers], à part 
les terrains. Nous sommes une industrie qui assure un réseau de transport national qui supporte 
30 à 35 milliards de dollars de PNB, avec des milliers d’emplois à la clé. On crée une valeur 
économique beaucoup plus large que ce qu’elle nous rapporte à nous-mêmes. On assure un 
réseau productif pour les affaires. Vous imaginez les gens d’affaires de Toronto aller faire un 
voyage d’affaires à Vancouver en train? Sept jours aller-retour? On n’est pas en Belgique ici, où 
tu t’assoies dans le train à Anvers, tu bois un café, tu lis ton journal, et tu es à l’autre bout du 
pays. Au Canada, ça prend un réseau aérien efficace, alors quand le gouvernement le taxe pour 
rien en plus. Et puis il y a le tourisme aussi, c’est 600 000 emplois au Canada. Alors 
politiquement, ça ne coûte rien à un politicien d’envoyer « chier » les compagnies aériennes du 
Canada. Parce que personne ne parle de ça le matin au Tim Horton. Au Tim Horton le matin, les 
gens parlent de la game de hockey de la veille, qu’ils payent trop de taxe. Mais les compagnies 
aériennes et les loyers d’aéroports, c’est pas ça qu’on entend le matin au Tim Horton et les 
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politiciens l’ont bien compris46.” The perception of this actor is common. A manager of another 
airline involved in another air transport association mentioned that: “I think that [the rent policy] 
hurts the industry, and that, for the most part, that is the government treating aviation as a cash 
cow, and as a result we have higher costs, and we have higher costs especially at the biggest 
airports, and especially at Pearson’s airport. […] I don’t have the numbers in front of me, but 
operating costs are still a significant part of our operating budget
47.” 
 The frustration against what is perceived by airlines to be as an artificial increase of the 
cost of operating at Canada’s four largest airports finds its rationale in the position of the airline 
industry within the air transport value chain. The weak profitability of airlines has been a concern 
for the past two decades (Pearce 2012): airlines have the weakest profitability of the air transport 
value chain:  
Table 3. Uneven returns along the air transport supply chain 
 
Source: McKinsey & Company analysis in International Air Transport Association Value Chain 
Profitability (Pearce 2012). 
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 Respondent from a Canadian airline, interview conducted on 23/02/2012. 
47
 Respondent from a Canadian airline, interview conducted on 14/03/2012. 
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This weak profitability of airlines in general, while they contribute to wealth and growth of 
regions and countries, explains the frustration experienced by air carriers with the high level of 
the airport rent. Far from being perceived as a fair contribution by users to support the costs of 
the airport system, airlines’ stakeholders perceives the high amounts of rent as a hidden tax that 
they end up paying with no benefit at all. Clearly, the issue is not with the taxation-type 
instrument, but with its content (a too high financial burden). 
The second line of criticism is about the competitiveness of air transport against other 
modes of transport. Air carriers that operate domestic and short-haul transborder flights have 
developed a specific line of criticism that complements the first one. Representatives of the 
Canadian airline industry see the high amounts of rent as artificially increasing the price of air 
transport in Canada against the price of other modes of transportation, such as rail transportation 
or road transportation (with car or with bus). Consequently, they perceive the rent as creating a 
distortion of the competition between air transport and rail and/or road transport. A notable 
example of this second line of criticism was seen when the Conservative government of Stephen 
Harper announced in 2007 that Via Rail would receive about $700 million over five years. The 
subsidy would be dedicated to furbish locomotives and passenger cars, to increase rail capacity 
and for day-to-day operations. This $700 million envelope was added to the $170 million that Via 
Rail receives from the federal government in the form of operating subsidies (The Canadian Press 
2007). Many stakeholders of the airline industry perceive the subsidies given to the rail industry 
as contrasting with the rent imposed upon airport operators and subsequently on users through 
airport charges. If the fact that “unlike rail passengers that are heavily subsidized, it is the 
opposite for aviation
48”, as said a representative of an airline association. The state of mind of the 
                                                 
48
 Respondent from a Canadian airline trade association, interview conducted on 08/03/2012. 
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Canadian air carriers stakeholders interviewed for the purpose of this dissertation was best 
captured in this public statement from Capt. Dan Adamus, President of the Canada Board –Air 
Line Pilots Association (ALPA), who said that: “It’s time to treat all modes of transportation 
equally, especially in a country as big as Canada: air travel is not a luxury—it is necessary to do 
business and will only serve to strengthen our economy. The government’s regressive taxation 
approach towards aviation needs to be overhauled. The federal government must understand that 
the airline industry is not a cash cow, and that subsidizing one form of transportation while 
excessively taxing another only punishes those Canadians who fly in and out of their rural 
communities. Transport Canada set a $691 million precedent this week—and we expect air 
transport to be next in line.” (ALPA 2007). 
In addition to paying a rent that is perceived as an unfair burden imposed upon their 
fragile financial sustainability (first line of criticism), Canadian aircraft operators have the very 
unpleasant impression that they are subject to an unfair burden which does not apply to other 
modes of transportation which are favoured by the federal government. The air transport industry 
is thus being discriminated against by being the sole target of this policy instrument within the 
transportation industry. Of course, the terms of the debates might be more complex. For example, 
some have argued that the government deliberately favoured the Canadian airline industry by 
refusing to engage in the funding of a high speed train in the “eastern triangle”, formed by the 
metropolitan areas of Montreal, Ottawa and Toronto in order to protect a lucrative market for 
Canadian air carriers (Rebello 2009). Even the bus industry took a stance in favour of changing 
the dynamic of transportation in the “eastern triangle”, pointing to the restrictions imposed by the 
lobby from air carriers and Air Canada (Porter 2009). The same dynamics can be observed for 
other regions of Canada, for example the Edmonton-Calgary corridor, or the Pacific Northwest 
corridor (which includes the Vancouver metropolitan area). Nevertheless, in the cognitive 
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analysis perspective, it is of high relevance to see that there is a consensus in the airline 
community, including the pilots, about an unfair treatment of the air transport industry in 
comparison to other transportation industries. The argument has been further developed to 
include not only the competition of other modes of transportation in Canada, but also modes of 
transportation in the United States. In the U.S., almost all the commercial service airports are 
owned by local governments and, in a few instances, federal or state governments. The Airport 
and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, which is still in force, established an Airport Improvement 
Program (administered by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Under this program, 
grants-in-aid for airport planning and development are provided to airport operators and allocated 
on the basis of a legislated apportionment formula and set aside categories earmarked for specific 
types of airports and projects (ICAO 2011a). In other words, this program establishes grants paid 
by the federal government to airport operators. Furthermore, it should be noted that airport 
operators in the United States do not pay any kind of rent or concession fee to either local or 
federal governments. An executive officer of a Canadian air carrier explained that the fact that 
Canada’s four largest airports have to pay a significant rent while U.S. airport receive grants 
constitutes a major hindrance for airlines: “In fact the rents would be less of an issue if we were 
to fly domestically only, but if you go international and you compete with the U.S., it gives you a 
significant disadvantage. Canada’s government policy has a more important impact on our 
development than local airport policies. And they are in a difficult position because they are 
impeded by the rents. They pay rents and the U.S. airports do not. So government policy makes it 
difficult […]49.” Representatives of the Canadian airline industry perceive that the high amounts 
of rent distorts the competition with their U.S. counterparts for transborder traffic, because it 
                                                 
49
 Respondent from a Canadian airline, interview conducted on 01/03/2012. 
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increases the cost of operating from the Canadian bases (which are basically the four airports of 
Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, and Calgary)
50
. 
The third line of criticism developed by the airline industry also complements the first line 
on the artificial increase in cost operation and has been developed by both domestic and 
international air carriers operating to and from Canada. All stakeholders of the airline industry 
that were interviewed mentioned that airports had already paid back the federal government 
through the rent that was collected in the past, and that since then, the rent has just been a free 
source of money for the federal government. Since one of the rationales behind the maintenance 
of the rent instrument is that the government assumed the construction and the development of 
Canada’s airports, it should earn a return on this investment; airlines’ representatives feel that this 
return on investment was charged twice. A stakeholder explains this mechanism by referring to 
Doc 9082: “It doesn’t make any sense. ICAO’s policies clearly state that users should only pay 
for the service they receive. Airports were paid for, and the federal government acts as if they 
paid for the infrastructure. But up to the transfer, airlines were paying user fees. Now they are 
paying again, they just duplicated the costs. Transport Canada has given lots of reasons for the 
rent, but the only valid reason is that it is good for the Department of Finance
51.” According to 
another stakeholder, who also referred to Doc 9082: “ICAO is very clear in Doc 9082: airport 
charges should be cost-based. But now they are taking 18% of the revenues for government taxes. 
In total, the rent is about CAD$250 million a year, and 18% of every CAD$1 revenue of airports 
goes to the government. And if airports make commercial revenues, they are also charged for 
that. So airlines are double-taxed, by the rent and on other activities.” This demonstrates that 
                                                 
50
 This aspect will be further developed in the next section: the full cost of Canada’s airports will be 
assessed and the comparison with neighbouring airports in the United States will be drawn. 
51
 Respondent from the international airlines industry, interview conducted on 06/03/2012. 
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airlines representatives have been looking into ways to undermine the validity of the content of 
the rent policy by referring to ICAO’s policies on charges. Indeed, during interviews, policy-
makers that supported the rent policy systematically put forward the fact that the rent reflected 
the ownership of the land by the government of Canada. But even this argument has not 
convinced airlines. According an executive officer of an air carrier: “Alors il y a des baux, le 
fédéral est propriétaire, mais dans la relation locateur locataire, le locateur doit faire quelque 
chose, il y a des contreparties. Là il y en a zéro, à part les terrains
52.”  
 Airlines thus have the unpleasant impression that they are paying an unfair burden which 
is not imposed on other modes of transportation and that the rationale behind this burden is 
flawed. They are being asked to pay for something they consider having already paid in the past. 
They are asked to support a lessee-landlord relationship in which the lessee would have all the 
duties while the landlord would have no obligation toward its lessee. All these excerpts show that 
a taxation-type instrument is not at stake (taxation-type instrument to ensure a return on 
investment and in exchange of government services is accepted), but it is rather the way the 
instrument has been used that has in the end run counter to the referential by impeding the 
competitiveness of airport’s users. 
To conclude, airlines have not been the sole stakeholders of the Canadian airport 
referential to criticize the Crown rent and its impact. The key actors of the Canadian airline 
industry as well as the key actors of transborder and international air carriers operating to/from 
the four largest airports have shared and echoed the concerns of the airport industry, adding to the 
tensions already existing in the referential. This is theoretically extremely interesting, as it 
reinforces the fact that various actors, from the airport but also the airline sides, are targeting 
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 Respondent from a Canadian airline, interview conducted on 23/02/2012. 
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airport Crown rents as a major source of problem in the referential without requesting to go back 
to the previous situation where airports would be publicly owned and operated. Actors are in 
agreement over market-oriented norms and values, which can be supported by a taxation-type 
instrument such as the rent in a user-pay perspective. But the content of the rent is largely at 
stake, with all airline actors drastically challenging the content of such instrument and the way it 
has been used by the government. According to them, the content of such an instrument is in the 
end running counter to the core values of a market-oriented referential because it artificially 
impedes the competitiveness of economic actors and it is unfair because there is no service in 
return of tax payment.  
2.4. A Critique from the Observers and Analysts  
Finally, it is important to note that the content of the rent instrument has been criticized by other 
stakeholders of the Canadian air transport sector that do not directly engage in aviation activities. 
Research professionals have investigated the debates of Canada’s rent policy, either on the behalf 
of industry clients or think tanks, or with a non-partisan, academic research expertise. Their 
criticisms are fundamental in a cognitive analysis of public policy perspective, because they 
demonstrate that there is a potential for the formation of a mediation space which could reshape 
and reframe the parameters of the referential. It is indeed postulated by authors of the cognitive 
analysis stream that not all actors involved in a sector will agree on all the elements of the 
referential and the policies it implies (Dubois 1997, 250; Jobert 1992; Faure, Pollet, and Warin 
1995, 162). Thus, it is expected that some tensions about an instrument, its content, or an aspect 
of the policy may arise. But the fact that the four airports concerned and their users, as well as the 
observers of the Canadian air transport sector would consensually agree on an attempt to reframe 
the terms of the referential indicates that there may be a cognitive dissonance. 
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 Criticism voiced by the observers of the air transport sector can be classified in three 
categories. First are the criticisms made in studies and reports commissioned by the industry. 
Second are the notes prepared by think tanks, and third are the conclusions of non-partisan, 
independent academic researchers. Each of these categories will be briefly developed in the 
following paragraphs and their criticisms will be described. 
First, the airport industry and the airline industry in Canada have commissioned various 
studies and reports aimed at demonstrating the validity of the criticism they have voiced against 
the content of the rent instrument. In a way, actors of these industries have looked for an external 
empirical validation that would make their complaints more trustworthy. The Canadian Airports 
Council (CAC), a division of Airports Council International-North America (ACI-NA), which 
was formed in 1992, serves as the industry association that lobbies the federal government on 
issues that affect the business interests of Canada’s airports. CAC commissioned a study to the 
InterVISTAS Consulting Group, a well-established consulting firm specialized in transport and 
tourism. Released in 2009 under the title The Elimination of Airport Rent: Return on Investment, 
InterVISTAS’ study empirically documents the impact of eliminating airport rents. The 










Table 4. Summary of Pros and Cons of the Elimination of Airport Rents 
 
Source: The Elimination of Airport Rent: Return on Investment (InterVISTAS 2009, 16) 
 
 This collaboration between the airport industry and a well-established and renowned 
consulting firm can been seen as an attempt to create some sort of public policy forum from 
which new policy ideas and representations could emerge (Jobert 1992). The Air Transport 
Association of Canada (ATAC), which was founded in 1934, is the national trade association for 
commercial aviation, flight training industries and aviation industry suppliers. ATAC 
commissioned a study realized by Fred Lazar, Associate Professor of Economics at the Schulich 
School of Business, York University, which was released in 2007 under the title: The Potential 
Economic Impacts of Reducing the Federal Government’s Ground Rents for Toronto Pearson 
International Airport and Reducing the Federal Excise Tax on Aviation. Lazar produced an 
economic study on the impact of the rent in Toronto, in which he documented that a reduction of 
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$58 million in the annual ground rents at Toronto-Pearson airport might lead to an additional 
214,000 passengers per year, and he concluded on that matter that: 
“[The] ground rent regime is unfair for YYZ. Indeed […], since 
YYZ was the only Canadian airport that had been forced, either by 
the terms of its lease with Transport Canada, or through 
extraordinary circumstances, to incur large amounts of debt. These 
in turn necessitated substantial increases in revenues, and thus 
contributed to larger payments of ground rents.” (Lazar 2007, 10). 
 
A few years later, the newly formed National Airlines Council of Canada (NACC), which was 
founded in September 2008 by Air Canada, Air Transat, Jazz Aviation LP and WestJet to act as 
the trade association representing Canada's largest passenger air carriers, also commissioned a 
study to be completed by the same Fred Lazar of the Schulich School of Business. The study 
entitled The Economic Impacts of the Member Carriers of the National Airlines Council of 
Canada and released in September 2011 contains a significant development on airport rents, in 
which the author highlights that calculating the rent as a percent of revenues means that the price 
of every aeronautical service an airport provides has to be marked up by at least the amount of 
rent charged which, in turn, increases the airport’s break-even point and raises the amount of 
revenue that must be generated. Lazar subsequently documents this argument by explaining that 
if the operator of an airport situated in the 12% rent bracket of the rent (cf. supra) needs to net 
$100 from a given fee, it must set the fee at $113.65, which results in a mark-up of 13.6% (Lazar 
2010, 27). These two attempts by the airline sector further demonstrate the attempts to establish a 
new forum of public policy, or a space of mediation, through which the parameters of the 
Canadian referential for air transport could be discussed and modified to fit with a shared vision 
of what the sector should be and how it should operate. 
This attempt to establish a space of mediation did not solely originate from stakeholders 
directly involved in the operational aspects of air transports. Think tanks have also been engaged 
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in the debate and proposed policy evaluations and policy changes with respect to the airport rent. 
Two independent studies tackled the issues related with the content of the taxation-type rent 
instrument. A report from the Institut Économique de Montréal published in 2006 identified 
airport rents as one of the three areas of taxation in need of an urgent reform. It documented that 
between 2000 and 2005, airport rents accounted for 38% of revenues collected by the federal 
government from the airline sector. The study concluded that rents are among the main obstacles 
to the competitive position of Canada’s major airports compared to U.S. airports, which face no 
similar cost; and that the rent burden is shared unequally since nearly the full amount comes from 
the airport administrations in Toronto (48%), Vancouver (27%), Calgary (9%) and Montreal 
(7%)
53
 (Giaume 2006). The C.D. Howe Institute also tackled the issue of airport rent, with a 
study released in 2007. According to the Toronto-based think tank, the rent formula is one of the 
five elements to change in order to alleviate air transport’s fiscal burden. For the 1999-2005 
period, the study documents that the amount of rent paid by the largest airport operators grew 
faster than their volume of passengers, which was the basis of the formula. It adds that the new 
rent formula negatively affects airports’ incentives to seek additional revenue sources, because 
the airport must charge higher rates to cover any rent due from a new source of revenue 
(Cherniavsky and Dachis 2007). 
Finally, the academic community has also criticized the rent policy and its impacts 
(Morrison 2008).  
                                                 
53
 The data covers the 2000-2004 period. Subsequently, the conclusions of the study address the pre-rent 
formula change of 2005 period. 
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3. A Cognitive Dissonance?  
The content of the rent policy instrument and the way it is used by the government of Canada is 
puzzling in that it seems to hinder the ability of the four largest airport operators to grow their 
business, expand their activities, and offer competitive operating costs to their users. User 
charges and a reasonable return on investment are both market-driven and agreeable to all 
stakeholders, but the level of the rent has been set at a higher level than a market mechanism 
would have allowed. While the four largest airport authorities were given the necessary 
autonomy to allow them to transform their platforms into competitive regional and international 
aerotropolises, and while the rent as a taxation-type instrument may be aligned with such a 
market-oriented perspective, the significant amount of money diverted because of the rent 
prevents them to achieve efficiently such objective. It thus indicates a cognitive dissonnance in 
the Canadian referential for air transport. Indeed, it highlights the fact that some prominent actors 
within the referential do not interpret its algorithms in the same manner and this leads to different 
interpretations of what Canada’s air transport policy should be. It constitutes an apparent 
cognitive dissonance for airports, airlines and other parties because they do not have the same 
understading as compared to key policy-makers and bureaucrats of the implementation of the 
“user-pay” philosophy. In Muller and Jobert’s approach, such a situation is supposed to evolve, 
with the creation of a space of mediation and the reformulation of the sectoral referential. But this 
has not been the case in Canada: the policy has not changed and the conflicts have been long-
lasting. Therefore, the cognitive analysis of public policy as formulated by Muller and Jobert 
needs to be amended. 
 The previous sections illustrated that if the rent is often referred to as one of the most 
contentious issue that undermines the stability of the sectoral referential, actors consider that, in 
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general terms, a taxation-type instrument is not counter to a market-oriented approach provided 
that it allows economic actors to remain competitive and that the system is fair (there should be 
some kind of services in exchange of the payment of taxes). Such understanding applied to the 
Canadian airport sector can be found in the following interview excerpts with two senior 
executive officers, from the GTAA and from the Vancouver Airport Authority, who have a clear 
mind about a taxation-type instrument being more or less in line with a market-oriented 
referential:  
- According the senior manager from Vancouver Airport (YVR), “Obviously we 
would prefer to pay less, because the rent we pay contributes to higher costs. 
There is a lot of rhetoric in all that, […]. I have no strong opinion, but I know that 
we have to contribute one way or another. Over the year we negotiated a new rent 
formula, so there has been progress, but the notion that airports could not pay any 
rent nor any tax is misguided
54.” 
- And according to the senior executive officer from the GTAA: “There are a lot of 
politics with the rent issue, and I have never been comfortable with that. It became 
a political issue very quickly to whether it is fair or unfair. At YYZ we handle 1/3 
of the traffic, and we pay 2/3 of the rent. It offended people, but they never 
measure the economic impact, but the economic impact is the key: what is it 
really?
 55” 
These two leaders of the airport industry accept that airports have to pay something to the 
government. But all actors except policy-makers are of the strong opinion that the content of the 
rent instrument (in terms of formula, level, allocation, etc.) runs counter to the referential for the 
                                                 
54
 Respondent from YVR, interview conducted on 21/03/2012. 
55
 Respondent from the GTAA, interview conducted on 12/04/2012. 
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precise reasons that it undermines competitiveness and it is an unfair burden. These notions are 
key in the analysis: interviewees are giving hints that what is at stake may be beyond the rent per 
se. More precisely, the rent appears to be the instrument that has crystallized all the tensions from 
all stakeholders except Transport Canada, as being representative of something that goes beyond 
it, and which is the cost of operating at Canada’s hub airports. Non-government interviewees all 
used the airport rent in order to express a profound dissatisfaction and a certain level of concern 
about the way the sector is regulated. Because the rent is the simplest cost center that can be 
considered, and because its content – most notably the formula – is perceived as being flawed by 
almost every actor, it has been at the forefront of the conflict between the Government of Canada 
and the four major airport operators and their users. However, if one goes deeper, it appears that 
the discontent about the rent reveals an even more profound concern about the competitiveness of 
Canadian airports, the fairly high cost of this industry, and the effect of passing these costs onto 
airlines and passengers through charges. A taxation-type instrument is not at stake: what is 
contentious is more broadly the whole “user-pay” algorithm and its implication in terms of 
airport policy. All actors do believe that a “user-pay” orientation is a fundamental algorithm of 
the Canadian airport sectoral referential, but non-government actors have a radically different 
perception on what and how users should be paying. This is visible through the dissatisfaction 
with the content of the rent instrument, and the next section will demonstrate that such 
dissatisfaction is spread to all other aspects covered by the user-pay algorithm (not only the rent, 
but also the general cost structure of Canadian largest airports, the airport charges, etc.). It should 
be noted that such analysis reinforces a theoretical argument put forward in this dissertation: a 
specific focus on policy instruments and their content is successful in identifying the possible 
cognitive dissonances. The next section will reinforce the argument even further by shifting the 
focus on the algorithm of the sectoral referential. 
 113 
C – The Costs of Canada’s Largest Airports and the “User-Pay” Algorithm 
1. The Rent as an Addition to Other Costs 
The analysis of the interviews reveal that costs other than those engendered by the parameters of 
the rent instrument are at the source of tensions between key actors of the Canadian referential. 
All these costs have in common that they relate specifically to the “user-pay” algorithm. The first 
type is the cost basis for airport charges. The second type is the cost basis for airport development 
and planning.  
1.1. Other Aeronautical and Non Aeronautical Costs 
With respect to the cost basis for airport charges, airport operators simply integrate the rent to 
their landing charges and terminal charges. This automatically increases the cost base on which 
these charges are established. But notwithstanding the inclusion of the rent in landing charges, 
these levies are, on average, higher in Canada than they are in the United States. The Air 
Transport Research Society (ATRS) runs systematic comparisons of airport charges on a 
worldwide basis. For instance, Figure 4 compares the landing charges for an average long-haul 
aircraft (in the case a Boeing 767-400) at North America’s major airports, and it clearly shows 
that the landing fees in Toronto are, by far, the highest in North America
56
. In the case of the B-
767-400, it is estimated by ATRS that landing charges at Toronto-Pearson are USD 6,000. In 
comparison, the North American average for landing charges for this aircraft are slightly higher 
than USD 1,000. Two of the three other main Canadian airports are above this North American 
mean, with approximately USD 1,600 for Montréal-Trudeau and USD 1,500 for Calgary, 
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 A worldwide comparison would lead to similar results, with Toronto-Pearson competing with Tokyo-
Narita for the award of the « most expensive » airport in the world. 
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respectively. Only the airport of Vancouver is slightly below this mean. In other words, the table 
clearly illustrates that Toronto-Pearson is a very expensive airport in terms of landing fees. It is 
two times more expensive to land a B-767 in Toronto than it is in the most expensive American 
airport (New York-LaGuardia), and it is almost 6 times more expensive, on average, to land this 
aircraft in Toronto than in other North American airports. If the three other Canadian airports are 
more in line with North American standards, two of them remain nevertheless expensive, and 
thus less appealing than US airports to develop new routes and attract new air carriers. 
 Figure 4. Landing Charges for Boeing 767-400 in North America, 2010 (in US$) 
 
Source: Global Airport Performance Benchmarking, Global Standards for Airport Excellence 
(ATRS 2011, I–82) 
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If landing fees are billed to airlines, Canada’s four largest airports have also billed charges 
directly to their end-users (the air travelers) under the form of the so-called “airport improvement 
fees” (AIF). These airport improvement fees are defined as follows: 
“an additional fee charged to departing and connecting passengers 
at an airport. It is levied by […] an airport management 
corporation and the proceeds are usually intended for funding of 
major airport improvements or expansion or airport service.  
The airport improvement fee is included in the cost of traveller's 
airline ticket, in which case the airline will forward the fee to 
proper agency. […]. The amount varies usually between US$10 
and $30. In some instances, the fee continues to be charged long 
after construction has been completed (i.e. Ottawa Macdonald-
Cartier International Airport). A legitimate reason for this is that 
the airport must finance the cost of the improvement and then pays 
off these costs over an extended period of time.” (Singh 2008, 
315–316). 
 
More specifically, AIF are billed in order to fund airport improvement, development or 
expansion. In a way, they can be characterized as a form of pre-funding project, through which 
airport authorities collect costs in advance of commissioning new airport facility or infrastructure. 
On that matter, ICAO’s policies on charges advocate a cautious approach towards pre-funding of 
projects through charges. Doc 9562 states that this is an acceptable mean of financing airport 
development when more traditional sources of funds are not available and requests that 
safeguards are set in place for pre-funding, notably the application of charges for a limited time 
period (ICAO 2013a, Appendix 2). Nevertheless, while the imposition of AIF has occurred at 
many airports in the world, AIF at Canada’s largest airports have become an automatic and 
permanent source of revenue. They are not collected for specific projects being realized on 
specific timeframes. The AIF in 2012 were as high as (ICAO 2012d): 
- Toronto-Pearson: $25.00 per departing passenger, and $4.00 for connecting 
passengers; 
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- Montréal-Trudeau: $25.00 per departing passenger; 
- Vancouver: $5.00 per departing passenger to a destination in British Columbia or 
Yukon; $15.00 per departing passenger to a North American destination (not 
including British Columbia or Yukon), $20.00 per departing passenger to a 
destination outside North America; and 
- Calgary: $25.00 per passenger. 
If AIFs have become a necessary source of revenues for airport operators in Canada, they add to 
the cost of flying from Canada, while many competing airports on the U.S. side of the border do 
not impose such levies on air travelers. 
In addition, air navigation services charges have also increased with the creation of Nav 
Canada. Indeed, if the charging principles for Nav Canada as established in the Air Navigation 
Service Act (Nav Canada 2008, 2) are in line with ICAO’s polices on charges in Doc 9082, they 
were criticized for being stated in very broad and general terms (A. Jones and Guthrie 2008, 24) 
and for being not practical and leaving too much room for interpretation (Lovink 1999, 375–376). 
The charging decisions that have followed the implementation of these principles are also 
questionable: supporting documents elaborated by Nav Canada to justify fees’ increase assert the 
compatibility of these increases with the charging principle without demonstrating this 
compatibility (Lovink 1999, 381). Air navigation services charges have indeed drastically 
increased since the creation of Nav Canada, with a dramatic hike in the aftermath of the 09/11 
events
57
. What airlines representatives call the “Nav Canada fee” has also been highlighted as an 
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 User charges for the provision of air navigation services by Nav Canada increased by 6% to compensate 
the impact of the 09/11 attacks on the service provider’s revenues (McDougall 2004, 33). By 2002, the 
average fee per-traveler increased from $12 to $22 (Sclar and HDR 2003, 11). 
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element increasing the cost of flying in Canada and creating a competitive disadvantage for 
Canadian carriers and Canadian airports. 
Finally, it should be noted that Canada’s air transport system is subject to other charges, 
taxes, and levies that are accused of impeding the sustainable development of airports and air 
transport. A unique illustration would be the case of municipal taxes at Montréal-Trudeau. While 
other airports do pay some municipal taxes, the Montreal airport entity paid $40,3 million to the 
city of Montreal in 2011, a sum that increase every year (from 2010 to 2011, it represented a 
6.3% increase in municipal taxes) (La Presse Canadienne 2012). Municipal taxes in Montreal are 
thus almost equivalent to the airport rent paid to the federal government ($43.4 million that year), 
which further decreases the competitive advantage of ADM
58
. Other costs are also factors, such 
as the fuel excise tax and other levies that airport operators pass on user and end-user charges. If 
all stakeholders mentioned that the rent was too high and was impeding growth and business, all 
stakeholders also developed certain resentment against the accumulation, or the addition, of 
several taxes, charges, and levies that all together increase the cost of operating at Canada’s most 
important airports. 
 The following interview excerpt is worth noting not only because it is representative of 
the image given by many stakeholders, but also because it is made by a representative of a U.S. 
airlines which operates flights both in Canada and in the U.S. (both at low-cost competing 
airports and at U.S. important hubs): “Toronto or Vancouver are competing with the largest 
international hub airports in North America, and any cost of operation at these airports impacts 
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 According to a senior executive of Aéroports de Montréal: “Parce qu’en [plus du loyer], on paie $45M 
de taxes municipales, et ça c’est unique au Canada, c’est une nuisance additionnelle. Juste avec ces deux 
là, on rajoute 15 à 20$ sur le prix du billet, et le passager quitte cet aéroport. C’est pas unique car les 
autres aéroports paient aussi des taxes municipales, mais à Toronto c’est plafonné, c’est moitié moins que 
nous, pour le double de passagers. À Montréal la ville exige le même montant de taxe que n’importe 
quelle entreprise.” Respondant from Aéroports de Montréal, interview conducted on 23/03/2012. 
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their competitiveness. But it is not an issue with the rent per se, it is rather the addition of all the 
costs. The whole has a major impact, and you don’t see it if you look only at individual pieces. 
Whether you are looking at the rent, Nav Canada fees, security fees, they are all absorbed by 
airlines and airports.
59” For a representative of the hotel industry, the situation is dramatic and has 
impact beyond the airport and air transport industry: “when you add all these fees, the rent, the 
Nav Canada fee, the airport improvement fee, the security fee, the municipal tax, the only result 
is that you are not competitive, and it makes your airfares more expensive. In the end you see 1/3 
of Canadian travelling from a US airport. And there is no reason why landing fees at Toronto are 
the double to what they are in the US. And it also impact foreign carriers. When you see Air 
France looking at opening a new route to Vancouver, and finally going to Seattle because of 
lower costs, it means less people in my hotels!
 60” 
1.2. The Debt of Airports 
In addition to high costs, the four Canadian airports have high debts. The Government of Canada 
assumed that Canada’s most important airports would have the fiscal capacity61 to attract the 
capital necessary for infrastructure investment (Forsyth et al. 2004, 57), in that they would use 
the debt instrument alongside generating enough revenues from airside and groundside activities 
in order to finance their development and maintain their assets. Airport infrastructure assets 
depreciate over time, and it was demonstrated that the airport rent formula takes no account of 
asset depreciation, leading airport authorities to borrow to finance the investments that would 
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 Respondent from a U.S. airline, interview conducted on 11/04/2012. 
60
 Respondent from the Canadian hotel industry, interview conducted on 04/04/2012. 
61
 Fiscal capacity may be defined as “the ability of an airport to achieve a particular level of revenue 
and/or capital access (bonds) because of the market it serves and traffic level it attracts” (Gillen and 
Morrison 2004, 57). 
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increase passenger services, flows and revenue. Another shortcoming of the current rent formula 
would be that it increases the cost of debt by requiring rent payments on the revenue collected to 
cover interest expenses (Cherniavsky and Dachis 2007, 6).  
 Nevertheless, many stakeholders worry about the level of debt that the largest airports 
have contracted, and its impact on airport charges. This is particularly true for the Greater 
Toronto Airport Authority. An airline operating from the four largest airports captured this 
situation: “et ils se sont mis à construire, et construire, et construire, et à s’endetter. Et ensuite, il 
faut repayer la dette. Alors on a vu les frais d’amélioration aéroportuaire (les FAA) arriver. Mais 
à Toronto, la dette de l’aéroport c’est 7 milliards, alors s’ils collectent 100 millions par an en 
FAA, ça paie juste les intérêts de la dette, pas le capital, d’où l’augmentation des redevances de 
manière très importantes. […] L’élément crucial, c’est l’endettement des aéroports, qu’ils doivent 
rembourser. Si demain on annule la dette de Toronto, alors les charges baissent de 60%.
62”. A 
senior executive official from the GTAA confirms both this fact and this state of mind, 
demonstrating that the GTAA top-management is also extremely concerned by the situation: 
“The harder question is this: we, at Pearson, had to raise 7.5B in equity markets to build or 
renovate our infrastructure. And now we have to service that debt. It is a huge part of our balance 
sheet. And that is never talked about. The rent is not the hardest part, the main impact is the debt, 
and it is the same at every Canadian airports.
 63” 
 The debt accumulated by the four largest airport authorities, and to a greater degree by the 
GTAA, which was required to spend over $700 million to purchase Terminal 3 at the time of the 
transfer (this is the only facility for which an airport authority had to pay) (Cherniavsky and 
Dachis 2007, 7) thus impacts airport charges and airport improvement fees, but it is difficult to 
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 Respondent from a Canadian airline, interview conducted on 23/02/2012. 
63
 Respondent from the GTAA, interview conducted on 12/04/2012. 
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see the reimbursement of the debt in a foreseeable future. Nevertheless, airport operators are 
required to pay back this debt at some point. Indeed, at the time of the transfer, the federal 
government decided that airports should be returned to the government at the end of the lease 
with no debt, meaning that all that airport authorities have borrowed should be paid back before 
the end of the 60 to 80-year ground lease period. This situation is troublesome, because it may 
lead airport operators to stop all investments in order to reimburse the debt, a situation that would 
see a major depreciation of assets with no further investment to support them. According to 
Tretheway and Andriulatis: “this raises the question as to how airports authorities will be able to 
sustain a first-class airport to the last day of their lease, yet have no debt” (Tretheway and 
Andriulaitis 2008, 141). 
1.3. Synthesis. The Cumulative Impact of the Rent, the Charges, the 
AIFs, and the Debts 
To conclude on costs other than those related to the rent, it is clear that the content of the rent 
instrument is not the only concern for the four largest airport operators, their users and the 
observers. It is rather the whole cost structure of these airports in their relation to the user-pay 
orientation that is at stake. According to ATRS, the average cost of airport charges for an 
enplaned passenger in the United States is below US $10, while it is about US $35 at Toronto-
Pearson (ATRS 2011, I–87). Of course, Canada’s airports do not enjoy the same market as 
compared to their U.S. counterparts do, but the fact that one in five Canadians flying to a U.S. 
destination is departing from a U.S. airport (Jang 2010a) creates frustrations and losses of 
opportunities for both the four Canadian airports and for their users. These dramatic figures for 
the actors of the Canadian airport sector do therefore highlight the point that if the rent is highly 
visible, it is not the sole source of dissatisfaction: analyzing the rent sheds light on key elements 
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such as competitiveness and fairness, and it was fruitful in shifting the analysis towards the all 
“user-pay” algorithm through other costs. The next section will pursue a similar analysis focused 
on airport’s governance system in order to demonstrate that the real issue lies with the algorithm.  
2. A Growing Critique over the Governance System 
Canada’s four largest airports costs’ are passed on to users through user charges. While some of 
these costs reflect aeronautical and non-aeronautical activities of the airport operators, other costs 
simply reflect taxes and charges imposed by the government upon the Canadian air transport 
sector. The preceding sections demonstrated that ground lease rent have crystallized all the 
tensions and public outcry against the Canadian airport policy, somehow over shadowing the 
overall cost structure issue of Canada’s most important airports. Nevertheless, all stakeholders of 
the Canadian air transport system used the rent aspect to express their concerns and fears with 
respect to the cost structure of these four airports. In addition, most stakeholders from the airline 
industry link their discontent over costs with the governance structure of airports. This last 
element is of paramount importance, because it directly relates to and challenges a fundamental 
element of the Canadian referential for air transport: the “user-pay” algorithm. 
2.1. A Critique over the Representation of User Interests 
When the Canadian federal government established the National Airport Policy, it integrated 
some safeguards into the policy frameworks aiming at ensuring the accountability of CAAs’ 
administrators and protecting the general interest. The idea at that time, which was already at the 
core of the transfer of the four LAAs, was to use the Board of Directors as a safeguard through 
the nomination of representatives of local communities. The NAP clearly states that community 
accountability is ensured through enhanced principles of accountability, such as: CAAs must be 
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“not-for-profit” corporations, guided by a local board of directors; the board members will be 
representative of the local community and will not include government employees or elected 
representatives; and there will be federal and provincial government representation on the board 
of directors (Transport Canada 1994, 45–46). For instance, 15 members compose the board of 
directors of the Greater Toronto Airport Authority. Each of the Regional Municipalities of York, 
Halton, Peel, Durham and the City of Toronto are entitled to nominate a director. The federal 
government is entitled to appoint two directors, and the Government of Ontario one director. 
Moreover, four directors are appointed by the board from a list of candidates nominated by a pool 
of nominators composed of the Law Society of Upper Canada, the Association of Professional 
Engineers of Ontario, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario, the Toronto Board of 
Trade, and the Boards of Trade and Chambers of Commerce in the Regional Municipalities of 
York, Halton, Durham and Peel. Finally, the board of director itself is entitled to appoint three 
additional directors (Gough 2004, 190). In addition, the NAP prescribes that each airport 
establishes community consultative committees, which include representative of the airline 
industry and meet at least twice per year to discuss matters related to the airport (Transport 
Canada 1994, 47). 
 These elements are implemented in order to prevent the airport authority from abusing its 
market power and increasing its prices without adequate control and safeguards and without 
consulting the users and the communities. But for most airlines representatives, these 
mechanisms are not enough. Many interviewees from the airline sector, and most notably from 
Canadian aircraft operators, felt that they were ignored by the four airport authorities, which 
would “simply inform, and not consult” and would overextend airport capacity and pass on the 
costs through user charges. These complaints are normal and are to be found at every airport for a 
simple reason. As put by a senior officer of ICAO: “Les compagnies râlent partout, et j’allais 
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dire, c’est normal. Elles veulent le meilleur service au prix le plus bas, alors si les redevances 
augmentent, il y a beaucoup de protestations.
64” An executive from the CAC completes this 
explanation: “When airports consider capital expenditures, the consult their users. But they don’t 
necessarily have the same perspectives: an airport looks at a 35-year perspective, while an air 
carrier look at the next quarter, so airport authorities have to balances different interests.
65” 
Further, a representative from IATA concludes, in a statement that proves the relative good 
quality of airport consultation, that: “There is always room for improvement, but Canada is quite 
advanced [with respect to consultation with users] in comparison to many other places in the 
world. We used to have a troubled relationship, […] we changed that, and we have built a 
coalition with airports.
 66” 
 The real issue is not the absence of consultation; on the contrary there exist several 
consultation forums. The issue lies in the fact that users are not integrated in the decision-making 
process. Users acknowledge that they are consulted, but that crucial decisions are taken before 
they are consulted. It is felt that the Board of Directors does not serve as a safeguard and does not 
adequately examine spending and investment decisions, and that the absence of any economic 
regulation for charges lead air carriers to pay for the bill. This conclusion, drawn from the 
analysis of airline representatives’ interviews, is also made by a senior executive officer of the 
GTAA, who recognized that: “Maybe it is a failure of the NAP. It did not realize that airport 
authorities would get quite as much control as they do on charges. The policy-makers at that 
times created board of directors which would represents various interests, but the board never had 
a strong enough voice. There is a consultation process, we do go to the airlines, and we talk to 
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 Respondent from ICAO, interview conducted on 28/02/2012. 
65
 Respondent from the Canadian Airports Council, interview conducted on 13/04/2012. 
66
 Respondent from IATA, interview conducted on 06/03/2012. 
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them.
67” When the federal government divested the provision of air navigation services, it 
followed a somewhat different path through the implementation of a model of ‘shared 
governance’ (Aucoin 2006, 117): Nav Canada was established as non-share, not-for-profit but 
privately owned corporation and its stakeholders were invited to manage the ANSP entity 
through the participation on the Board of Directors. In this case, the Board of Directors is 
composed of fifteen members: the federal government appoints three directors, aircraft operators 
represented by the Air Transport Association of Canada (ATAC) appoint five directors, and 
employees’ unions appoint two members. Four others and the Chief Executive Officer are 
selected by the ten above, creating a real ‘stakeholder board’ in which interested parties have to 
reach a significant level of agreement in order to govern the corporation (Poole and Butler 2002). 
This shared governance with airline representatives sitting on Nav Canada’s board was one of the 
key factors explaining the success story of Nav Canada (Heaver and Waters 2005, 792) The 
Board is far removed from government and political intervention but with consensual governance 
that supports the best interests of both ANS provision and ANS users in Canada. What is 
achieved with Nav Canada is therefore a joint “user-pay and user-say” through the shared 
governance model. This has not been achieved for airports: users feel that they do not really have 
a say in the process. The above is therefore confirming more than with the content of the airport 
rent, it is really with the “user-pay” algorithm that the issue lies and the causal relation of user-
pay user-say that is not adequately realized. 
                                                 
67
 Respondent from the GTAA, interview conducted on 02/04/2012. 
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2.2. The Referential: “User-Pay” and “User-Say” 
The following algorithm is present in the case of Nav Canada: “user-pay, user-say”. In the case of 
the four largest airports, the “user-pay” is a core algorithm, but the increasing costs and charges 
of airports have made users requesting a greater “user-say”.  
 Based on the above, it can be said that the issue of the ground lease rent payments 
required by the federal governments has engendered a high degree of tension among the 
stakeholders of the Canadian air transport sector. If for almost all actors the rent does indeed 
constitute an issue that should be discussed, a deeper analysis reveals that the rent is just the 
visible tip of the iceberg. There is a real discontent, but also a real anxiety among all actors over 
the cost structure of Canadian airports. A synthesis of the various interviews indicates that the 
four largest airports are worried because they are put at a competitive disadvantage with their U.S 
competitors (for both point-to-point traffic and hub traffic). They also feel that the government 
could improve this situation by simply changing the taxation and rent framework imposed upon 
airport authorities. It also shows that aircraft operators are worried because they assume the cost 
of providing airport services through user charges, and in this sense they feel that there is a “user 
pay” philosophy that does not go hand in hand with the corresponding “user say”. They also 
believe that airports are given too much freedom in their charging and spending capacity: they 
recognize that consultation mechanisms are in place, but they would like to see upstream 
safeguards and they would like to see their voice being heard more. In that sense they feel that 
there is a “user pay” philosophy that does not go hand in hand with the corresponding “user say”.  
 What appears thus is a cognitive dissonance in the Canadian sectoral referential for air 
transport: key actors of the airport and the airline (both domestic and international) involved in 
airport activities do not recognize some of core the policy instruments that affect the cost 
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structure of the four largest Canadian airports as being still valid and relevant for the regulation 
of their sector, and they subsequently do not recognize the legitimacy of such policy instruments 
to justify the direction of a policy and the modalities of its implementation (Muller 2000). What 
is at stake is that these instruments prevent the “user-pay” algorithm to be translated into policies 
that effectively allow an engagement of the airport and airline actors in a “user-pay” and “user-
say” perspective. The analysis indeed reveals that the algorithm is not only “user pay”, but also in 
the case of monopolistic airports funded through charges “user-say”. This dissonance between the 
algorithm and the effects of the content of the rent instrument as well as other cost-related 
instruments explains the tensions among and between actors of the Canadian civil aviation sector, 
who do not see any convergence between on one hand their perception of their sector and its 
regulation, and on the other hand the parameters that support Canada’s airport policy.  
In other words, the “user-pay” algorithm is at stake (along with the associated rent 
instrument), because both airports and airlines consider that it is possible to decrease this “pay 
element”, for instance by decreasing government levies on air transportation and/or by better 
integrating the views of users with respect to spending and investments. The content of the rent 
instrument crystallizes this cognitive dissonance, in that it simplifies the cost issue at Canada’s 
four largest airports, allowing all actors of the sector and beyond the sector to come to the 
realization that there is an issue with the core principles that support Canada’s airport policy. This 
explains why air transport stakeholders have given much attention to the rent issue, but this also 
explains why it is necessary to go beyond the rent to understand the drastic cognitive dissonance 
that threatens the stability of the referential. 
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D – Conclusion: Assessing the Cognitive Dissonance 
Theoretical works that relate to the cognitive analysis of public policy all consider that a policy 
change is to be expected given: a) the presence of a major cognitive dissonance(s), and b) a space 
of mediation through which actors of a sector are both able to reformulate the sectoral referential 
and its associated policy and policy instruments, and in a position to effectively implement a 
policy change. The empirical analysis of the tensions related to the rent and the cost structure 
within the Canadian airport referential shows that there is a major cognitive dissonance related to 
the “user-pay” algorithm.  
Nevertheless, tensions are confined to this algorithm: interviewees do not draw 
spontaneous lines between these tensions and other elements and algorithms of the Canadian 
airport referential. Other elements of tensions do exist. For instance, the following chapter 
demonstrates that Canada’s international air policy and the access to Canada’s largest airport is a 
clear element of tensions and conflicts, but actors do not combine the access to Canada’s airports 
with the level of user charges in the perspective of challenging the sectoral referential. 
Conversely, they perceive these two elements of tensions as having different causes and impacts, 
and as being separate issues that should be dealt with separately (cf. infra). Furthermore, tensions 
on the “user-pay” algorithm are well defined within the referential, whose core values, norms and 
images have not been questioned by any of the respondents. All are taking for granted the 
commercialization of airports, the market-oriented management and operation of airport services 
and facilities, and the funding of airport activities through cost-related user charges. 
Consequently, there is no a space of mediation through which key actors would be both willing 
and in position to reformulate the sectoral referential and its associated policy and policy 
instruments. No major airport policy change is thus expected. 
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 Some evidence supports the claim that no major policy change is likely to occur. 
According to a former senior executive of the airport industry: “the real world is when Her 
Majesty tastes revenue, she does not let it go easily
68”. In other words, the Government of Canada 
relies on the money extracted from airport rents, which is a significant source of revenue, to fund 
Transport Canada. Due to this situation, most actors agree that it is unlikely that any policy 
change will occur. This can be extended to the entire cognitive dissonance. For many 
stakeholders within Transport Canada, the cost issue does not threaten the air transport system. 
According to a Transport Canada’s senior officer, “If you look at Air Canada or WestJet, airports 
and ANS costs represent less than more or less 10% of their ongoing costs. So, rents represent 
around 1% of the cost of a ticket, between $2.5 and $4 on a ticket. Of course you can argue that 
every dollar of a ticket has an impact, and you can forecast how much it can decrease the 
traffic… In reality, it does not make any difference. $2.5 does not make any difference. 69” On the 
one hand, the rent and all other airport charges and costs do not seem to be problematic for 
Transport Canada’s officers, and on the other hand it is unlikely to see elected officials giving up 
an easy and significant source of revenue. Neither the four airport operators nor aircraft operators 
are in a situation of power through which they could reformulate some parameters of the 
referential and subsequently implement related policy changes. 
 Despite this situation, there have been some calls from within the state’s apparatus to 
acknowledge the presence of this cognitive dissonance and act on it through an instrument policy 
change. A very recent report prepared for and endorsed by the Standing Senate Committee on 
Transport and Communications entitled The Future of Canadian Air Travel: Toll Booth or Spark 
Plug? Report on the Future Growth and Global Competitiveness of Canada’s Airports, 
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 Respondent from the Canadian airport industry, interview conducted on 22/02/2012. 
69
 Respondent from Transport Canada, interview conducted on 13/03/2012. 
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concluded that government taxes and fees associated with air travel, starting with ground rents, 
should be reduced in order to make air travel in Canada more affordable and more competitive 
(Senate 2012a, 15). The Senate’s conclusion follows to a qualitative research (dozens of air 
transport stakeholders were interviewed for the purpose of preparing this report) whose results 
are similar to those presented in the dissertation, and its conclusion also relates to the “user-pay” 
algorithm. 
In conclusion, this chapter contributed to the literature by demonstrating through a 
specific and renewed focus on algorithms that key actors may share the same values, norms, and 
images, but they may subsequently draw different causal relationships between policy objectives 
and policy effects, providing a theoretical explanations of long-lasting conflicts that were 
previously unaccounted by political scientists. The chapter demonstrated that actors of a 
referential may not agree on specific causal relations between the content of policy instruments 
and its effect on their sector, while these key actors also share the same core values and agree on 
the general principles of public action that ensue. While ideas-focused approaches of public 
policy analysis have difficulties in giving an account of such situation, this chapter showed that a 
combined focus on algorithms and policy instrument contents was a fruitful approach to 
understand and analyze long-lasting conflicts within unchallenged referential. Despite 
momentous conflicts and tensions about the airport rent and the cost of operating to/from the 
largest Canadian airports, actors do not challenge the market-oriented sectoral referential. A 
detailed analysis rather shows that what is at stake is the content of the policy instrument used by 
the federal government which is not in line with the algorithms of the sectoral referential. The 
content of the related taxation-type instrument (i.e. the airport rent) is criticized as being in 
contradiction with the “user-pay” algorithm: its scale and its allocation are impeding the 
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competitiveness of airport operators and their users while the “user-say” component of the “user-





Chapter IV: Accessing Canada’s largest airports 
In this chapter, I focus on the access to the four largest airports granted to Canadian, transborder 
and foreign air carriers by the federal government. Access to Canada’s largest airport 
infrastructure provides a promising empirical field to ground the theoretical assumptions 
described in the introductory chapters. The topic of access to airport infrastructure is closely 
linked with the market-oriented referential for air transport, in the sense that it would be expected 
that foreign airlines would be allowed to serve Canadian airports to increase the number of routes 
and increase competition in terms of routes, prices and quality of service. Conversely to the 
situation in many other countries (cf. infra), this has not been the case, as the federal government 
has somehow restricted access for foreign carriers to Canada’s largest airports. The chapter 
shows that there have been momentous dissensions between key actors of the airport sector over 
the issue of granting access to foreign air carriers to some or all of the four Canadian largest 
airports while there has been no policy shift to solve the conflicts. If ideas-focused approaches do 
not give an appropriate theoretical account of such a situation, the cognitive analysis of public 
policy as developed by Muller and Jobert gives a set of analytical tools on which a meaningful 
empirical investigation can be established. 
 In order to ground the analysis, I will first give background information on access to 
airport infrastructure. It is indeed necessary to trace the origins of the conditions and restrictions 
associated with market access granted to foreign air carriers in order to understand why some 
airlines are permitted to fly to/from Canada while some others are not. This necessary historical 
background will also ground the characterization of the current global referential and the 
Canadian sectoral referential for air transport and the role that airports have recently been able to 
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play. I will then analyze the current situation to identify clearly the algorithm that relates to 
airport access in the Canadian sectoral airport referential. I will thus be able to demonstrate that 
all actors do agree on the following algorithm: it is through “global marketing” that the largest 
airports are attracting foreign air carriers to their platforms in order to develop their network and 
increase their ability to become major global and/or regional aerotropolises. I will subsequently 
focus on the dissensions over the policies that enable the four largest airport authorities to market 
themselves globally, in order to highlight that there is a cognitive dissonance which is grounded 
in a different understanding of what the algorithm means in terms of public policy 
instrumentation. I will show that the content of policy instruments through which the government 
of Canada grants access to Canada’s airport platforms is puzzling in that it seems to hinder the 
ability of the largest airport operators to market themselves, grow their business, and expand their 
network. It indicates a cognitive dissonance in the Canadian referential for air transport, because 
if actors agree on the core algorithm of “global marketing”, they draw different conclusions on 
what this actually means for the ‘real world’ of the Canadian airport sector and how this should 
therefore been translated into concrete policies and policy instruments. The different 
understanding of what the algorithm means has led actors to strongly disagree on the type of 
policies that should accompany the algorithm. More specifically, the chapter will show that the 
disagreement is sourced in the content of a specific soft law-policy instrument. The conclusion of 
the chapter will address the likelihood of a policy change in order to align the content of the 
policy instrument with the “global marketing” algorithm. 
 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Part A gives background 
information on airport access and the various legal and policy mechanisms that enable airlines to 
serve a given airport and defines the current “global marketing” algorithm of the Canadian air 
transport referential; Part B analyzes the dissensions over access to Canada’s largest airports and 
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demonstrates that it highlights the presence of a dissonance; Part C establishes the cognitive 
dissonance over the global marketing algorithm; and Part D concludes that such dissonance can 
be solved by a change in the content of the public policy instrumentation that relates to market 
access. 
A – Granting Access to Canadian Airports: From States’ Designation to 
Global Marketing 
1. A Brief Background on the Convention on International Civil Aviation and 
the Legal Provisions Regulating the Access to Airports for Air Carriers 
The Convention on International Civil Aviation Organization (Chicago Convention) was signed 
in Chicago in 1944, and it has remained since then the only international legally binding treaty 
upon which international air transport is organized. It is based on the concepts in the Convention, 
its Annexes and the policy it engendered that actors organize their relationships. It is therefore of 
paramount importance to precisely define a few concepts from the Convention in order to pursue 
with a meaningful discussion about the Canadian case.  
First, the notion of market access refers to the rights for international air carriers to obtain 
and carry traffic between two places and beyond (ICAO 2004, 4.1–1). It is important to further 
note that Article 6 of the Chicago Convention prohibits commercial air transport between two 
states without the permission or the authorization of the two states involved: market access rights 
are therefore constrained by specific conditions imposed by states, for instance physical and/or 
geographic specifications of what kinds of traffic may be carried (ICAO 2004, 4.1–2). 
 Second, the practice has been to grant market access right to a state in exchange for being 
granted similar rights through bilateral air services agreements (ASAs). ASAs have thus been the 
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soft-law instrument used for aviation market access objectives. ICAO’s guidance material notes 
that if market access rights provide an opportunity to serve a market, they also constitute a 
limitation on market access because of their specifications. Indeed, states have limited market 
access for various reasons including to bring about some perceived balance in rights exchanged; 
to retain leverage for possible future exchanges; to avoid or minimize competitive impacts on 
their national carriers; to be precise in order to avoid misinterpretation; and to promote or favor 
some market segment (such as that of a particular city or national region). Therefore, ASAs are 
policy instruments used by states to determine the degree of openness of their markets to foreign 
air carriers. 
What really determines market access lies in the restrictions and specifications of 
freedoms of the air that are granted to air carriers to serve a country. The first and second 
freedoms are the rights granted by one state to another state or states to fly across its territory 
and/or to land in its territory for non-traffic purposes. The three following freedoms of the air are 
granted through bilateral ASAs and subject to restriction. The third freedom is the right granted 
by one state to another state to put down, in the territory of the first state, traffic coming from the 
home state of the carrier, and the fourth freedom is the right to take on, in the territory of the first 
state, traffic destined for the home state of the carrier. Finally, the fifth freedom is the right to put 
down and to take on, in the territory of the first state, traffic coming from or destined to a third 
state. Finally, freedoms beyond the five freedoms are characterized as “so-called” freedoms 
because they are usually not incorporated into air services agreements and other treaties. The so-
called sixth freedom is the right of transporting, via the home state of the carrier, traffic moving 
between two other states. The so-called seven freedom is the right of transporting traffic between 
the territory of the granting state and any third state with no requirement to include on such 
operation any point in the territory of the recipient state. The so-called eighth and ninths 
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freedoms are the rights of transporting cabotage
70
 traffic and are outside the scope of this 
dissertation. A useful graphical illustration of the freedoms is also provided in Annex E. 
In order to grasp the degree of openness of an air transport market, one must therefore 
consider the ASAs and the freedoms of the air they allow. A state signing ASAs allowing foreign 
air carriers to carry fifth and sixth freedom traffic to/from its territory is drastically opening its 
market to competition and is strengthening market mechanisms, while a state signing only a 
limited number of ASAs restricted to third and four freedoms is implementing a highly 
protectionist air transport policy. ICAO has documented an impressive growing number of liberal 
ASAs, noting that from 1992 to 2011, more than 400 of the most liberal ASAs only (the so-called 
open-skies agreements) had been concluded involving 145 states (ICAO 2013c). This trend is 
congruent with a market-oriented referential for air transport, making the opening of the skies a 
norm of the referential. 
2. A Brief Background on Canada: Market Access through Airports 
This section undertakes a historical overview (1940s-mid 1990s) in order to understand the 
current role of the largest Canadian airports in the referential.  
2.1. Bilateralism in Air Services Agreements: A Drastic Restriction on 
Airport Growth (1940s-1960s) 
All the previous definitional elements concern airports in an indirect manner. In the exercise of 
their sovereignty and under bilateral air services agreements, states can designate specific aircraft 
operators that are allowed to provide service in other countries and they can also designate 
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 Cabotage refers to the transport of domestic air traffic within a State other than a carrier’s home State 
(ICAO 2004, 4.1–10). 
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specific air routes on which aircraft operators are allowed to fly. The ASA instrument is thus used 
to target, or designate, specific airports. Before the deregulation that occurred in the late 1970s 
and in the 1980s, states used to designate their national flag carrier as well as a limited number of 
airports from which international air carriers were allowed to serve the country. For example, in 
the case of Canada, the federal government signed several bilateral ASAs with European 
countries, in which it imposed European aircraft operators to land at Montreal’s airport. Montreal 
thus became the Canadian gateway for transatlantic air traffic. The only international air carriers 
that were granted the right to land at Toronto’s airport were Air Canada, Canadian Pacific 
Airlines (CPA) and British Overseas Airways Corp (BOAC). As a result of the content of the 
ASA instrument by the Canadian government, international air traffic was highly concentrated in 
Montreal. The federal government did not grant foreign airlines the right to develop their 
activities in Ontario or in Western Canada (Discazeaux and Polèse 2007, 27–28). 
 Thus, by regulating market access through the ASA instrument, the federal government 
also regulated the access to Canadian air transport infrastructure. More precisely, it chose which 
airports could handle international air traffic and which airports could not. Montreal became the 
center for international air transport in Canada, not due to the capacity of the airport, but because 
of the bilateral air transport regime that was developed after the adoption of the Chicago 
Convention and the role given to states in the exercise of their sovereignty.  
2.2. A First Relaxation: A Shift in the Designation of Air Carriers and 
Canadian Cities (1970s) 
The early international air policy implemented since the 1940s began to change in the early 1970, 
when the government of Canada allowed new airlines to serve the Canadian market. The policy 
change was twofold and indirectly impacted the role of airports in Canada. By granting 
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international routes to an increased number of airports, the government started to undermine the 
role of Montreal airport as the sole entry point in Canada and to give other airports a role in 
market access.  
In 1964 the federal government officially designated a second airline to carry the 
Canadian flag abroad. CP Air, a parent company of the Canadian Pacific Railway based in 
Western Canada, began to grow in the 1950s and 1960s, both on national and on the limited 
international routes it had been allowed to operate from Vancouver since 1948 (Corbett 1965)
71
. 
In 1964, the federal government decided to adjust its international air policy by adopting a formal 
division of the world and by allocating international routes to either TCA or CP Air according to 
this division. In this bilateral air regime, the government granted all international routes to TCA, 
with the exception of Pacific routes, and more specifically routes to Japan, Australia and Asia 
(Clancy 2004, 239). CP Air served its transpacific routes from the airport of Vancouver, making 
it a new point of entry to Canada along with the Montreal airport. The change in Canada’s 
international air policy that occurred in 1964 thus impacted the notion of airports as point of 
entry, by officially giving a role to a second airport in handling international traffic. If this policy 
change should not be overemphasized, as routes allocated to CP Air were not the most strategic 
ones (Stevenson 1987, 208), it nevertheless constitutes the first official step back from the 
designation of the airport of Montreal as the sole point of entry to Canada for international 
flights. 
The second element regards transborder flight and the bilateral air relations between 
Canada and the United States. The first bilateral air services agreement between Canada and the 
United States predated the ratification of the Chicago Convention and was signed in 1938, but 
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major developments occurred after the Second World War with the signature of two ASAs (1945 
and 1950) which included for the first time specific route schedules and limited fifth freedom 
rights. Under the 1945 ASA, designated Canadian air carriers were granted the right to operate 8 
routes to the United States and designated American air carriers were reciprocally granted the 
right to operate 10 routes to Canada. The 1966 and 1974 agreements increased the number of 
routes designated air carriers were allowed to operate (Dresner 1992). The consequence of the 
expansion of the number of routes operated by both American and Canadian carriers was to 
increase the number of Canadian airports receiving transborder flights and to increase the density 
of transborder traffic at some airports. Thus, similar to the designation of a sphere of influence 
dedicated to CP Air, this evolution of the bilateral relation with the United States changed the 
scope of the ASA instrument. Consequently, it officially challenged the position of the airport of 
Montreal in the handling of international air traffic. A growing number of airports were granted 
right to handle international and transborder air traffic, in a trend that clearly shows that airports 
could play their own role in the international air transport sector and with respect to market 
access. 
In terms of the Canadian air transport referential, the international air policy from World 
War Two to the late 1970s can subsequently be qualified as follows. In line with what was said 
on the funding of airport infrastructure at that time, the main player was the Canadian federal 
government, and it played the most prominent role with respect to market access. In terms of 
norms, the referential was structured by a rigid bilateral regime through which states were 
exerting their sovereign rights to grant access to their territory: airports were not part of the 
picture. Canada’s international air policy was formulated by diplomats and supported by 
diplomatic purposes. 
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2.3. A Second Relaxation: The Deregulation of Air Transport and 
Further Shift in the Designation of Cities  
The evolution in Canada’s international air policy that began in the late 1970s took a dramatic 
shift in the mid-1980s with the deregulation of international air transport. By putting airline 
competition at the core of its air transport policy, the government indirectly impacted the role of 
airports. They ceased to be the point of entry to a country, but they rather became a variable 
considered by competing airlines when operating an air route.  
A real policy shift through which airports were granted a new role with respect to market 
access occurred in the mid 1980’s with the deregulation of the airline industry and the 
liberalization of Canada’s international air policy. A new framework entitled Freedom to Move 
was released in 1985, following which the Progressive-Conservative Government of Brian 
Mulroney took many steps towards the deregulation of the airline industry: loosening of 
regulatory pricing policies for both domestic and international traffic, deregulation of the 
domestic market in southern Canada, privatization of Air Canada in 1989, and above all 
termination of the formal division of the world between CP Air and Air Canada (Dempsey, 
Buzdugan, and Nyampong 2005). Since Canadian air carriers were free to operate international 
air transport without any consideration of spheres and zones, Canadian Airlines International 
(former CP Air) could seize the possibility to open new routes from Vancouver, Montreal or 
Toronto to European countries, while Air Canada (former TCA) could do the same to Asian 
countries. This loosening in the content of the ASA instrument gave a new role to Canada’s 
largest airports, which were given the possibility to compete for the opening of such routes to any 
of the aircraft operators who would be interested in operating them. This new freedom was 
granted to airlines to develop and expand their networks and grow their business. In addition, 
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despite the remaining economic regulation imposed upon international air transport, the 
designation of Montreal as the point of entry to Canada was progressively relaxed. In 1972, the 
federal government changed its use of the ASA instrument by allowing international air carriers 
to land in Toronto: Toronto airport was accessible to an international air carrier under the 
condition that it would provide an equivalent service to Montreal. In 1985, the federal 
government allowed connecting traffic to Toronto, and Montreal airport immediately lost its 
status of point of entry to and point of transit in Canada (Discazeaux and Polèse 2007, 31). 
 In terms of referential, this period signaled the beginning of a shift. The restrictive content 
of ASA instruments engendered a rigid bilateral regime through which states were exerting their 
sovereign rights to grant access to their territory without giving any role to airports was 
progressively redrawn through the designation of new cities. Airports were given a limited 
autonomy in their capacity to convince air carriers to develop new routes and to attract new air 
carriers as well.  
3. The Canadian Referential for Air Transport: Airport Global Marketing 
The previous paragraphs demonstrated that airports were often not even considered as a key 
variable in the design and the implementation of Canada’s international air policy, and that such a 
situation began to change only in the 1980s.  
 Nonetheless, it is really in the mid-1990s that the situation drastically changed in Canada. 
A new international air policy was implemented in 1994, followed by the signature of an Open 
Skies Agreement with the United States. The remainder of this section: a) demonstrates that these 
two events are at the core of the definition of the current Canadian referential for air transport 
because they have introduced a significant market-orientation to the definition of Canada’s 
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international air policy; and b) details the algorithm related to airports and access to infrastructure 
in the current sectoral referential. 
3.1. The 1994 International Air Policy and the 1995 Open Skies 
Agreement with the United States 
The mid-1990s signaled a drastic shift in Canada’s international air policy. A new referential was 
progressively formulated and translated into policies and policy instruments that would give 
airports a new role. Doug Young again played a momentous role in the change of referential by 
creating of a space of mediation dedicated to Canada’s international air policy and which 
gathered government officials, representatives of Transport Canada, of Air Canada and of 
Canadian Airlines International. Its objective was to redraw the designation of air carriers and the 
regulation of international air transport. In the end, the Minister personally decided to allow 
direct competition on international routes between the two Canadian air carriers, and to allow 
foreign airlines to serve Canadian airports (with the exception of Toronto-Pearson) even if no 
Canadian air carrier would serve this country (Leclerc 2004). Airports played a secondary but 
important role in the mediation process through which they argued in favor of a greater 
liberalization of Canada’s international air policy that would permit foreign carriers to open new 
routes to Canada and Canadian carriers to expand their networks. And indeed, research shows 
that Canadian bilaterals based on the 1994 international air policy, in comparison with previous 
bilaterals, appeared to expand Canadian international air markets and limit traffic diversion to the 
United States (Dresner and Oum 1998).  
A second drastic change occurred in 1995 with the signature of an Open Skies agreement. 
Open skies give air carriers of contracting states unlimited access to operate routes to and from 
any point in each other’s territory, removing restrictions on route (and thus airport) selection, 
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capacity, and pricing, thereby favoring the carriage of fifth freedom traffic. In that sense, they are 
a much looser instruments than rigid ASAs (Havel 2009, 12–13). In the case of the Canada-
United States open skies agreement signed in 1995, the accord included the removal of 
restrictions on air travel (thus allowing unrestricted cross-border services), pricing freedom (with 
the liberalization of Canada-US fare approval process), and several provisions on slot allocation 
and code-sharing (Monteiro, Krause, and Downs 2002).  
 The design of this instrument and its implementation after the ratification of the open 
skies agreement is a landmark for Canada’s major airports in that it represents their first 
opportunity to market themselves, attract new users and grow their business without any 
intervention from the federal government. Airports were given total freedom in their ability to go 
in the U.S. market, and convince American air carriers to fly to their infrastructure. This open 
skies agreement led to a sharp increase in the capacity of scheduled airline services between the 
two countries. In the first year alone, transborder traffic grew up by 25% (Blank and Prentice 
2012, 11). In addition, the numbers of both new services and carriers serving more than one 
Canadian airport increased sharply after 1995, leading to a subsequent increase in the volume of 
passengers (Monteiro, Krause, and Downs 2002).  All of these elements characterized the new 
role of Canada’s four largest airports in the current Canadian referential for air transport. 
3.2. The “Global Marketing”: An Algorithm of the Canadian 
Referential for Air Transport 
A new phenomenon subsequently emerged: airport marketing. While this activity was not 
considered a core element of airport management in the past, the liberalization of air transport has 
made airports to compete for routes and for carriers (Thelle, Pedersen, and Harhoff 2012). 
Airport operators consequently developed marketing departments in order to forecast air traffic, 
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build business cases, and market their cities in order to convince airlines to choose their 
infrastructure (Graham 2008; Echevarne 2010).  
 In Canada, the referential for air transport has integrated this global shift, and as it 
occurred for airport management and financing, market access has been at the core of the 
parameters that define and support the Canadian referential and the policies derived from it. 
Indeed, Canada has ceased to designate Montreal as the only point of entry to the country: 
American air carriers are free to choose the airports they want to use in Canada, while foreign air 
carriers are still constrained by the bilateral regimes but are given more freedom. This retreat of 
the federal government in designating routes and airports allowed newly formed airport operators 
to play a role in Canada’s international air policy: airport managers developed new departments 
whose work has been to produce business cases and marketing strategies in order to attract 
airlines. In liberalized air transport markets, airport operators have become responsible for their 
own fate by being given the tools to grow their international air traffic. This has mainly 
concerned the four largest airport operators, as their cities are the main business centers of 
Canada and as they are the only ones in Canada with sufficient local markets to support 
transoceanic traffic or with the possibility of developing fifth and sixth freedom traffic. 
 Consequently, global marketing of airports is a fundamental algorithm of the Canadian 
referential for air transport that has been in place since the mid-1990s. It identifies the stalemate 
of the previous policy (an anachronistic access to airport platforms rules), proposes a solution 
(involve the airports) that will solve the stalemate (airports will grow their network by attracting 
new carriers). Such algorithm does really highlight a causal relation between a perceived problem 
and a solution to fix it congruently with the norms and values of a referential. Indeed, the 
algorithm can be specified as follows: 
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- “In a market-oriented perspective, it is not the role of the government to designate airports 
that are authorized to handle transborder and international traffic”; 
-  “Operators of the largest international airports are responsible for attracting air carriers 
and developing their network”; 
- “Because airports compete for air traffic, they should market themselves on the global 
routes market”; 
Theoretically, such an algorithm means that key actors would be assessing the international 
policy of Canada, they would draw causal relationship between the perceived successes/failures 
of the policy with the ability of airports to market themselves and widen the access to their 
platforms to foreign air carriers. Several empirical elements demonstrate the importance of the 
“global marketing” algorithm. For instance, airports have strengthened their marketing 
departments and developed their capabilities to build business cases. Moreover, the senior 
management of airport authorities is directly in charge of monitoring and delivering these 
activities, indicating how crucial is this business. The airport authorities of Toronto, Montreal, 
Vancouver and Calgary all have a senior manager in charge of attracting and developing 
international air services, for instance directors or vice-presidents in charge of network 
development, air service marketing, etc.
72
  Further evidence of the importance of the algorithm 
in the Canadian referential lies in its impact on public policy. In 2006, the Conservative 
Government of Stephen Harper formulated and implemented a new international air policy to 
replace the previous one elaborated in 1994. Entitled the Blue Sky Policy, its core objective is the 
proactive negotiation of open skies-type agreements, given that they are in Canada’s best 
interests. It is further stated in the policy that Canada’s main goals in negotiating agreements are 
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to provide a framework that encourages competition and development of new and expanded 
international air services to benefit travelers, shippers, and the tourism and business sectors; 
provide opportunities for Canadian airlines to grow and compete successfully in a more 
liberalized global environment; enable airports to market themselves in a manner unhindered by 
bilateral constraints to the greatest extent possible: support and facilitate Canada’s international 
trade objectives; and support a safe, secure, efficient, economically healthy and viable Canadian 
air transportation industry (Transport Canada 2006a, 2–3). 
The third objective of Blue Sky is of paramount importance, because it translates into 
public policy an algorithm of the Canadian referential, demonstrating the transformation of the 
role of airports in international air services development. A senior officer of DFAIT describes 
how Blue Sky enables airports to play a new role: “Fundamentally the international agreement 
framework is a facilitator; commercial operators
73
 can take advantage of it. Now we have new 
services with Europe, Air Canada increased its service to Europe. With other agreements we saw 
new traffic coming from every corner of the world, from Qatar, from China, from Brazil, and it is 
Blue Sky that allows that to happen.
74” It should nevertheless be noted that the Blue Sky policy is 
not a fully liberalized framework: a certain number of the bilaterals signed under Blue Sky are 
not as permissive as those made under the U.S. Open Skies policy, and it has been argued that 
Canada’s overall air transportation policy remains, to a degree, protectionist (Ruffilli 2012). 
Despite this, Blue Sky has received the assent of Canada’s main air carriers through NACC 
(NACC 2009, 23), which characterize the policy as a “balanced liberalization policy framework 
for Canada”, and airport officials that were interviewed shared the vision expressed by a 
respondent, who considered that: “C’est un peu protectionniste, c’est vrai, il faut le dire. […] En 
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 Respondent from DFAIT, interview conducted on 22/03/2012. 
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général je trouve la politique un peu trop restrictive.
75” In any case, Blue Sky has provided a 
framework through which the four largest airports have looked for new routes and aircraft 
operators to operate them. And indeed, airports have used the Blue Sky framework to play this 
new role. According to a former official of the Canadian Airports Council, “the governance 
structure of airport authorities in Canada allows them to exploit all the benefits of these bilateral 
agreements: they can exploit all the advantages of this system and sell themselves as a destination 
for air carriers, they can market their city, and they did a wonderful job in attracting new carriers 
and new destinations.
 76” In this statement, the interviewee clearly highlights the presence of the 
algorithms that concerns airport marketing and the structuring role it plays in the Canadian 
referential for air transport. 
This algorithm is consistent and in line with the algorithm related to airport financing. 
Indeed, both algorithms have in common to reject government interventionism and to rely on 
market mechanisms (either “user-pay” for airport costs or “global marketing” to grow the 
business). Theoretically, it is expected by the cognitive analysis of public policy as developed by 
Muller and Jobert that the algorithms of a sectoral referential are related and grounded on the 
same bases. Indeed, algorithms of the sectoral referential must be congruent with the global 
referential: their core assumption must be market-oriented related. Therefore, two sectoral 
algorithms are related because they share the same core market-oriented elements. 
On a final note, key actors are similar whether the topic is access to airport infrastructure 
(Chapter 4) or airport rent and charges (Chapter 3). On one hand, industry actors are at the 
forefront: airports, because they need to grow their network and therefore need to attract airlines, 
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and airlines, because they compete on routes, prices, quality of service and strategies (offering a 
point-to-point or hub-and-spoke connection) to the airport they serve. Another key actor is the 
federal government, which has the power to grant traffic rights through the content of the ASA 
policy instrument. Finally, it will be shown that experts (both academic and consultants) also play 
an important role in access to infrastructure. Most of these actors agree on the “global marketing” 
algorithm by which airports have to play a momentous role in developing their route network by 
attracting airlines. 
B – A Puzzling Conflict with the United Arab Emirates over Market Access 
to Canada  
The “global marketing” of the largest Canadian airports to attract new carriers and grow their 
network has become a core algorithm of the Canadian sectoral referential. Such algorithm has 
been accompanied by a relaxed designation of cities in ASAs, and more recently formalized 
within the Blue Skye policy. Nevertheless, Canada has experienced a unique situation with regard 
to the content of the ASA instrument, which has not occurred in any other Western country: in 
2010, the federal government refused Emirati air carriers to double their services to Toronto and 
to serve the airports of Vancouver and Calgary. Canada then faced fierce retaliatory measures 
from the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.). The Canadian Forces were ousted from the Emirati 
Camp Mirage military base that they had been using for nine years to supply the Afghanistan 
war, and the U.A.E imposed a $1,000 visa fee on Canadian visitors (Jang 2011b). Even more 
surprising than the dramatic consequence of this dispute is that the restrictive use of the ASA 
with regard to Emirati air carriers appears to fundamentally contradict the “global marketing” 
algorithm of the sectoral referential. Similarly to the content of the ground lease rent, such 
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surprising use of the ASA instrument is unexpected by the cognitive analysis of public policy as 
developed by Muller and Jobert.  
The remainder of this part is organized as follows: 1) the dispute between Canada and the 
U.A.E is described; 2) the specific role of the key actors is assessed in link with the norms, values 
and algorithms of the sectoral referential; and 3) a possible cognitive dissonance is discussed. 
 
 
1. The Dispute  
1.1. Background: U.A.E.-Canada Aviation Relations 
Canada and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) officially entered into air relations in May 1999 
through the establishment of a Memorandum of Understanding on an Agreement between the 
Government of Canada and the Government of the United Arab Emirates on Air Transport. 
Signed in January 2001, the Canada-U.A.E. bilateral air services agreement entered into force in 
October 2002. Routes and associated rights were defined in the bilateral as follows (Canadian 
Transportation Agency 2007): any points can be served by designated carriers; for the U.A.E., 
fifth freedom rights shall be available between points in Canada and points in the U.S.A. but is be 
limited to no more than fifty percent of the seating capacity of the aircraft on each flight; and a 
maximum of four flights per week in each direction (increased to six flights per week in 2003) 
was granted. Air Canada was designated by Canada in 1999, while the U.A.E. designated both 
Emirates Airlines in 2004 and Etihad Awould this leirways in 2007
77
. For Canada, this bilateral 
agreement is similar to many other bilaterals it signed with other countries: Air Canada is 
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any one designated airline shall be subject to the approval of the aeronautical authorities of both 
Contracting Parties. 
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designated as the Canadian air carrier, the designated foreign air carriers can serve their point of 
choice in Canada, fifth freedom traffic is limited, and frequencies are restricted
78
. The scope and 
the content of this ASA instrument appears to be more restrictive than the philosophy behind the 
Blue Sky policy, but it was designed before the formulation of the framework. For the United 
Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), this ASA is nevertheless less liberalized than what the country’s 
international air policy is seeking to achieve. 
Before going into the details, it is first important to note that Emirates Airlines was 
founded in the mid-1980s and has grown spectacularly since: Emirates has indeed virtually 
doubled in size every three years since the early 1990s (Sull, Ghoshal, and Monteiro 2005). Two 
factors contributed to the unique success of Emirates. First, its geographical location: it was 
pointed out that “no major agglomeration on the globe is further than 8,000 nautical miles away 
from DXB. As a result, any two major cities on earth can be connected via Dubai with only one 
stop” (Knorr and Eisenkopf 2007, 1). This ideal location makes Dubai a natural international hub, 
especially convenient for traffic between Europe and the Americas with Asia and with the Middle 
East. The second factor explaining the success of Emirates Airlines lies in the sound aviation 
strategy implemented by the emirate of Dubai: it has pursued on “open skies” policy that has 
allowed over 100 airlines serving 140 destinations to operate out of Dubai airport and the 
government of the Emirate as directly coordinated its aviation policy with the corporate strategy 
of the airline and the airport (Debbage and Alkaabi 2010, 158). The neighbor Emirate of Abu 
Dhabi has copied such a successful strategy and supported the creation and growth of Etihad 
Airways since 2003. The impressive growth of the Emirati air carrier has been made possible by 
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Emirates Airlines has served Toronto-Pearson from Dubai three times a week. Both airlines have chosen 
to concentrate their rights to Canada’s economic center. 
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a policy commitment from governments to ensure the mutual growth of the national flag carrier 
and its hub airport. In each case, the three actors have engaged a strong and exclusive 
relationship, which can be characterized as a triangular relationship, through which the 
interactions, negotiations, and arrangement between the three members of the triangle frame, 
shape, and transform the air transport strategies and policies to their mutual advantage. According 
to Peters: 
 Each actor in the iron triangle needs the other two to succeed, 
and the style that develops is symbiotic. The pressure group 
needs the agency to deliver services to its members and to 
provide a friendly point of access to government, while the 
agency needs the pressure group to mobilize political support for 
its program among the affected clientele. . . . In many ways they 
all represent the same individuals, variously playing roles of 
voter, client, and organization member (Peters 1986, 24). 
 
This model of government-airline-airport relationship in terms of iron triangle is evident 
in the case of the Emirati air carrier, and research shows the strong conjunction of interests 
between the three actors, the coordination of their actions, and the leadership of domestic public 
authorities (Sull, Ghoshal, and Monteiro 2005; Davidson 2009; O’Connell 2011a; O’Connell 
2011b). This model is not unique to Emirati air carrier: the “iron triangle” has been established in 
the case of Air France, Aéroports de Paris and the French government and is also suggested in the 
case of the four other intercontinental European hub airports (Villard 2011b), and with the case of 
Singapore with Singapore Airlines and Singapore International Airport (Raguraman 1997). But 
the strength of the iron triangle in the U.A.E. is unique, as the emirates of Dubai and Abu Dhabi 
haven taken all measures they could take to ensure the development of their flag carrier and hub 
airport. 
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1.2. Adapting the Content of the ASA Soft Law-Type Instrument? 
In order to have an efficient hubbing strategy, it is best for airlines to operate daily flights 
between the hub and its spokes. To minimize the loss of passenger demand through the transfer 
time at the hub, the solution is to implement a wave-system structure consisting of daily 
connection waves for flights to and from the hub airport (Burghouwt 2007, 10). Indeed, 
passengers do not wish to spend two days at Dubai or Abu Dhabi airports before being able to 
find a flight to Toronto, and that is why both Emirates and Etihad, relying on connecting 
passengers to fill their aircraft, need daily connections to Toronto. Emirati civil aviation and 
foreign affairs authorities have therefore pressed the Canadian government to redesign the 
content of the instrument that organizes their aviation relationship by expanding the ASA, in 
order to grant daily flights to Toronto to both carriers and additional frequencies to serve other 
cities. Such a proposal to amend the content of the ASA policy instrument is in line with the 
market-oriented referential and its “global marketing” algorithm, as the airports of Vancouver 
and Calgary both supported the extension of their route network via service to Dubai and/or Abu 
Dhabi and beyond. Numerous presentations were made to Canadian officials at the administrative 
and ministerial levels (Campion-Smith 2009a), but the Canadian Government has each time 
refused to design the ASA instrument. A senior official from Transport Canada justifies the 
decision of Canadian authorities as follows: “ l’objectif d’Emirates ou d’Etihad n’est pas de 
répondre à cette demande bilatérale [de transport entre les deux pays], mais de développer une 
place tournante globale, et d’aller chercher notre marché pour l’amener vers d’autres marchés, 
alors qu’eux-mêmes n’ont pas de demande domestique pour cela. [...] Alors nous, en tant que 
Transports Canada, on doit s’assurer de la concurrence durable et saine à long terme. On prend en 
compte les risques que ça peut avoir, d’ouvrir le marché, et notamment les risqués de perte de 
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services. Par exemple on a des relations très importantes avec le Royaume-Uni, la France et 
l’Allemagne, avec des transporteurs qui offrent des services directs entre les villes des deux pays, 
et qui ont des répercussions importantes pour les affaires et le tourisme. [...] tout le monde y 
trouve son compte. Et ce n’est pas le cas avec les Émirats, qui veulent du trafic 6ème liberté. 
Beaucoup de villes canadiennes ont des lignes vers Londres, Paris, Francfort ou Amsterdam, et 
c’est très important pour ces villes, et quand une compagnie veut ouvrir des lignes qui ne 
répondent pas à un besoin et qui engendrent un déséquilibre massif pour les transporteurs 
canadiens, ça pose problème. Il faut que les choses soient un peu plus raisonnables
79”. 
 Private briefings elaborated by Transport Canada officials went even further. They 
described Emirates Airlines and Etihad Airways as an heavily subsidized air carriers (“the 
governments are helping finance massive wide-body aircraft orders and massive expansion of 
airport infrastructure”) which would just be “an instrument of government policy” and that 
Transport Canada’s role should be to shelter Canadian carriers from Middle Eastern carriers’ 
“unhealthy competition and irrational commercial behaviour” (Campion-Smith 2009b). Emirati 
public authorities and the two designated air carriers did not accept this position. While air 
services negotiations are usually made within diplomatic alcoves, Emirates and Etihad decided to 
go public with this issue. For instance, Etihad’s chief executive gave an interview to a Canadian 
national newspaper in September 2008, in which he stated that “it's a shame that Canada is 
probably one of the last first world markets that hasn't embraced open skies,” adding that “from a 
consumer and competitive point of view not enabling us to operate here daily is not good for 
competition” (Surridge 2008). A few months later, Emirates adopted the strategy of Etihad. The 
airline’s senior vice-president public and international affairs explained in the Toronto Star that 
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by denying permission to begin daily service from Dubai to Toronto, the Government of Canada 
was preventing Emirates from creating several hundred jobs in Toronto, pumping tens of millions 
of dollars into the region's ailing economy and boosting flagging tourism numbers. He also 
expressed its surprise and its frustration to see a Conservative government with a pro-market 
agenda and who often publicly lecture other nations about the dangers of trade protectionism 
refusing to liberalize the bilateral ASA, while the City of Toronto and the Government of Ontario 
would support the U.A.E. bidders (Campion-Smith 2009b). Emirates pursued this strategy of 
going public though numerous press interviews in which it expressed strong frustration towards 
the federal government and mention supports from other players such as airports and provincial 
and municipal governments (Jang 2009; J. Lee-Young 2009; Martin 2010). 
1.3. The Conflict: A Progressive Escalation 
After seeking to bring the debate over the restrictions contained in the 1999 ASA into Canada’s 
local and national newspapers, Emirates engaged experts’ credibility by commissioning a study 
on the liberalization of the bilateral ASA to the Vancouver-based InterVISTAS, a well-
established consulting firm focusing on aviation and tourism issues. It is therefore very clear that 
the dispute lies in the content of the soft law-type instrument (i.e. in the restrictions of the ASA). 
The study concludes that a daily Emirates service to Toronto would annually add 61,027 
passengers on the Dubai-Toronto route, create 344 new direct full-time jobs, add $30.3M in 
direct economic activity at the airport, bring $18.5M in direct tourism spending, and generate 
$10.3M in tax revenue. Similar results were displayed for services to Vancouver and Calgary, 
reinforcing the view that Vancouver and Calgary would also gain from an expansion of their 
network, in line with the “global marketing” referential by which these two airports should be 
free to handle Emirates or Etihad if they wish so. InterVISTAS’ study also points out that 
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Emirates' expansion in Canada would have a low impact on Air Canada's international traffic, 
because the new traffic generated by increased Emirates service to Canada would come from 
markets that Air Canada does not serve. Last but not least, the report specifically mentions the 
three concerned airport authorities as one of the main beneficiaries of a liberalized ASA 
(InterVISTAS 2010, 3–5). 
Of course, the report sparked off vigorous reactions from Air Canada and Transport 
Canada
80
 which refused to reconsider the content of the ASA. The government of the U.A.E. 
made a rare diplomatic move with respect to air services agreements. Following a secret meeting 
gathering senior officials of civil aviation authorities of the two countries in Paris during which 
no agreement was found, (Chase, Taber, and Jang 2010), Abu Dhabi threatened Ottawa to evict 
the Canadian Forces from the Emirati Camp Mirage if the content of the soft law-type instrument 
was not changed. Camp Mirage was established in late 2001 as a hub for Canadian operations in 
nearby Afghanistan, and is located in the vicinity of Dubai. Thus, the U.A.E. linked air 
negotiations to geopolitics in order to convince the Canadian government to grant more access to 
both Emirates Airlines and Etihad Airways. Since the Canadian government refused to both link 
the two issues and expand the 1999 bilateral ASA beyond its limited proposal, the government of 
the U.A.E. gave the Canadian Force a 30-day notice to evacuate the Camp Mirage base and leave 
the country (Chase, Taber, and Jang 2010). In December 2010, the United Arab Emirates 
embassy in Ottawa announced it would start charging Canadian citizens up to $1,000 for visas 
starting January 2, 2011. The $1,000 fee for the entry visa appeared as a seemingly punitive 
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 Air Canada’s spokesperson denounced “Emirates' aggressive tactics to force Canada into a one-sided air 
services agreement” and Transport Canada officially considered that “the rights under the current Canada-
U.A.E. air transport agreement meet the market demands of travellers whose origin or final destination is 
either Canada or the U.A.E” (Jang 2010b). 
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pricing that exceeds global norms
81
 (Freeze 2010). Such retaliatory measures over refusal to 
liberalize existing bilateral air services agreements are exceptional: from the research made for 
the purpose of this dissertation and from the interviews conducted with civil aviation officials, it 
has not been possible to find any other example of such diplomatic and commercial escalation 
over landing rights at foreign airports. In addition, while the position of the Canadian government 
was supported by Air Canada, two provinces went public to express their discontent over the 
U.A.E.-Canada dispute and the Canadian position (Campion-Smith 2011). 
This dispute is clearly linked to a different understanding of what the “global marketing” 
algorithm within a market-oriented referential means for actors. The next sections will 
demonstrate that while actors’ positions appear to be frontally divergent, they all believe that 
their actions are totally aligned with a “global marketing” algorithm within a market-oriented 
referential.  
2. Behind Closed Doors: The Role of Air Canada and of Airport Authorities in 
the Canada-United Arab Emirates Dispute 
2.1. An Apparent United Front: Canadian Airlines Operating 
Scheduled International Services against the Liberalization of the 
Canada-U.A.E. Bilateral 
The first element to be noted is that some stakeholders of the Canadian airport sector responded 
to Emirati’s assertions about the benefits of liberalizing the ASA. Schulich School of Business’ 
Fred Lazar released a counter-report focusing on the additional landing rights at Canadian 
airports claimed by the two Emirati flag carriers, which was made available on the website of Air 
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 It is worth noting that no citizen of any other Western country needs a visa to enter the U.A.E. territory. 
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Canada. The argument of the report is simple: the Emirati air carriers are subsidized, and this 
constitutes an unfair advantage. Granting them more access to Toronto and access to Calgary and 
Vancouver would divert passengers from Air Canada and its Star alliance partners' networks to 
the middle-eastern hubs. This would weaken the presence of Air Canada at the Canadian airports, 
thus weakening both the carrier and the airport operators, leading to economic losses for 
Canada (Lazar 2011). The solution would be to compete on a level playing field in line with the 
principle that international air services should be established “on the basis of equality of 
opportunity” as set out in Chicago Convention sets (ICAO 2006).  In the end, Lazar’s report not 
only provides an answer to InterVISTAS’ study, but it also provides some “scientific” credibility 
to Air Canada’s claims. More than the figures disputed between experts, the report gives Air 
Canada a tool for lobbying and communicating its position by showing that it would not only be 
the victim of the Emirati air carriers, but that airport operators would also be drastically 
weakened.  
In terms of referential, it appears that the notion of level playing field plays a central role for 
some actors of the Canadian air transport sector. This notion is key to understand how some 
actors perceive the meaning of a “global marketing” referential, as compared to other actors 
having a different understating of the same algorithm. In addition to a “global marketing” 
algorithm, growing airport networks should be done in a market-oriented manner by which there 
is a level playing field between competing airlines at these airports. Indeed, the notion of level 
playing field has increasingly been associated with the market-oriented referential. The 
liberalization of markets is a key element of the global referential. Consequently, the 
liberalization of air transport markets is a key element of air transport sectoral referential at the 
domestic level. But the opening of markets and the lifting of capacity limits at airports opened to 
international air traffic has been accompanied by fierce debates over the “level playing field” at 
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the international level: such notion has been central in all the debates of liberalization of market 
access even though there is no common view of what constitutes a level playing field (ICAO 
2012e, 2.4–1; ICAO 2013c). 
The notion of level playing field has helped the key policy actors of the Canadian 
referential to conceptualize (using Muller’s terms) the social identity of their sector as well as the 
correct policy response to maintain this social identity. The following excerpts are extracted from 
interviews conducted with three senior managers of three different Canadian airlines. The three 
airlines operate schedule or charter international flights.  
- According to the first respondent, who works for Air Canada: “You don’t want your own 
market to be destroyed by foreign carriers. It is very unfortunate that the only carriers 
interested in coming here are predatory carriers, with unlimited government funds. It is 
not healthy for the market. The spin on airlines like Emirates is that it is coming to the 
Canadian market, it is taking traffic with no competition, and it brings it to the Asian 
subcontinent. If no one can compete with you, you want to be here!
 82”.  
- For the second respondent, whose air carrier is not a member of any of the three alliances 
and does not have any hubbing strategy: “Emirates est un modèle spécial quand même. Il 
n’y a pas beaucoup de compagnies d’un pays de 4 millions d’habitants qui sont capables 
d’absorber 96 A380 et plus d’une centaine de Dreamliners. Maintenant, c’est pas un 
problème unique à Air Canada. Personnellement, je pense qu’ils ont un plan qui fait du 
sens pour eux autres : on va être la plaque tournante du monde. Mais nous autres, il faut 
qu’on protège nos intérêts à nous. 83 ” 
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 Respondent from Air Canada, interview conducted on 22/03/2012. 
83
 Respondent from a Canadian point-to-point carrier, interview conducted on 23/02/2012. 
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- And finally, according to the third respondent, whose airline is neither a member of an 
alliance nor it has a hubbing strategy: “It is a complicated story. I think that the federal 
government did the right thing. It is because of their model. They are highly subsidized. 
Their model has been designed to destroy the network model of legacy carriers. They are 
trying to put their hubs on the map, with crazy orders of A380 aircraft. And they can order 
them only because they are subsidized. So the extent to which they are subsidized is 
unfair. On the other hand our industry is very fragile.
 84” 
It is clear from these interviews that for these actors, the notion of a “level playing field” 
is at the heart of what they conceive as good international air policy. This is particularly 
significant considering that only one Canadian air carrier is operating long-haul, scheduled 
international air services as part of an integrated air transport network centered on a hub-and-
spokes model. The two other respondents are not confronted by the direct competition of the 
Emirati air carriers, and will probably never be. Nevertheless, they feel that it is the Canadian air 
transport sector as a whole which should compete on a level playing field, and thus that the 
appropriate policy action from the federal government is to maintain safeguards in order to 
protect the Canadian sector. This leads another respondent, who works for one of the two 
Canadian air transport trade associations, to explain that: “I wouldn’t say that the government 
protects Air Canada, but it protects the Canadian airline industry. Not only Air Canada. And this 
is consistent with the government protecting other sectors, for example the automobile sector, or 
agriculture.
85” And during the interviews, all of these respondents acknowledged that their 
organization (and even themselves in some cases) briefed government officials against 
liberalizing the ASA for this playing field reason. 
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 Respondent from a Canadian point-to-point carrier, interview conducted on 29/02/2012. 
85
 Respondent from a U.A.E organization, interview conducted on 28/03/2012. 
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Would this lead to a consideration that, in addition to the “global marketing” algorithm, 
the notion of a level playing field is a parameter of the Canadian air transport referential 
regarding Canada’s international air policy? Is there a complementary algorithm that could be 
formulated as follows: “a level playing field is a condition to international air transport 
liberalization” and “airport global marketing and freedom to handle foreign air carriers is 
conditioned to a level playing field”? The answer is more complicated than it seems, for two 
reasons. First, even in Canada there is not a commonly accepted definition of the conditions 
constituting a “level playing field”, and actions from the Canadian government to protect Air 
Canada on that basis has been easily challenged. Indeed, according to a respondent working for a 
U.A.E. aviation organization: “Air Canada says that Middle-Eastern air carriers receive subsidies, 
for example you cannot strike in the U.A.E. But these are not subsidies. These are cultural issues. 
Cultural differences cannot be overcome, and this is too bad for Air Canada if human rights laws 
in Canada are very prescriptive. And if you take the example of Air Canada, when unions are 
threatening to go on strike, if the government is intervening with a so-called “Back to work” 
legislation, is it an indirect subsidy? If you go on that route, you would be surprised to see the 
expanded concept of subsidies.
 86” The argument is irrefutable: the Harper government has 
repeatedly intervened in Air Canada’s labor relations. In September 2011, 6,800 flight attendants 
returned to work after they reached a deal with Air Canada under the threat of back-to-work 
legislation tabled by the Conservative government. In June 2001, Air Canada’s 3,800 striking 
sales and service agents returned to work after the Conservative Labor Minister tabled back-to-
work legislation in the House of Commons. In March 2012, the House of Commons passed back-
to-work legislation to prevent a work stoppage at Air Canada during the March break vacation 
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season (Global News 2012). The Harper government-appointed arbitrators imposed new 
contracts on Air Canada’s pilots and Air Canada’s ground crew members, each time siding with 
the less advantageous offer made to the labor. In the absence of definition of fair competition 
between airlines, some aviation professionals made a clear point by qualifying this practice of 
indirect subsidies, thus showing that the notion of a level playing field would be too ambiguous 
to be an algorithm of the Canadian referential. This clearly supports the fact that all actors agree 
on a same algorithm, but from this agreement, multiple interpretations arise. It can of course be 
assumed that the long-term impact of the Government interventions in Air Canada labor relations 
have a much more limited impact in term of competitiveness of the carrier as compared to the 
alleged massive subsidies received by Middle Eastern carriers, but the fact remains that it clearly 
shows a different understanding of a similar algorithm.  
The second element is even more interesting. On the one hand, representatives of the 
Canadian airline industry interpret the Canadian air transport policy through the notion of level 
playing field, which constitutes for them a core norm of the referential. Ensuring a level playing 
field between Canadian and foreign air carriers would thus be an explicitly acknowledged 
principle of action that is compatible with the market-oriented values of the referential. But they 
limit it to a level playing field for airline competition: airports are absent in this picture. On the 
other hand, other stakeholders, such as representatives of the four largest airports and of their 
trade association, do not put this notion of level playing field for Air Canada as a core element of 
the referential: it is not this norm that frames their vision of air transport.  
 161 
2.2. An Obviously Disunited Front: The Divergent Vision of the Four 
largest Airport Authorities  
The cognitive analysis of public policy as formulated by Muller and Jobert would expect all key 
actors of the sectoral referential to share a somehow similar understanding of the notion of level 
playing field. But by focusing the analysis on the algorithm level, or the causal relations drawn 
by actors, it is possible to see that this not the case. Indeed, not only key airport actors do not 
share the same understanding than key airlines actors, but in addition they do not share the same 
understanding between themselves. If they all agree with the “global marketing” algorithm by 
which they should be free to engage in business relationship with airlines in order to grow their 
networks, they do not draw the same causal relationships in terms of the content of the ASA 
policy instruments and the enforcement of a level playing field between airlines. 
With the emergence of a market-oriented referential for air transport in Canada, the four 
largest airports have become autonomous players in the development of air services from/to their 
runways and terminals. They have become free to get into the air service market and lobby air 
carriers to develop new routes. This is highlighted by a senior executive of a Canadian air carrier, 
who noticed that “Now airports have their own marketing departments, they do research and 
studies on new routes, they hire consultants, and they try to attract operators to establish new air 
services. They do that with Emirates, but they also do the same thing with us, they approach us as 
well. All what they want is to develop their network, and they will look for an air carrier willing 
to do it.
 87” 
 Consequently, three among the four largest airports which were not directly connected to 
the Middle East have been trying to establish such connections. Airport authorities at Montreal, 
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 Respondent from a Canadian airline, interview conducted on 11/04/2012. 
 162 
Vancouver and Calgary held several meetings with representatives of middle-eastern air carriers, 
government officials in the Middle East, and government officials in Canada in order to revise 
the design and the content of ASA instruments in order to attract air carriers to their platforms. 
They nevertheless followed different strategies. 
 First, airports in Western Canada decided to support the bid of Emirati air carriers for the 
liberalization of the Canada-U.A.E. ASA bilateral. This decision was based on a liberal 
interpretation of the Blue Sky policy, which was seen as the policy-side of the market-oriented 
referential for air transport. A senior executive of YVR defined its identity as follows: “As an 
airport authority we are free-traders, we want more carriers coming to Vancouver International 
Airport, and we have spent a lot of time in Ottawa trying to convince the government that it 
would be good to have these carriers.
 88” And an official from Etihad confirmed that these two 
airports have fully played a role in the potential development of routes to the Middle-East: “They 
[the airport authorities of Vancouver and Calgary] are actively engaged in having us come. The 
airport authority of Calgary made us an offer in the past, they are very keen. And airports in 
Canada, and especially Calgary, are very much trying to attract us
89”. Despite the market 
behavior of these two airport authorities, which is in line with the Canadian referential for air 
transport, the Canadian government decided not to put the finishing touches on their effort by 
allowing Emirati air carriers to access their platforms: “Oui, les aéroports y ont intérêt [à recevoir 
des vols d’Emirates et d’Etihad], notamment Vancouver et Calgary, parce que ça ne peut 
qu’augmenter le volume de trafic, et donc la connectivité et les revenus. Mais c’est le 
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 Respondent from YVR, interview conducted on 21/03/2012. 
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 Respondent from Etihad, interview conducted on 07/03/2012. 
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gouvernement qui refuse. Alors que ça ne peut qu’augmenter les volumes de trafic à ces 
aéroports. Mais ce ne sont pas les aéroports qui décident.
 90” 
Such interpretation is nonetheless contentious. For instance, a senior executive of a 
Canadian air carrier (which is not Air Canada) provides another understanding of the interests of 
the airports of Calgary and Vancouver combined with the long-term interest of Canada’s air 
transport in order to explain their unsuccessful attempt to develop routes to the Middle East in 
spite of Blue Sky: “It would benefit, in the short term, to certain stakeholders. Airports will 
become spokes of Emirates and Etihad hubs, they will become new points, and it will increase 
their connectivity and their volumes. But in the long term it may be problematic, because new 
international service will go to foreign hubs. Volume would benefit to Dubai or Abu Dhabi, but 
in the end it may decrease at Toronto because Air Canada will decrease its service.
 91” This 
understanding of the situation is shared by the vast majority of Canadian airlines representatives 
and Canadian government officials that were interviewed for the purpose of this dissertation, as 
demonstrates the following representative excerpt: “[These two airports] don’t care… their 
primary stakeholders are the users. So they would welcome foreign carriers, even if that would 
result in weakening domestic traffic. But because Emirates and Etihad are highly subsidized, they 
are going to win the battle, they will bring traffic in the short term. But the problem is that they 
will weaken domestic carriers, which will cut international service, but also local service and this 
will threaten local traffic. Airport authorities should not undermine Canada’s domestic network! 
It wouldn’t take much to weaken Air Canada and WestJet, which would cut their networks. 92”  
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 Respondent from ICAO, interview conducted on 28/02/2012. 
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 Respondent from a Canadian airline, interview conducted on 01/03/2012. 
92
 Respondent from a Canadian airline, interview conducted on 29/02/2012. 
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From these two representative excerpts, it can be clearly seen that air carriers 
representatives that operate scheduled or charter international air services do not put their 
interests and airport operators interest at the same level within the Canadian referential for air 
transport. At the airport authorities of Vancouver and Calgary, the understanding of the market-
oriented referential is both broad and liberal, in that airports are seeing themselves as market-
players. At the airline level, the market-oriented referential is understood as a framework 
ensuring a level playing field for airline competition, which conditions the effective freedom for 
airports to market themselves. The airlines are thus adding the level playing field as a core 
parameter of the referential, without providing any shared definition of what it is and what it 
means for airports. This creates a fundamental ambiguity between key actors of the air transport 
sector. Second, Toronto and Montreal airport authorities opted for maintaining a restrictive 
bilateral to maintain existing routes and protect Air Canada, thus further highlighting the 
ambiguity between key actors of the sector. The position of the leaders of Aéroports de Montréal 
represents a middle-ground between the divergent positions of the airports of Vancouver and 
Calgary on the one hand and the representatives of the Canadian airlines operating international 
services on the other hand. Indeed, ADM officials appear to be satisfied with somewhat 
restrictive agreements that allow them to maintain their traffic to European hubs. According to a 
respondent from ADM: “Nos marchés sont entièrement différents [de ceux de Vancouver et 
Calgary], ils ont juste une petite fraction de leur trafic vers l’Europe, mais peu de transfert 
d’activités avec l’Europe. Les gens de Vancouver sont plus ouverts aux open skies car ils ont plus 
à y gagner, alors que Toronto a plus à y perdre, et Montréal est un peu entre les deux. C’est un 
number game à la fin… C’est aussi simple que ça. Certains pensent qu’Emirates à Montréal peut 
stimuler le trafic, mais s’ils viennent tous les jours en A380, et je ne sais pas comment ils vont le 
remplir, je ne sais pas si on garde trois fréquences d’Air France tous les jours, et des fréquences 
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vers Francfort, Munich et Londres. À Montréal on ne veut pas accorder de fréquence quotidienne 
à un A380 du golfe car on ne veut pas que notre trafic vers l’Europe s’effondre. 93”  
Preserving the European connections from Montréal-Trudeau is a preoccupation of the 
top-management of the airport: a daily frequency to the Middle-East would be seen favourably by 
the airport, on the condition that it be operated with reasonable capacities. While Calgary and 
Vancouver would welcome a liberalization of the Canada-U.A.E. bilateral ASA, Montreal would 
rather favour a limited liberalization that would preserve its European traffic (even though it is 
clear for the senior executives officials that were interviewed that there is a global trend of 
liberalization that Canada will have to adjust its position). With respect to the U.A.E. dispute per 
se, ADM was much more discrete than the other three airport authorities, for the following 
reason: “On a été pas mal moins vocal que Toronto et Calgary sur le sujet, mais on a rencontré 
Etihad et Emirates. C’était clair dans le plan d’expansion d’Emirates qu’ils voulaient deux vols 
par jour de Toronto, et un par jour de Vancouver et de Calgary, et Montréal n’était pas vraiment 
dans les plans. Donc on a été moins visible.
 94” ADM officials recognize that Gulf air carriers 
cannot be kept out of Canada and that some liberalization will become inevitable at some point, 
and they seek to adjust this liberalization. Since Montréal-Trudeau is not and will never be Air 
Canada’s main international hub, ADM’s interests lies in the expansion of its network and the 
preservation of its European routes. 
With respect to Toronto, the executives of GTAA have chosen to support the limitation of 
landing rights for Emirati air carriers. They perceive that these carriers engender an unfair 
competition with Air Canada, and they have made this position public. Their logic is as follows: 
Toronto-Pearson is the only platform through which Air Canada has built its international 
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hubbing strategy. In addition, Air Canada and its regional affiliates are the main users of Toronto-
Pearson facilities: they carried 56% of total airport passengers in 2011. Consequently, GTAA 
needs Air Canada to maintain its activities in order to maintain its own level of activities, and the 
growth of GTAA business is intrinsically linked to the growth of Air Canada. This is what GTAA 
calls the “particular exposure to this dominant air carrier” (GTAA 2012, 51). The three other 
airports are also dependent on Air Canada to maintain and grow their activities, but they are not 
part of the global hubbing strategy of the Canadian air carrier. Since Air Canada does not intend 
to make them the center of the wheel, they have a strong interest in being the spoke of other 
wheels. Conversely, Toronto-Pearson has the ambition to be a global hub, and that explains why 
it sees unfavorably the possibility that Emirati air carriers would bring 6th freedom passenger to 
the hubs of Dubai and Abu Dhabi.  
 The two following interview excerpts provide an excellent illustration of how GTAA 
leaders perceive their relationship with Air Canada, its link with Canada’s international air policy 
and the dispute with the United Arab Emirates. The first excerpt is from an interview with an 
executive in charge of the strategy of GTAA: “Emirates has a destructive effect on its 
competitors, it is heavily subsidized by its government, and we see it as a competitive threat. We 
want people to connect here at Pearson, and our goal is the same than Dubai’s airport authority 
goal, and Air Canada is our tool. When the government looks at our request with the Blue Sky 
policy, we argue against services that would take away connection from us. Emirates at Toronto, 
it is 25 jobs. Air Canada, it is thousands of jobs for Canada.
 95” The second excerpt, which is a bit 
lengthy, comes one of the most senior executive of GTAA, and is of a particular relevance for an 
analysis in terms of referential: “But at the end of the day, the question is: does this [additional 
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frequency to the U.A.E.] serve Canada? At Pearson, Air Canada and WestJet must be healthy. 
The international air policy has to incorporate that, and there are necessarily conflicting 
objectives with that. The interest of Japan, when JAL flies to Canada, is not to promote Canadian 
aviation, but Japanese aviation! Aviation is a tool for development and I feel that Pearson is well 
served by the Blue Sky. […] If we start a conversation about Emirates, we are not talking about 
international air policy, but about political lobbying from one airline. We are not talking about 
access to Pearson. I applaud the Blue Sky policy, we are working closely with the government to 
identify markets that we want to serve. Out of Pearson, there is no direct access to Africa and 
some regions of Asia. Either we can provide service to these regions with a 787, which will be 
game changer, or we can discuss it through one access in the Middle-East, one route, and we 
totally miss what is important in the access to infrastructure. What is important is a) to keep solid 
foundation for aviation, and it does serve us to have only one international air traffic taking all 
the traffic to its hub; and b) what are the real markets the we must be able to access with 787 
aircraft. Having 14 flights a week to Dubai distorts the discussion on international air policy
96” 
These excerpts clearly reveal that GTAA top managers fear the competition from the 
Emirati air carriers. They see this competition as being unfair and unhealthy: they see themselves 
as competing for air traffic in the global air transport market, with a huge positive impact on the 
Canadian economy, and they consider that Emirates and Etihad are not playing a fair game 
because of the subsidies they would receive and because of their reliance on 6th freedom traffic 
only. The argument is thus similar to what Lazar’s A Tale of Four Cities: Canada and the 
U.A.E.’s report and Canada’s airlines are arguing: the air transport market should be based on 
market forces, but the competition should be fair with a level playing field.  
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 Respondent from the GTAA, interview conducted on 12/04/2012. 
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3. A Cognitive Dissonance?  
The dispute between Canada and the U.A.E. over the Agreement between the Government of 
Canada and the Government of the United Arab Emirates on Air Transport and its restrictive 
market access is puzzling in that it seems to indicate a cognitive dissonnace in the Canadian 
referential for air transport. Such possible dissonance can be identified by the fact that some 
prominent actors within the referential do not interpret its algorithms in the same manner, and 
this leads to a different perception of what Canada’s air transport policy should be. It constitutes 
an apparent cognitive dissonance for airports because they do not have the same understading of 
designation: Vancouver and Calgary want to receive Emirati air carriers, Toronto does not, but all 
three emphasize a market-oriented rationale supported by the “global marketing” algorithm to 
support their position. It also constitutes an apparent cognitive dissonance for airlines, because 
airlines interested in operating a new route to/from an airport, as per a proposition made by the 
marketing department of an airport, may not be granted the traffic rights to do so. The notion of 
airport marketing, which is at the heart of the algorithm, has been challenged by this dispute. 
In Muller and Jobert’s approach, such apparent cognitive dissonance is supposed to 
evolve, with the creation of a space of mediation and the reformulation of the sectoral referential. 
Since the Canadian airport policy has not changed and the conflicts have been long-lasting, the 
cognitive analysis of public policy as formulated by Muller and Jobert needs to be amended. 
Indeed, a deeper analysis of the interviews and of other documents reveals more subtle results 
with respect to the cognitive dissonance. The dissonance in the algorithm seems to lie on the 
notion of fair competition, or level playing field, and from a divergent interpretation of this 
notion all subsequent interpretations would follow. But as an interviewee, who works closely 
with both the Canadian air transport industry and foreign competitors, put it: “Air Canada would 
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argue that they [Emirates Airlines and Etihad Airways] are heavily subsidized. What we should 
do instead of banishing them to fly here is supporting Air Canada and our airports as well, instead 
of taxing them! But refusing the access rights was a purely political decision. And this is coming 
from a government which is not overly friendly with Air Canada. They don’t like the CBC, they 
don’t like Air Canada. Their policy is very difficult to understand, one hand they protect Air 
Canada from competition, on the other hand they treat air transport as a cash cow. We need to 
undertake a full review of the aviation sector. There are so many inconsistencies.
 97” When 
Canada’s officials refused to liberalize the Canada-U.A.E. bilateral ASA, they did not formulate 
this policy response because of their understanding of the situation that would have been framed 
and shaped by the referential and its algorithm. This response was indeed inconsistent with other 




Because the dispute with the U.A.E. attracted an important coverage from the media and 
has had unseen political and economic consequences with respect to the conclusion of bilateral 
air services agreements, it has been at the forefront of Canada’s international air policy. But if 
one goes deeper, it appears that this particular event may reveal more than an episodic dispute 
between two countries. It would simply crystallize the diverging interpretations with respect to 
the content of the ASA instrument and its impact on airport marketing. In fact, it would indicate 
that there is a cognitive dissonance in the Canadian referential for air transport.  
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 Under the Chicago Convention bilateral regulatory regime, whatever the referential in place at the 
domestic level, governments have retained “the power to parcel out (and to deny) access to national 
airspace by foreign airlines, to exclude foreign airlines from domestic point-to-point service, and to 
prohibit foreign citizens (and their airlines) from owning or controlling national air carriers” (Havel 2009, 
2) without justifying it. 
 170 
Theoretically, the ASA instrument is part of the broader “global marketing for access to 
infrastructure” algorithm, which not only regards bilateral air services relation between Canada 
and other states, but also other elements that relates to accessing airport infrastructure such as 
airport development or the granting of the freedoms of the air. The next section demonstrates that 
if the dispute with the U.A.E. is an easily identifiable source of conflict in the referential, other 
aspects specifically related to the access to the airport infrastructure are at stake.  
 
C – Canada’s International Air Policy: the Interests of the National Flag 
(and Its Hub)  
1. Airport Authorities in the Referential: Interests in a Market-Oriented 
Referential 
The dispute between Canada and the U.A.E. gave the impression that the leaders of the airports 
of Vancouver and Calgary would be supportive of a more liberal international air policy while the 
leaders of the airports of Montreal and Toronto would be supportive of a more protectionist 
international air policy. Nevertheless, this impression does not stand up to an attentive scrutiny of 
their deeds during the dispute: all four airports have adopted, at various degrees, a free-trader 
position. This is consistent with the parameters of the Canadian referential for air transport.  
1.1. Airports are Free-Traders  
The following section will look at each airport specifically and evaluate its “free trader” position 
in the Canadian referential. 
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First, the leaders of the airports of Vancouver clearly supported the bid of the U.A.E. to 
liberalize the bilateral ASA. They advocated a global liberalization of Canada’s international air 
policy with a move towards open skies that would permit carriers from all over the world to land 
on their runways (carriers from the Middle East, but also from Asia for instance). It is from an 
interview with a Vancouver airport representative that the notion of airports as free trader was 
mentioned
99
. Such position is coherent with the evolution of Canada’s air policy (which ceased to 
impose Montréal as the sole entry point) and is aligned with the market-oriented referential: 
Vancouver airport is developing its business by attracting foreign air carriers. Furthermore, the 
operators of Vancouver and Calgary airports share the same interests in a liberalized air transport 
market. Because they are not Air Canada’s main global hub platform, they have a strong interest 
in both expanding their direct origin-destination traffic by direct flights and in being spokes of 
not only Toronto-Pearson, but also of all major hubs in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. This 
strategy allows them to connect their communities to other communities in the world. In addition, 
these two airports have also a specific role to play as part of the Asia-Pacific gateway and its 
Western corridor. The federal government recognized the gateway position of lower British 
Columbia: it launched in 2006 its Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative, aiming at 
transforming BC lower mainland into a major network facilitating global supply chains between 
North America and Asia, in a corridor that would go to Calgary and then expand to the rest of 
Canada. Airports constitute a major element of such a strategy, and the federal initiative includes 
a further liberalization of air services agreements that would strengthen the airports of the 
Gateway (Transport Canada 2006b, 17).  
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 The position of the leaders of the airports of Vancouver and Calgary is illustrated by the 
notion of free-trader. They want to expand their network through a liberalization of the Canadian 
international air policy, consistently with several policy moves made by the Conservative 
government of Stephen Harper (such as the Blue Sky policy or the Asia-Pacific Gateway and 
Corridor Initiative). Their representation of airport activities and policies is in line with the 
Canadian referential of air transport, and more specifically with the parameters on access to 
infrastructure, which has clearly framed and shaped their policy and economic positions. The 
notion of free-trader that has been embraced is a coherent understanding of the global and 
sectoral referentials which reflects the social identity of key airport actors. In terms of policy 
instrumentation, these airports therefore favor much more liberalized provisions contained in 
ASAs instruments (fifth and sixth freedoms, open skies, etc.) as compared to what is currently 
put in the ASAs by the government. 
 With regard to Montréal, the airport authority has favored a restrictive approach to the 
liberalization of ASAs which has not prevented the airport to grow its connections to the Middle 
East. While the dispute between Canada and the U.A.E. was growing, ADM has been successful 
in attracting two middle-eastern air carriers to operate scheduled air traffic between Montréal-
Trudeau and two middle-eastern hub airports. This demonstrated not only its commitment to 
expand its network towards this region, but also its pro-active, market-oriented behavior that is in 
line with the Canadian referential for air transport and its “airport marketing” algorithm. In 
addition to Royal Jordanian who launched a new service to Montréal-Trudeau in 2007, ADM 
secured new services to Doha and beyond with Qatar Airways. Qatar Airways was launched in 
1997, operating only four planes. In 2010, it was operating 70 planes with an additional 220 
aircraft on order, intending to maintain its 40% year-on-year expansion. Its growth has been 
supported by Doha International Airport, which has undergone a series of expansions, and by the 
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Government of Qatar and its strategy to make Doha into a global and regional powerful hub 
(Oxford Business Group 2010, 147–149). ADM has been a successful player, using all the 
provisions it has at its disposal to attract new carriers, including Qatar Airways, while 
maintaining Montréal-Trudeau network and frequencies to Europe. ADM is thus clearly 
manoeuvring within the market-oriented referential, which shapes and frames its actions and its 
vision of international air policy. 
Finally, the position of Toronto-Pearson is also more subtle than its advocacy campaign 
against the liberalization of the Canada-U.A.E. ASA, which does not mean that it does not accept 
the opening of Canadian skies to fast-growing foreign air carriers. An example of that would be 
the service provided by Turkish Airlines to Canada from its Istanbul-Atatürk International 
Airport hub since 2009. Turkish Airlines is one of the European carriers whose share of traffic 
dramatically increased since 2008, including fifth and sixth freedom traffic through Istanbul-
Atatürk airport (Reynolds-Feighan 2010). Interviews with Canadian civil aviation stakeholders 
reveal that the airport authority of Toronto informed the Canadian authorities of its wish to be 
connected to Turkey, indicating a will to see foreign carriers being granted a greater access to the 
Toronto-Pearson platform. This example nevertheless reveals the consistency of the position of 
the GTAA, because Turkish Airlines – a Star Alliance member – has partnered with Air Canada 
to transfer its international passengers onto domestic and regional Air Canada’s flights (Air 
Transport News 2012). This demonstrates that Air Canada and Toronto-Pearson intend to go 
beyond the point-to-point traffic and to develop sixth freedom traffic from fast-growing carriers, 
with the explicit objective to grow the connectivity of Toronto’s hub airport. According to a 
former Transport Canada policy adviser: “Air Canada is in favour of open skies only if it does not 
face competitors there, such as the Dominican Republic, or if it “competes” with a friend from 
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Star Alliance. Otherwise they oppose to Open Skies.
100” The GTAA executives follow Air 
Canada’s lead because of the mutual objectives and interests surrounding the hubbing strategy 
developed by the carrier on the airport platform. In fact, many observers have concluded that the 
mutual growth of Toronto-Pearson and Air Canada is conditioned by the organization of 
international routes around the Star Alliance network in general, and also around the close 
partnership between Air Canada, Lufthansa, and United/Continental. These three airlines have 
embarked in a joint-venture (A++ joint venture) by which they share pricing strategies and 
revenue on their transatlantic routes (American Bar Association 2010, 403). This may explain 
why Air Canada and the GTAA opposed the liberalization of the Canada-U.A.E. bilateral ASA. 
Emirati air carriers intend to serve North American routes to Asia and to the Indian subcontinent 
through their hubs in Dubai or Abu Dhabi. Air Canada does not operate most of these routes, but 
it is in its financial interest to send Canadian passengers to Asia through Lufthansa’s hub of 
Frankfurt, because Air Canada will get a portion of the revenue earned from these passengers. 
For instance, if a Torontonian flies to New Delhi with Emirates and connects through the Dubai 
airport, Emirates will keep all the profit generated by this trip. But if that same Torontonian flies 
to New Delhi with Lufthansa or Air Canada and connects through the Frankfurt airport, Air 
Canada will get a portion of the profit generated by this passenger, because Air Canada and 
Lufthansa pool revenues through the A++ joint venture. According to a U.A.E. official: “The 
government is protecting the revenue of these two carriers to protect the revenue of Air 
Canada.
101” And this interpretation is even shared by a former official from Transport Canada, 
who mentioned: “Air Canada doesn’t care about India in fact. […] Air Canada doesn’t want an 
Open Skies with the U.A.E. With their A++ venture with Continental/United and Lufthansa, they 
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receive a share from Canadian travelers using Frankfurt to connect to India. So they want to 
protect their portion of the profit. As a result, what you see is Canada’s international air policy 
influenced by Lufthansa, a German carrier. A foreign carrier has now the shot in Canada.
 102” 
The partnership between Air Canada and Lufthansa should not be overstated. What results 
from the interviews with a broad range of stakeholders is that air carriers remain selfish and act 
according to their individual interest first. According to a senior officer from ICAO: “C’est Air 
Canada qu’on protège, et pas Lufthansa ou le hub de Frankfort. Le premier intérêt, c’est de 
protéger son territoire, ils s’en foutent de Lufthansa, à Air Canada. Les compagnies sont assez 
individualistes et égoïstes, elles tirent des alliances tous les profits qu’elles peuvent. 103” Another 
way of expressing this conception was stated by a European air carrier senior executive as 
follows: “On the one hand, it is clear that Lufthansa had its hand in it. To be honest the close 
relationship with Air Canada is there for sure, and there was definitely lobbying on the behalf of 
Air Canada and Lufthansa. But on the other hand, saying that Lufthansa dictates Canada’s 
policy… I don’t think that reverse would be true, you would never say that AC dictates 
Germany’s policy.104” And as for GTAA, its own interests being highly dependent on the growth 
of Air Canada, it aligned its position with its main user’s position, creating a GTAA-Air Canada 
nexus lobbying for developing the Star Alliance network at Toronto-Pearson. 
To conclude, GTAA is thus also manoeuvring within the market-oriented referential, 
which shapes and frames its actions and its vision of international air policy, but it has a 
restrictive interpretation of its parameters. Indeed, it wants to maximize its interests and acts 
accordingly, but it does not consider the legitimate role and aspiration of Canada’s other main 
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airports, which could serve as gateways to the Pacific and Western Canada through a spoke 
position to foreign hubs. In terms of policy instrumentation, it favors a somehow restrictive 
content of the ASA, as it favors its interests. 
1.2. The Four Airport Authorities: Common Ground in the Canadian 
Referential 
What emerges from the above analysis is that the Canadian referential for air transport, and more 
specifically its parameters on international air policy, has framed and shaped how the four airport 
authorities’ leaders conceive the roles and the interests of their infrastructure. All share the same 
values of expanding their network though market-oriented mechanisms. With respect to global 
marketing, all have adapted and transformed the global airport marketing algorithm by setting up 
marketing departments and by attracting foreign air carriers to develop their network and market 
their communities as destinations to be served by aircraft operators. Furthermore, the 
Conservative Government of Stephen Harper formulated new policies that aimed to implement 
the parameters of the referential. The Blue Sky policy recognized that airports should be enabled 
to market themselves in a manner unhindered by bilateral constraints to the greatest extent 
possible. The Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative recognized the major role of the 
airports of Vancouver and Calgary and the necessary liberalization of bilateral air services 
agreements to develop their full potential.  
Nevertheless, if the government policies are clear on paper, it appears that they have been 
interpreted differently by actors. Airport authorities have not come to the same understanding of 
what the liberalization of ASAs really means, who it concerns, and how it should be applied. The 
Blue Sky policy has been formulated and mentioned several times, but its parameters are broad 
and vague, allowing the government to justify several different positions by referring to the same 
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policy provisions. This has generated frustration among the stakeholder of the air transport sector. 
The following excerpts illustrate this frustration. First, with respect to the Blue Sky policy, a 
representative of an airport organization mentions that “generally, it isn’t as blue as it 
seems…105”. Second, a representative of a major foreign air carrier operating in Canada 
explained: “If you allow Emirates to come 3 times a week, what does it change? Either you allow 
it, or you don’t allow it. Same thing for Qatar Airways in Montreal, they were allowed to come 3 
times a week. This is very ambiguous, there is no clear cut in the policy, which makes it difficult 
to understand for the average stakeholder in the industry. It is probably very clear for the 
policymakers, but it is difficult the average person.
106” And third, a senior executive of a 
Canadian air carrier also mentioned: “that’s true that the government jumps to the defense of Air 
Canada, but this is not part of a structured policy. There is no structured policy in place for this 
matter.
 107” Finally, another interviewee recounted an anecdote that reveals a great deal about 
Canada’s international air policy. When asked to comment on the organized relationship between 
the national flag carrier, hub airport operator and public authorities in various countries and 
compare it with Canada, this senior executive of a major Canadian carrier said: “The government 
has no policy for aviation. You have the Blue Sky policy, but it is only 25% of a policy, and they 
did it because it is a worldwide trend, and they did it later than the others, without any kind of 
policy perspective for aviation. How is it possible to work together if the government does not 
show any interest for a consistent an up-to-date aviation policy? If you write “commercial 
aviation policy in Canada”, the first Google result is Transport Canada’s Policy Letter 133 which 
is about a possible computer failure in 2000. There is a complete vacuum with respect to aviation 
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policy, to the point that even Google can’t find anything108”. And indeed, the first Google result 
of a search with the keywords “commercial aviation policy in Canada” is Transport Canada’s 
Policy Letter 133 (Annex F refers). 
 Thus, it is the government’s interpretation of its own policies and the related orientation it 
inputs in the ASA instrument that are contentious and create ambiguity and frustrations among 
stakeholders of the Canadian civil aviation sector. All airport authorities share the same 
commitment to expand their network and enhance their marketing capabilities in a market-
oriented approach. Nonetheless, the fact that the government interprets policies in different 
manners according to the circumstances seems to be the factor that creates a cognitive dissonance 
within the referential.  
2. A Growing Critique over the Blue Sky: A Factor of Policy Instability  
This section highlights the source of the cognitive dissonance, and demonstrates that its origin 
can be traced in the implementation of the Blue Sky policy. While this policy reinforces the role 
of airports in the global competition for attracting air carriers and developing new routes, its 
implementation does not enable to play that role, and the government has kept using the ASA 
instrument in a manner that has restricted the ability of airports to fully become “free traders”. 
 Theoretically, the specific focus on algorithms and the related content of specific policy 
instruments will highlight how the cognitive analysis of public policy can be improved. Indeed, 
Mullert and Jobert did not foresee the potential fruitful impact of focusing the analysis on the 
algorithms (they rather considered the “image” analytical level). But such focus on algorithms 
and instruments’ content highlights the source of conflicts within a referential and allows to give 
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a clear account of the fact that key actors of a sector may be sharing the same core conceptions of 
a policy sector and the same core representations of how it should be framed and shaped by 
policies, but would still be in puzzling conflicts with each other’s.  
 
2.1. A Problem of Implementation: Striking a Balance between 
Airports’ Interests and Air Canada’s Financial Interests 
A first issue lies in defining priorities. The Blue Sky policy contains several objectives that have 
to be taken into account when determining the priorities of Canada’s international air relations, 
from expanding routes to/from Canada and providing opportunities for Canadian air carriers to 
grow to giving more freedom to airport authorities to market themselves and facilitate Canada’s 
international trade objectives (Transport Canada 2006a, 2–3). There is no further definition of 
what an “opportunity to grow” for a Canadian flag is, or what the freedom given to airport 
authorities entails, and how these should be translated into ASAs. The process of setting priorities 
in bilateral air negotiations is not clearly defined. An insider from the federal government, when 
asked to comment on the role of airports in setting priorities, described the “black box” of 
determining Canada’s international air policy: “First, they [the four airport authorities] are 
included in the consultative process that we have with all stakeholders, and which is run by 
Transport Canada, and communicated to the Chief Negotiator. We have access to their evolving 
commercial interest, and we meet with them, individually, and with the Canadian Airports 
Council, so that they know what arrangements are in place. [What if they have divergent 
opinions?] Priority-setting is a complicated process. We consult with air carriers and airports; we 
receive invitations from foreign carriers and foreign governments, in addition to existing bilateral 
relationships. All need to be taken into account. What we try to do is not to respond solely to one 
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stakeholder, or one set of stakeholders, but to deliver top priorities for air carriers and airports 
and foreign governments. In addition, we have to be aware of the regional dynamics, interests can 
differ at Vancouver and in Ontario or Quebec or Atlantic Canada. We have to identify and 
respond to the various interests, and I think that we see success in the eyes of stakeholders.
 109” 
Such an insight has been confirmed in interviews with airport and airline senior executives: 
Transport Canada consults with airports, air carriers and their professional associations, and they 
align the results of these consultations with international policy and political priorities. Then, a 
list of negotiations to be held is given to the Chief Air Negotiator at Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade Canada, who subsequently negotiate the conclusion and/or the liberalization 
of bilateral air services agreements with foreign countries.  
With the exception of the GTAA, all interviewees from the airport sector expressed 
frustration with the results of the consultations held by Transport Canada under the Blue Sky 
framework. For these actors, their priorities were heard, but not taken into account. The 
government tried to strike a balance between their interests and the interest of Air Canada, 
disproportionately in favor of the national flag. This means that if an airport authority requests a 
bilateral agreement with a third country in order to market airlines to serve routes from their 
platform to this country, and if Air Canada opposed this request or asks to conclude an agreement 
with another country first, the government would more or less systematically side with Air 
Canada’s position. The following excerpts illustrate this understanding of the consultation 
process: 
- From a senior executive of YVR: “I am speculating here, but maybe they are giving more 
weight to other stakeholders than us… [...] With a Western Canada perspective: our 
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priorities are not placed at the top of the country’s high priorities. [...] We suggested 
alternatives, and we proposed compromises. For the Middle East, we can just sustain one 
daily service. We were ignored
110”. 
- From a senior executive of ADM: “ je vois des différences entre la façon dont Transports 
Canada traite les compagnies aériennes et la façon dont ils traitent les aéroports. C’est pas 
la même chose. À chaque année Transports Canada fait la liste des négociations qu’ils 
veulent faire avec chaque pays, quand ils veulent signer une entente ou moderniser un 
traité, et après ils consultent avec les aéroports et les transporteurs, mais quand ils 
établissent leur priorité, c’est en ligne avec celles des transporteurs. Ça arrive même que 
des transporteurs assistent aux négociations, alors que les aéroports ne sont jamais invité 
(il y a juste eu trois exceptions où ils ont invité les aéroports : pour l’Open Skies avec les 
États Unis, l’Union Européenne, et la Corée). C’est encore Air Canada qui a le dessus, ils 
ont une forte influence sur le gouvernement.
111”. 
- From a senior executive of CAC: “The government currently appears to favor air carriers. 
It is difficult for airports. When you have different airports that don’t agree, it is difficult 
to understand the position of the industry, and what the government does, it looks at the 
interest of the whole. It comes from history, the management of airports used to be 
centralized in Ottawa, and airports were not considered specifically, and this has 
continued despite the transfer.
 112” 
These representative excerpts illustrate the frustration of some airport authorities with the 
Blue Sky policy. On the one hand, they welcome this policy in that it offers them the tools to 
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market themselves and expand their network, in line with the role they are supposed to play as 
per the Canadian referential parameters. But on the other hand, the four largest airport authorities 
also denounce the gap between the theory and the practice. According to the airport authorities of 
Montreal, Vancouver and Calgary, the federal government does not act as it is supposed to: it 
favors some specific actors to the detriment of some others. In other words, the government has 
aligned its policies with the parameters and algorithms of the Canadian referential for air 
transport with regard to international air policy, but it has then not acted in accordance with the 
policies it formulated. In terms of instrumentation, it means that the content of the ASA 
instrument is not fairly consistent with the algorithms of the referential. For these airports, there 
is gap between the government’s policy moves and its actual behavior, and it is in this gap that a 
cognitive dissonance lies with regard to access to airport infrastructure.  
 It is thus the status given to Air Canada that crystallizes the dissonance among and 
between actors of the Canadian civil aviation sector. In a market-oriented air transport industry, 
and with a policy objective of enabling airports to market themselves in a manner unhindered by 
bilateral constraints to the greatest extent possible, airport authorities feel that constraints 
imposed by the government on Air Canada are not in line with the referential. On the contrary, 
for Air Canada and for other Canadian air carriers, advancing the interests on the Canadian 
airline industry is necessary in order for aircraft operators to be able to compete in a deregulated 
sector. For air carriers, the main objective of Blue Sky should not target airports, but it should be 
to ensure a level playing field between airlines to ensure a healthy competition. Thus, they 
consider that when the government is restrictive in its approach to international air policy, it is in 
line with the market-oriented referential because the government’s interventions would aim to 
ensure a sustainable competition. According to a senior executive of the Canadian flag carrier: 
“You don’t want your own market to be destroyed by foreign carriers. It is very unfortunate that 
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the only carriers interested in coming here are predatory carriers, with unlimited government 
funds. It is not healthy for the market. The spin on airlines like EK is that it is coming to the 
Canadian market, it is taking traffic with no competition, and it brings it to the Asian 
subcontinent. If no one can compete with you, you want to be here! […]The Blue Sky policy 
targets clearly some destinations. I have no further arguments on that.
113” By favoring the 
interests of Air Canada over the ones of the airport authorities of Vancouver, Calgary, the 
government of Canada is also favoring the interests of the Toronto-Pearson airport. In a global air 
transport market, the growth of Pearson is dependent on the growth carrier using it as a hub. This 
leads GTAA’s officials to support Air Canada’s positions and to support the approach 
implemented by the government
114
.  
  To conclude, a further proof that there is a cognitive dissonance with regard to access to 
infrastructure can be found in the Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative. Indeed, the 
cognitive dissonance goes beyond the bizarre implementation of the Blue Sky policy and can be 
extended to the content of other instruments that relate to the “global marketing of airports” 
algorithm. The Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative from the federal government aims at 
contributing to a more productive, competitive economy and at strengthening Canada’s 
competitive position in international commerce. Thus, it is very much a market-oriented 
initiative. If this sounds good for the airport of Vancouver, it appears in practice that YVR has 
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not been free to develop its Gateway position strategy in a way consistent with the policy and 
economic objectives of the Initiative. The following excerpt, from a representative of the airline 
industry, grasps the position of both many users of the airports and of the airport authority: “YVR 
is competing against San Francisco, Seattle, and Los Angeles for transpacific traffic, and it has 
lost traffic to these airports. And the federal government does not treat it as a gateway to Asia. 
Instead, it faces a segmented policy that does not address the issues.
 115” For the senior executives 
of Vancouver airport, it is the implementation of the policy that is not in line with its both its 
philosophy and with the Canadian referential for air transport: “For example, Emirates was not 
allowed to fly to YVR, even if they were committed to fly to YVR, and they were forced to go to 
Seattle instead. We lost an opportunity, and now we see more Canadian traffic going to Seattle. 
And there are many other examples like that, like Singapore Airlines. But the issue is not the 
policy, but its implementation.
 116” 
 If the Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative concerns mainly the airport of 
Vancouver, and to a lesser extent the airport of Calgary, it illustrates more broadly the cognitive 
dissonance on access to airport infrastructure. The dissonance lies in the gap between the 
philosophy of the Canadian policies (which are very much market-oriented, and thus in line with 
the Canadian referential for air transport) and their implementation through the content of ASAs 
signed by the federal government (which had chosen not to put the interest of the four largest 
airport operators at the top of its priorities). An analysis of the Initiative alone is not sufficient to 
identify the reason why the government is not acting so as to allow airports to play a major role in 
the development of their network, but form the above-mentioned, it can be induced that the 
financial interests of Air Canada have taken precedence over all other interests. 
                                                 
115
 Respondent from an airlines trade association, interview conducted on 06/03/2012. 
116
 Respondent from YVR, interview conducted on 07/03/2012. 
 185 
2.2. A Problem of Conceptualization: The Fifth and the Sixth 
Freedoms of the Air in the Policy Framework 
The gap between the philosophy and the discourses surrounding Canada’s international air 
policy, its implementation, and the related policy choices made by the Conservative government 
of Stephen Harper can be summed up by referring to the freedoms of the air (such freedoms are 
the content of the ASA instrument). It is logical that when a state liberalizes access to its air 
transport infrastructure, it grants more freedoms of the air to foreign air carriers, in order to 
alleviate restrictions on frequencies, capacities, and origins and destinations. Subsequently, the 
more liberal an international air policy, the more freedoms are granted to foreign air carriers. This 
can be seen through the drastic increase in the number of open skies, which are granting the most 
freedoms by a growing number of countries in order to liberalize their international air transport 
policies (ICAO 2013c). 
 The mismatch in the Canadian referential lies in the fact that it supports a liberal view of 
air transport, but not with reference to the more liberal freedoms that would allow foreign air 
carriers to operate traffic between Canada and third countries that are foreign to these air carriers, 
such as the sixth freedom (the right for a foreign airline to carry revenue traffic to/from third via 
its home state) or even the fifth freedom (the right for a foreign airline to carry revenue traffic 
to/from third states without)
117
. But there is a reluctance to fully implement these policies as far 
as the sixth freedom of the air is concerned: when ASA instruments are designed, this freedom is 
not incorporated into the instrument. From the perspective of the GTAA, Air Canada and 
Transport Canada, the development of sixth freedom traffic is necessary for the international 
growth of both the national flag and the hub airport. Indeed, in order to add to the limited 
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potential of the Canadian market, Air Canada aims at attracting foreign passengers (and mainly 
from the United States) to its Toronto hub and to transfer them onto its international flights to 
Asia and Europe. This is really Air Canada’s strategy: it has been lobbying the federal 
government in order to expand its possibilities to carry fifth and sixth freedom traffic (Clancy 
2004, 250). In that sense, both Air Canada and the GTAA would benefit from a liberalization of 
international air policy that would enable them to serve fifth and sixth freedoms traffic. The three 
other airports also benefit, to a lesser extent, from this traffic.  
 Nevertheless, Air Canada and the GTAA are also afraid that if the federal government 
liberalizes its approach towards fifth and sixth freedom traffic, foreign competitors would abuse 
it and take too much traffic away from them because they would enjoy a competitive advantage. 
From their perspective, the Air Canada/GTAA sixth freedom traffic is justified by the very 
existence of third and fourth freedom traffic (or origin-destination traffic), and consequently, the 
only sixth freedom traffic that would be acceptable is the one that is supported by a strong origin-
destination market. The following excerpts of interviews with a senior officer from Transport 
Canada and a former senior official from the same department illustrate this conception:  
- “Air Canada transporte aussi du trafic 6ème liberté, mais c’est très différent. Si vous 
regardez Qatar Airways à Montréal, 90% des passagers sont 6ème liberté. Trouvez-moi 
un vol d’Air Canada où 9 passagers sur 10 sont des passagers 6ème liberté! et puis Air 
Canada va chercher le trafic américain, mais c’est de bonne guerre car on a un accord de 
ciel ouvert avec les américains, qui viennent aussi chercher les passagers canadiens pour 
leurs hubs.
 118” 
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- “The issue is not a capacity issue, but a sixth freedom issue. All bilaterals in Canada are 
justified by the third and the fourth freedoms. There is a massive sixth freedom traffic 
with KLM via its hub of Amsterdam, Air France is doing sixth freedom as well, but you 
always have at least 30% of the plane that end its trip in Paris. With Emirates, they would 
all go to India. There is no market between Dubai and Canada, or between Abu Dhabi and 
Canada. So Air Canada strongly opposed the bilateral with the U.A.E. They argue that we 
should have an Open Skies with India first, and after with the U.A.E. Giving the sixth 
freedom to Emirates would stab Air Canada in the back.
 119” 
This interpretation of Transport Canada’s officials gives a clear indication of where a 
cognitive dissonance lies. The different freedoms are well defined and have remained the core 
elements to define and establish both the objectives of Canada’s international air policy and the 
subsequent bilaterals which grant access to Canadian airports to foreign air carriers. Nevertheless, 
what is unclear is the degree to which these freedoms should be granted: should sixth freedom 
traffic be allowed without restriction, or should sixth freedom traffic be allowed under the 
condition that there is also certain level of third/fourth freedom traffic? If a certain level of 
origin-destination market is necessary, to what extent is it necessary (half of the enplaned 
passengers? 30 per cent? 60 per cent?)? Is it fair to prevent sixth freedom traffic on final 
destinations not served by Air Canada (e.g. India)? None of these questions are answered by the 
Blue Sky policy, or by a consistent policy response from the federal government. It is precisely 
because there is no one answer to these questions that various actors feel that their own answers 
are legitimate but ignored by the federal government, thus creating a cognitive dissonance in the 
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 Respondent from Transport Canada (not in the department anymore), interview conducted on 
28/02/2012. 
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Canadian referential for air transport. This cognitive dissonance sheds light on how actors 
understand and define their identity in the referential and in the social world.  
First, Air Canada and the GTAA used the notion of the level playing field to request a 
granting of the freedoms of the air that would be asymmetrical in the end. Air Canada sought 
sixth freedom traffic in order to increase its capacity as a North American (and not Canadian) 
network carrier. This is positive for the GTAA in that it would strengthen its hub strategy and its 
hub position. Subsequently, these actors argued for a limited granting of the sixth freedom of the 
air to foreign competitor that may cannibalize Air Canada’s lucrative international long-haul 
market and would take transiting passengers away from Toronto-Pearson hub. These two actors 
see themselves as the only Canadian flag carrier and the only potential global hub, and they 
subsequently request a special status within the Canadian referential, whereby they would be 
given all the tools to strengthen their position in a deregulated and liberalized environment. 
Second, the other major airport authorities are clearly aware that it is Toronto-Pearson 
that is at the heart of the hubbing strategy of Air Canada, and they also use the notion of the level 
playing field to advance their position. Nevertheless, instead of arguing for a level playing field 
for air carriers, they argue for a level playing field for airports. For example, YVR is competing 
with Seattle-Tacoma for international traffic, and it subsequently requests its autonomy within the 
Canadian referential, whereby it would be given all the tools to attract new air carriers, develop 
its network, and strengthen its position in a deregulated and liberalized environment. This is 
convergent in that granting sixth freedom right to foreign air carriers that would connect YVR to 
their hubs. 
Third, the government of Canada has liberalized their air transport industry and has given 
more freedom to airport authorities to market themselves worldwide. Nevertheless, it has limited 
sixth freedom traffic to/from Canada for foreign air carriers, and by doing so, it has empirically 
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taken Air Canada and GTAA’s stances without saying it so out loud in terms of policy. This 
decision does not come from the bureaucracy: it is not Transport Canada or DFAIT that have set 




 To conclude, the Blue Sky policy, which sets the basis for foreign air carriers to access the 
Canadian airport infrastructure, provides a clear illustration of the cognitive dissonance and of the 
role given to elected officials in terms of orienting the application of the policy. It both aims at 
providing opportunities for Canadian airlines to grow (and this implies sixth freedom for air 
Canada) and at enabling airports to market themselves (and this implies for them attracting a 
certain level of sixth freedom traffic). In the absence of hierarchy and in the absence of 
elaboration of the notion of sixth freedom, the government has been able to put forward Air 
Canada’s and GTAA’s interests, at the possible expense of the three other largest airports. 
 
D – Conclusion: Assessing the Cognitive Dissonance 
The cognitive analysis of public policy as developed by Muller and Jobert predicts that a policy 
change will occur provided that there is a major cognitive dissonance and a space of mediation 
through which actors will redesign the policies and policy instruments in order to accord them to 
the referential. This chapter demonstrated the presence of a major cognitive dissonance with 
respect to the “global marketing of airports” algorithm and the content of the ASA policy 
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 These elements were highlighted in this chapter (cf. supra), and it is also interesting that they were 
publicly pointed out by the CEO of Qatar Airways during a press conference in Montréal (it is unusual to 
have a CEO of a foreign company commenting abroad the foreign policy of the country he/she is staying 
at): “You have only one chief negotiator for such a big country. Other countries have teams that go all 
over the world. But this is no criticism of him. He's a civil servant getting instructions from his political 
masters. Actually he was very embarrassed when he came to Doha. He told me 'this is my mandate. I 
cannot go beyond’.” (Shalom 2012) 
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instruments and the granting of the freedom of the air by the federal government, which has not 
led to redesigning the policies and policy instrument at stake. The contribution of this dissertation 
has been to analyze the policy instruments and conflicts at stake with a renewed focus on the 
algorithm in order to give an account of the sustainability of the sectoral referential.  
 The use and content of the policy instrument at stake also created a major diplomatic 
conflict with a foreign power followed with military and economic retaliatory measures. Is the 
Canadian international air policy likely to evolve? Or in other words, is there a space of 
mediation to reformulate the Canadian international air policy, as the cognitive analysis of public 
policy as developed by Muller and Jobert would expect? The answer is twofold. First, it is 
expected that the move towards a greater liberalization of skies will continue, and thus the 
Canadian government will be likely to face more pressures to relax its market access policy. And 
indeed, many actors that were interviewed for the purpose of this dissertation expected a minor 
liberalization through and adjustment of the content of ASAs, which could even concern Emirati 
air carrier, in the short to medium term. The rationale was that it is not politically possible to let 
major players of the industry through the door into Canada. But for the referential to evolve, and 
thus for a clear policy that would be a shared point of reference for all stakeholders, the 
emergence of a space of mediation is necessary. It does not seem that the Canadian civil aviation 
community is close to that step. First, the industry is divided on this issue, since the four largest 
airports are not on the same page. Second, the government favors one side over the other. It 
welcomes the convergence between the interests of the GTAA and Air Canada, and acts 
accordingly, despite what has been promised to other major airport authorities with Blue Sky. 
Third, there does not seem to have any room for engaging a discussion from within the state 
apparatus: the very recent report prepared for and endorsed by the Standing Senate Committee on 
Transport and Communications, entitled The Future of Canadian Air Travel: Toll Booth or Spark 
 191 
Plug? Report on the Future Growth and Global Competitiveness of Canada’s Airports, does not 
even mention the issue of granting airport access to foreign air carriers, and the bureaucracy is 
subject to a very tight control from elected officials with regard to implementing Canada’s 
international air policy and negotiating or revising bilateral air services agreements. 
Consequently, this cognitive dissonance is likely to remain. Moreover, it is expected that the 
debate over granting sixth freedom of the air will remain a hot issue for airports, airlines and the 
government. Since actors are all in agreement with the market-oriented core elements of 
Canadian referential for air transport, and that there is no venue in which the diverging 
understanding of what these values mean in terms of traffic right would be aligned, the Canadian 
government will continue to use the ASA instrument that will dissatisfy many stakeholders of the 
Canadian air transport and airport sector.  
In conclusion, this chapter demonstrated that actors of a referential may not agree on 
specific causal relations between the content of policy instruments and its effect on their sector, 
while these key actors also share the same core values and agree on the general principles of 
public action that ensue. The conclusion of this chapter is therefore similar to the conclusion of 
the chapter on airport costs and the content of the rent instrument. It reinforces the theoretical 
argument of this dissertation: while ideas-focused approaches of public policy analysis have 
difficulties in giving an account of long-lasting between actors sharing the same values, this 
dissertation shows that a combined focus on algorithms and policy instruments is a fruitful 
approach to understand and analyze long-lasting conflicts within unchallenged referential. But in 
addition, it also contributes to “Canadianizing” the cognitive analysis of public policy developed 
by Muller and Jobert by allowing the specificities of the Canadian setting to feed the theoretical 
evolution of the model. The diverging interests of airports in Toronto, Montréal and Western 
Canada and the alliance between GTAA and Air Canada is reminiscent of many federal battles in 
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Canada. Canadian studies are well equipped to give an account of such situations, and there is no 
doubt that perspectives on governing from the centre (Savoie 1999; Bakvis 2000) would 
accurately show that the situation of Western and/or Quebec airports may not have been 
considered and that the government may have favored Toronto. But such analyses would not be 
replicable for the airport rent issue, where there is no regional variance. This dissertation is 
therefore making an important contribution to the literature as it reshapes the cognitive analysis 
in order to allow it to give accurate and relevant analyses of extra-French or extra-European 
situations through a proposed theoretical framework that can be applied at all scales and levels in 
many different institutional settings.  
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Chapter V: Administrating and Funding the Provision of 
Security and Screening Services at Canada’s Largest 
Airports 
In this chapter, I focus on the administration and the funding of the provision of security and 
screening services at Canada’s largest airports. Airport security and screening provides a 
promising empirical field to ground the theoretical assumptions described in the introductory 
chapters. Indeed, the chapter shows that there have been momentous dissensions between key 
actors of the airport sector over the way the provision of security and screening services is both 
funded and administrated at the four Canadian largest airports while almost no policy change 
aimed at solving the dissension has occurred. If ideas-focused approaches do not give an 
appropriate theoretical account of such situation, the cognitive analysis of public policy as 
developed by Muller and Jobert gives a set of analytical tools on which a meaningful empirical 
investigation can be established. 
 In order to ground the analysis, I will first give background information on the inception 
and the evolution of Canada’s airport security and screening policy and characterize the current 
global referential and the Canadian sectoral referential for air transport. Indeed, political science 
has studied airport security and screening in reference to notions such as governmentality and 
surveillance or power and technology (Lyon 2006; Salter 2006; Salter 2008a), but this chapter 
will demonstrate that screening and security services at airports are clearly linked to other air 
transportation aspects (such as airport economics policy, international air policy, etc.). The core 
elements of transportation policies at large are identical to the core elements of airport screening 
policy: both have been reframed, reshaped and reoriented in the past decades in order to 
accompany the liberalization of air transport in a market-oriented perspective, and Canada’s 
airport security and screening policy has become a market-driven and market-oriented policy. I 
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will then analyze the current situation in order to clearly identify the algorithm that relates to 
airport security and screening in the Canadian sectoral airport referential. I will thus be able to 
demonstrate that all actors do agree on the following algorithms: “security and screening 
oversight at Canada’s largest airports is a core State function” and the “user-pay” model is the 
best for airport services funding, including security, and for ensuring the sustainability of the 
Canadian air transport sector. This “user-pay” algorithm for security and screening services 
demonstrates the commoditization of airport security making the market-oriented funding of 
airport security and screening services fully congruent with the global and sectoral referentials. I 
will subsequently focus on the dissensions over the policies that organize the administration and 
the funding of airport security and screening at Canada’s largest airports, in order to highlight 
that there is a cognitive dissonance which is grounded in a different understanding of what the 
algorithm means in terms of content of public policy instrumentation. I will show that the content 
of policy instruments related to airport security and screening is puzzling in that: a) it seems to 
increase the costs of Canada’s largest airports, thus undermining their ability to grow their 
business and truly become aerotropolises; and b) it seems to contradict the market-oriented 
philosophy that has shaped and framed the Canadian airport sector. I will highlight the fact that 
some prominent actors within the referential share the same understanding of the algorithms but 
have different interpretation of the implications in terms of policy instrumentation. This leads to 
different interpretations about the relevant content that Canada’s airport security policy 
instruments should have. Subsequently, a policy change that would further align the sectoral 
referential with the global, market-oriented referential is not to be expected, but it is rather an 
adjustment in the content of the policy instruments that will be able to solve the cognitive 
dissonance and ensure the stability of the Canadian sectoral referential as regards its airport 
security and screening algorithms.  
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 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Part A gives background 
information on airport security and screening policy and put within the broader Canadian airport 
and air transport policy; Part B analyzes the dissensions over security and screening at Canada’s 
largest airports and demonstrates that it highlights the presence of a dissonance; Part C 
establishes the cognitive dissonance over the “public service” and “user-pay” algorithms; and 
Part D concludes that such dissonance can be solved by a change in the public policy 
instrumentation content that relates to funding and administrating airport security and screening. 
 
A – Canada’s Airport Security Policy within the Broader Air Transport 
Policy  
1. Providing and Overseeing Airport Security in Canada: From a Public to 
Private Service 
1.1. A Brief Background on the Airport Security Function before the 
Commercialization of Canada’s Airports 
The first aircraft hijacking event in the short history of aviation occurred in 1930, where a Pan 
Am plane was seized by revolutionaries (Mackenzie 2010, 248). Modern terrorism attacks 
targeting commercial aircraft became more common in the 1960s and the 1970s. Consequently, 
states adopted a new Annex to the Chicago Convention that sets standards and recommended 
practices in the field of aviation security. Canada, along with all member states of ICAO, is 
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, and this dramatically impacted how the Government has handled the 
commercialization of airports in regard to airport and aviation security services provision and 
oversight in order to comply with the provisions of Annex 17. For instance, the Criminal Code of 
Canada was revised in order to take into account aircraft hijacking and the Aeronautics Act was 
amended in 1973 to include provisions on passenger and cargo screening (CATSA Act Review 
Secretariat 2006, 9). Air carriers assumed the responsibility for the security of their aircraft, 
including through searching passengers and goods. Transport Canada was the regulator of airport 
and aviation security, and was in addition the provider of aviation security equipment and 
facilities at airports (in its capacity of both owner and operator of these airports).  
 While airport security function represents a legal obligation that states must fulfill, it does 
not necessary mean that the provision of airport security services has to be delivered by states: 
the provision of airport security services can be delegated to private security organizations. 
Aviation security functions, which are intelligence, airport policing, and screening, can be 
performed by various organizations, from public police forces to security intelligence agencies 
and to either public or private security agencies. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service has 
been responsible for collecting intelligence at Canada’s airports (Rimsa 2011, 52), and the RCMP 
was responsible for airport policing (Brodeur 1992, 106; Rimsa 2011, 52) at a great cost: almost 
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 This confers ICAO a “quasi-legislative” power on that respect (Erler 1964), since the standards 
contained in the Annexes are somehow binding contracting states (Abeyratne 2007). 
122
 Annex 17 requests States to “[…] establish [and maintain] an organization and develop and implement 
regulations, practices and procedures to safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference 
taking into account the safety, regularity and efficiency of flights [and to ensure that] such an organization 
and such regulations, practices and procedures: a) protect the safety of passengers, crew, ground personnel 
and the general public in all matters related to safeguarding against acts of unlawful interference with civil 
aviation; and b) are capable of responding rapidly to meet any increased security threat” (ICAO 2011b, 2–
1). 
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eight hundred RCMP officers were assigned to Canadian airports in the early 1990s (Ericson and 
Haggerty 1997, 145–146). Finally, screening has been a historic responsibility of the private 
sector. This was made possible because the screening function in Canada was devolved to 
airlines, and the Federal Aeronautics Act granted private security personnel special search powers 
to enforce airport security measures (Shearing and Stenning 1981, 235)
123
. A former senior 
executive officer in charge of aviation security at Transport Canada describes how this used to 
work: “And screening was performed by airlines, meaning that they identified among themselves 
a lead airline at each airport (it was usually Air Canada), who was in charge of contracting out 
screening to an external company. And through contractual arrangements, all airlines were 
contributing to funding for the staff who was performing the screening, and the equipment was 
supplied by Transport Canada
124”. 
Following the Air India tragedy
125
, the government of Canada decided to modernize its 
aviation security regime. It specifically focused on baggage and passenger screening. New 
measures were introduced, such as more stringent security controls on passengers and carry-on 
baggage; the purchase of additional X-ray detection equipment and explosive detectors; 
strengthening of the pre-board screening training program and the introduction of a certification 
program for airport screening personnel, as well as enhanced training for airport security 
personnel; the consolidation of the security functions in Transport Canada; and the overhaul of 
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 It should be noted that this was not unique to Canada. For instance, the Protection of aircraft Act in the 
United Kingdom was also granting private security personnel special search powers (Shearing and 
Stenning 1981, 235). 
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 Respondent who used to be in charge of aviation security at Transport Canada, interview conducted on 
03/05/2012. 
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 On 23 June 1985, an Air India aircraft operating the Montreal-Delhi route (via London) was blown up 
by a bomb and crashed into the Atlantic Ocean while in Irish airspace. Three hundred and thirty nine 
passengers and crew members (including 280 Canadians) were killed in the bombing. It appears that the 
bomb, placed in a suitcase, originated in Vancouver and was transited to Montreal before being checked-
in and enplaned in the aircraft. The official inquiry which ensued revealed a host of security and 
communication lapses (Malcher 1991, 211–212; Sisson 2011). 
 198 
the regulatory framework, including the creation of new regulations (CATSA Act Review 
Secretariat 2006, 10–11).  
1.2. The Commercialization of Airports: A Parallel Movement toward 
the Commercialization of Airport Security? 
Following the proposal of the Program Review Task Force (or the Nieslen Task Force on 
government operation) to terminate direct federal ownership and operation of airports (Nielsen 
1985), the Airport Task Force advocated the transfer of airports to local authorities but strongly 
recommended that Transport Canada should keep the responsibility for air transport safety and 
security in order to ensure compliance with Annex 17 and keep a close eye on such a sensitive 
issue (Airports Task Force 1986; Kernaghan, Borins, and Marson 2005, 109). Nevertheless, the 
commercialization of airports to LAAs forced the government to clarify the way in which it 
would exercise its security oversight function. In the words of a former senior public servant of 
Transport Canada, “There was a change in a regulatory way. When airports were under federal 
control, security was the subject of a very minimum set of regulations and a very large set of 
policies and internal standards. With the commercialization, you have to have regulation in place 
for airport authorities to be accountable. So we made new very explicit regulations instead of 
broad internal policies.
 126” 
If the oversight of airport security remained with Transport Canada, which established 
new sets of regulations, the provision of airport security services dramatically evolved with the 
commercialization of airports. Indeed, since 1987, the airport policing function of the RCMP has 
been gradually decentralized and transferred to other organizations, including at the airport level. 
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 Respondent who used to be in charge of aviation security at Transport Canada, interview conducted on 
03/05/2012. 
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A former senior public servant of Transport Canada gives a good account of the change of 
situation: “Before the transfer [of some airports to LAAs], the RCMP was policing 18 airports127. 
Shortly after that, it decided to no longer provide policing at airports at no charge. So they 
withdrew. Then Transport Canada introduced new regulations stating that airports were 
responsible for providing the same level of security than the RCMP. And airport authorities 
contracted with local police or private security companies. This was in the late 1980s.
 128” With 
airports taking over the responsibility of providing airport policing (either directly or indirectly 
through contracting out with local police or private companies), the movement toward the 
devolution of airport security provisions to private companies was launched. 
 The movement toward the privatization of airport security services provision continued 
with the election of the Liberal Government of Jean Chrétien. Nevertheless, what the Chrétien 
Government did differently is that it integrated its airport security policy provisions within the 
NAP, thus establishing a clear framework for airport security privatization. Under the NAP, the 
Government reaffirmed that it would abide by ICAO’s SARPs contained in Annex 17, that it 
would modernize its policy and regulatory framework, and that it would continue to give airlines 
the responsibility to operate screening of goods and passengers. It stressed that the security of the 
Canadian air transportation system would continue to be the government's top priority, and that 
aviation security measures at NAS airports would be provided under existing security regulations 
and would apply to any certified aerodrome regardless of who owns or operates the airport 
(Transport Canada 1994). The federal government of Jean Chrétien also decided to stop being 
involved in the ownership and maintenance of the airport security equipment it until then had 
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provided to screeners. This decision was a small change within a revolution in the provision of 
the air transport sector. The government consulted with the industry and it was decided to create a 
non-share, not-for-profit company that would own and maintain screening equipment across 
Canada’s airports: the Air Transport Security Corporation was incorporated in March 1997.  
The Corporation’s mandate was to assume ownership, operate and manage certain 
security related equipment situated at Canadian airports. Ownership and membership of the Air 
Transport Security Corporation was granted to ATAC. In addition, a board was established, 
which represented the airline industry and the airports (ATAC 1999; House of Commons 2001a). 
The Air Transport Security Corporation can be described as a policy instrument. Research indeed 
showed that setting up a corporation to deliver public services has been instrumental to achieve 
public policy objectives and that considering them as policy instruments has been the source of 
meaningful analyses (Tupper and Doern 1988; Bellamy 2005). The design of such an instrument 
represented a significant policy move in that it shifted the responsibility over the cost associated 
with the screening equipment to air carriers. This was consistent with the overall “user-pay” 
philosophy that led to the commercialization of airports and the subsequent rent policy. 
According to a Transport Canada officer: “The creation of the Air Transport Security Corporation 
was consistent with overall changes in government policy. It is based on the principle that users 
of the system should pay for it. These were early days after Lockerbie
129
, and it was decided to 
move toward having the capability to screen all air baggage. The level of capital investment to 
acquire the material and the machines was a private sector responsibility. So the Air Transport 
Security Corporation was established as a not-for-profit company. It became responsible for the 
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 Lockerbie refers to the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 from London-Heathrow to New York on 21 
December 1988: the aircraft exploded at 31,000 ft over the Scottish town of Lockerbie, killing all 259 on 
board and 11 in the town. 
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equipment, which was transferred to the Corporation. And it also became responsible for 
maintenance. This was an airline company, with its headquarters literally next door to the 
ATAC’s office. At that time it was obvious that because the responsibility for operating the 
equipment was with airlines, then so to for the acquisition and the maintenance.
130” It would have 
been possible to directly transfer the responsibility for screening and equipment to security 
companies without involving air carriers and ATAC. However, it was felt at that time that the 
transfer was engendering enough difficulties and that involving several private security services 
providers in the process would make it even more complex, and that the system of a single 
ownership of equipment and an air carriers-led screening operations was operating efficiently 
(House of Commons 2001a)  . The rationale behind the design of an instrument such as the Air 
Transport Security Corporation was thus to find a cost-effective solution that would be in line 
with the user-pay philosophy that was becoming the norm at that time. 
1.3. The Referential and its Algorithms: Market, Privatization and 
User Pay? 
The privatization of airport security in Canada is in line with the parameters of the referential for 
air transport and its market-orientation. Indeed, if the market-oriented referential cannot be 
assimilated to a corpus of neoliberal ideas which would lead to deregulate and liberalize all 
aspects of all sectors, it nevertheless carries a vision of the economy and the society centered 
around the market norms. As regards the private delivery of security services, such a vision can 
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be seen in the idea that private security firms would be more effective and less expensive than 
state policing.  
With a greater focus on private management of airport, a greater emphasis on private sector 
mechanisms to finance airport development, a greater reliance on airport competition to allocate 
routes and attract air carriers, it is not surprising to see that a similar move occurred for security 
provision. Indeed, the Government of Canada progressively ceased to be a security services 
provider at major Canadian airports. The RCMP ceased to provide airport policing services at no 
cost, and was replaced by private companies, local police, or airport authorities’ staff. This move 
constitutes a privatization in that a private airport authority was given the responsibility of 
directly providing the service or to contract out the provision of service against a financial 
remuneration. Transport Canada also ceased to own and maintain screening equipment at airports 
and transferred them to the Air Transport Security Corporation, a private, non-share, not-for-
profit Corporation. The government only kept responsibility over the functions that could not be 
devolved to any other institution, namely intelligence services (though this could be debated) and 
security oversight. By devolving airport security services provision, the federal government 
adopted the “user-pay” model for the provision of such services. This change was done gradually, 
from the late 1980s to the creation of the Air Transport Security Corporation in 1997. This is very 
much in line with the general market-oriented perspective that frames and shapes the Canadian 
referential for air transport. Consequently, private provision of airport security funded by users 
instead of taxpayers is a fundamental algorithm of the Canadian referential for air transport that 
has been in place since the mid-1990s. The algorithm can be specified as follows: 
- “In a market-oriented perspective, it is not the role of the government to fund and provide 
security services at Canadian airports”; 
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- “In a market-oriented perspective, airport security is funded through charges (i.e. by user) 
and not through taxes (i.e. not from the general budget)”. 
-  “Users have to pay for the provision of airport security service: this will ensure the 
efficient provision of high-quality security services”,  
- “If airport security is funded by the users, then the government can solely focus on its 
core function of security oversight”; 
As highlighted above, these algorithms originated from both the air tragedies (Air India, 
September 11) and the global trend of privatization of airport facilities and services, including 
security services. Evidence of the importance of the “user-pay” algorithm for the provision of 
airport security algorithm within the Canadian referential is the progressive implementation of 
security charges at Canadian airports. The case of the Calgary airport provides a good illustration 
of the situation at other large Canadian airports. When the federal government announced in 1996 
that it would withdraw funding and RCMP services from Canada's international airports in 1997, 
giving airport authorities the responsibility for arranging and finding replacement services, the 
Calgary Airport Authority entered into negotiations and concluded contracts with two 
organizations which would provide uniformed presence throughout the terminal, patrol roadways, 
respond to pre-board screening incidents and other policing duties, as well as provide general 
terminal security patrols, and monitor alarm systems, curb control, parking and other related 
duties. This was in addition to the private security company which already provided pre-board 
security screening of passengers and goods. In order to fund its security services providers, 
Calgary Airport Authority incorporated all costs associated with airport policing and security into 
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fees and charges to airlines (and their passengers) using the airport (CNW 1997a)
131
. Further 
evidence of this market-oriented perspective for airport security services provision is the fierce 
competition that has led to the awarding of pre-boarding security contracts. Right before the 
transfer of screening equipment to a private, not-for-profit company, a significant event 
strengthened the market-oriented aspect. In April 1995, the Vancouver-based Executive Security 
Services Ltd was tipped into bankruptcy. At that time, Executive Security Services was providing 
pre-boarding screening at the airports of Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver (in addition to 13 
other small and medium-size airports), and the value of airport contracts was estimated at $18-
million per year (Williamson 1995). This event considerably reshuffled the cards of airport 
screening activities: the elimination of the dominant player led to a fierce competition open to 
existing and new forces, reinforcing the market-oriented nature of screening activities.  
Finally, the Canadian referential and its algorithm on security provision is in line with the 
global referential. ICAO, at the request of states, has developed extensive policies and guidance 
(in Doc 9082 and Doc 9562, respectively) that address user charges for airport security. The 
continuous development of these policies and guidance is a further evidence of a global trend 
towards a “user -pay” model of airport security that is part of the global referential. 
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2. The 9/11 Terrorist Attacks: A Game Changer for Aviation Security in 
Canada and in the World 
2.1. A Brief Background on the September 11 Attacks and their 
Immediate Impact on the Canadian Civil Aviation System 
The events of September 11 have had a historic and massive impact on airport security 
worldwide, including in Canada. On that morning, 19 terrorists belonging to the al-Qaeda group 
hijacked four aircraft: two were intentionally flown into the North and South towers of the World 
Trade Center complex in New York City, one into the Pentagon building, and one into the 
Capitol Building in Washington D.C (this attempt failed due to passengers attempting to take 
control of the aircraft and the aircraft crashed into a field in Pennsylvania) (Campbell 2001).  
The attacks dramatically impacted the Canadian civil aviation sector. Right after the 
attacks, United States Transportation Secretary requested to “get those goddamn planes down” 
(Scott 2007, 199), shutting down American airspace and ordering every plane in the sky to land 
immediately at the nearest available airport. It was the first and only time in the history of 
American civil aviation that such an order was given, forcing 4546 civilian aircraft which were 
flying in the American airspace to find an airstrip to land. But the closure of the American 
airspace also impacted about 400 international flights which were flying to the United States and 
were already en-route. Canadian officials then decided that airports from coast to coast to coast 
would accept all aircraft which did not have enough fuel to fly back to their origin airport. 
Subsequently, the Canadian airport system absorbed in a very limited period of time more than 
250 aircraft carrying more than 43,000 passengers (15 airports were used, from Vancouver in the 
West to Whitehorse in the North and to St John’s in the East). Even American-bound planes were 
diverted to closer Canadian airports (DeFede 2003, 5–7; Roach 2003, 4). The Canadian civil air 
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transport regulator, the military, the airport operators, the air navigation services providers and all 
involved stakeholders thus demonstrated the extreme reactivity of the Canadian civil aviation 
sector and the efficient management of an unseen crisis situation by its various stakeholders. 
2.2. The Canadian Response to September 11. The Creation of the 
Canadian Air Transport Security Authority: A Shift in the 
Referential? 
In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 events, security emerged as a new and urgent 
priority to the Canadian government. A month after the attacks, the Liberal government of Jean 
Chrétien introduced a massive bill addressing anti-terrorism. The Anti-Terrorism Act (Bill C-36) 
gave new powers to the Canadian government to define and act on groups suspected of terrorism. 
A second massive bill entitled the Public Safety Bill was introduced to broaden the powers of the 
government with respect to military measures, but it had to be withdrawn because of public 
criticisms of its extensively broad scope. The bill was amended and later reintroduced; it was 
ultimately adopted in 2004. With respect to aviation, the Parliament passed a bill on exchange of 
information about airline passenger lists (to comply with new American security requirements), 
which was subsequently referred to the Supreme Court. In December 2001 the Court ruled that 
the bill respected the privacy right of Canadian citizens (Roach 2003, 9–11; Sloan 2005). Finally, 
in December 2001, the government tabled a so-called “security budget” in which it allocated 
about $8 billion in spending on security. Specifically, new spending was directed to policing, the 
military, increased airport security and border and immigration control. This self-proclaimed 
“security budget’ pointed to terrorism as the most significant security threat to Canadians and it 
was largely devoted to air transport and air security (Roach 2003, 190). The budget was indeed 
accompanied by a new set of measures aiming at enhancing airport security capabilities in 
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Canada and transforming the way that airport security was performed, with the objective to 
prevent any terrorist attack through air.   
 With security becoming the prominent topic on the political agenda, the federal 
government identified the screening function as the key element that had to be addressed 
immediately. The Minister of Transport directed Transport Canada to work on new security 
measures to be implemented immediately, while several MPs suggested during meetings of the 
Standing Committee on Transport and Government Operations that screening provisions should 
be federalized (House of Commons 2001b; House of Commons 2001a). The issue of 
“nationalizing” or “federalizing” the provision of screening services at airports was thus officially 
and publicly raised by Canadian lawmakers, giving an indication that drastic changes could soon 
affect screening provision. Anticipating a drastic policy change with regard to screening, the 
Canadian Airports Council, speaking on behalf of the airport industry, proposed its own solution 
to the House of Commons: airport operators requested to take over and assume directly the 
function of passenger and cargo screening at Canadian airports (House of Commons 2001c). This 
proposal would constitute a major policy change, by shifting the responsibility from air carriers to 
airport operators. It would integrate the screening function along with all other security functions 
performed by airports. This is particularly relevant with regard to Canada’s four largest airport 
operators. The airports of Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver and Calgary handle many more 
passengers than their closest competitors in the country. This means that they are confronted with 
different challenges in terms of facilitation than smaller airports
132
, and there is an obvious 
interest for major airport operators to control the facilitation process, so that they coordinate all 
elements that would ensure the smooth flow of passengers, goods, crews and aircraft.  
                                                 
132
 Facilitation refers to a wide range of issues and activities in connection with the clearance of aircraft, 
people and goods through the formalities required at international borders (ICAO 2011c, vii). 
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Nonetheless, the Government of Canada decided to take over the screening function 
directly. Specifically, by the end of 2001, the Government of Canada announced the creation of a 
new federal agency. The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority was established as a Crown 
Corporation in April 2002, which reports to Parliament through the minister responsible for civil 
aviation. CATSA became responsible for passengers (and airport/airlines employees) and 
baggage screening; deployment, operation and maintenance of explosive detection equipment; 
assisting airports with the costs of enhanced aviation security related policing; financing the 
RCMP to provide air marshal capabilities and the issuing of access media; and financing the 
provision of law enforcement officers for airport security. In practice, CATSA became 
responsible for the screening at 89 airports, which represents more than 4,000 contract 
employees. CATSA divided Canada into six (and then four) regions. For each region, it then 
launched a competitive bid for awarding screening at all airports. The winner of the bid then 
became responsible for providing screeners to all airports of that region. Screeners then wear the 
CATSA uniform (not the uniform of their employers) and perform screening on behalf of 
CATSA. Finally, Canadian airport authorities retain responsibility for airport policing, perimeter 
security and aprons, taxiways and runways security (Price and Forrest 2008, 113–114; Salter 
2007, 55–57). 
 The rationale behind the creation of CATSA was that the government needed a new 
instrument by which it would ensure the provision of a uniform and consistent airport screening 
service from coast to coast. By directly writing the terms of references of its subcontractors and 
by overseeing the competitive bidding process for granting screening services, CATSA was seen 
a unique policy instrument that would ensure standardized practices across Canada. In addition to 
the standardization of screening norms and practices, CATSA was also seen as instrumental in 
improving the qualification of screeners. Before the 9/11 events, screeners usually earned low 
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wages (for instance, hourly rate at Calgary airport ranged from $8 to $10). Because of these low 
wages, recruiting attracted mostly immigrant workers unable to qualify for higher paid jobs, and 
the extremely high turnover of staff was a major preoccupation (Dahlberg 2003, 96–97). The 
government wanted to change this situation by increasing the wage of screeners, by training 
them, and by offering them conditions that would retain them. Consequently, when CATSA was 
created, it immediately launched four training centres to teach effective pre-board screening to 
3,000 new security personnel (Lyon 2006, 400). 
 Finally, the government of Canada also designed a new instrument to fund airport security 
in general and CATSA more specifically. It announced the creation of a new air traveler security 
charge (ATSC, or Droit pour la sécurité des passagers du transport aérien, DPSTA in French). 
The so-called “security budget” that was tabled in 2001 created an ATSC to be levied on each 
departing passenger where screening would be overseen by CATSA, and the charge would be 
modulated according to the destination of the departing passenger (domestic, transborder, or 
international). Interestingly enough, CATSA is nevertheless not funded by this charge. Its budget 
comes through the Treasury Board. The ATSC is intended to fund the air travel security system 
as a whole, including CATSA, but also the implementation of Transport Canada’s regulations 
and oversight, as well as RCMP “air marshals” officers on selected domestic and international 
flights (Salter 2007, 55). The process of airport security funding thus became complicated: by 
creating a new security fee, and by calling it a “charge”, the government implies that sums 
collected would be applied specifically to recover the costs of providing security equipment and 
services for civil aviation. But the government then treats ATSC revenue as general revenue, 
since it is integrated to the federal revenue. CATSA is funded separately through parliamentary 
appropriations from the tax-funded Consolidated Revenue Fund. In addition, the portion of the 
ATSC revenue that is supposed to fund both Transport Canada’s programs on security and safety 
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the RCMP’s air marshals also goes to general revenues, and is then allocated through 
appropriations, but the cost-basis of such allocation is either unclear for Transport Canada or 
nonexistent for the RCMP. It would thus be possible to qualify the ATSC as a tax, in that it 
appears to be designed to raise government revenues and in that it is not applied to civil aviation 
on a rigorous cost-specific basis. It is worth noting that the separation of the ATSC fee from other 
levies on aviation and the fact that it was one of the highest security fees in the world has led to 
substantial controversy surrounding the adoption of the air traveler security charge (Waters and 
Yu 2003). 
2.3. Charges vs. Taxes: Looking for the Algorithm of Airport Security? 
CATSA can be seen as a “security shift” through which airport security was both politicized and 
nationalized. Indeed, research has shown that while airport security was previously expressed in 
terms of technical standards, the creation of CATSA represented a nationalization of airport 
security and an expansion of governmental powers that was due to a perceived emergency and an 
existential threat (Salter 2008b, 331–332). While the government could have granted the 
responsibility for screening to airports, which would have strengthened the private provision of 
airport facilities and services (including security), it rather decided to create a Crown Corporation 
funded through parliamentary appropriation. Canadian public administration scholars often 
consider crown corporations to be a “traditional” form of program delivery (along with 
departments, special operating agencies, public partnerships and departmental corporations): 
despite operating along commercial lines, crown corporations are subject to a policy framework 
established by the government and are accountable to Parliament through a minister (Kernaghan, 
Borins, and Marson 2005, 97–99). 
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 In terms of the algorithm, this may indicate that the September 11 events were a game 
changer in the Canadian referential for air transport. The cognitive analysis of public policy 
indeed postulates that a referential is constructed, supported and reinforced by four key elements, 
and the algorithms are one of these key elements that provide causal relations carrying both a 
perception and a prescription onto a specific topic of a sector (Colomb 2007). The Canadian 
referential has been shaped and framed by a market-oriented perspective. Stakeholders have 
understood that users would assume the cost structure of Canada’s four largest airports through a 
“user-pay” model. With regard to airport competition, it is now accepted that Canada’s four 
largest airports are competing with other airports to attract foreign air carriers and develop their 
networks. But with regard to airport security, the unanticipated involvement of the federal 
government though the design of two new instruments (a corporation and a levy) seems to 
indicate a “public service” algorithm that would specifically address the security sector 
(considered as a subsector within the sectoral referential). Subsequently, the algorithms related to 
the provision of airport screening services could be the following: 
- “In a world threatened by terrorism, it is the role of the federal government to directly 
monitor airport screening”,  
- “Screening must be consistent from coast to coast: only the government can guarantee 
such consistency, through a federal department/agency or a Crown corporation”; 
- “If the government creates and controls CATSA, it will increase the quality and the 
efficiency of airport screening at Canada’s airports”. 
The careful search for evidence that would support the presence of such an algorithm indicates 
an ambiguous situation. On the one hand, the continuous affirmation of the role of the state in the 
oversight of air transport security, the creation of a federal authority and the nationalization of 
airport screening, and the decision to fund CATSA via parliamentary appropriation clearly 
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highlights this “public service” move within a subsector of the referential. This is also reflected 
by some stakeholders of the Canadian civil aviation sector. For a CATSA representative, “I 
believe the objective, or the reason why the government created a central organization, is 
consistency. It was to make sure that screening is consistent, that it is in the public interest, and 
the reason why CATSA was created is consistency at the national level.
133” On the other hand, 
the scrutiny of CATSA practices and the rationale behind the ATSC may indicate otherwise. 
Indeed, the model that was chosen for airport screening in Canada appears to be ambivalent. If 
some algorithms are not in line with the market-oriented referential for air transport, some other 
elements are much more market-friendly. First, CATSA grants screening contracts through 
competitive bidding. CATSA is not the screening services provider, but the screening services 
granter. This maintains a private-sector delivery of screening services, and the bidding process 
ensures fair competition among services. These elements indicate that despite the Crown 
Corporation status of CATSA, there is still a market-oriented stance with regard to airport 
screening. Furthermore, the mode of funding chosen by the government also appears to be in line 
with the market-oriented referential for air transport. The creation of the ATSC to fund airport 
screening as well as some elements of airport security makes end-users pay for the provision of 
the specific services they need. The ATSC thus indicates a move towards a “user-pay” algorithm 
for airport security, in line with other algorithms on airport costs and aligned with the general 
market-oriented Canadian referential for air transport. Consequently, other algorithms related to 
the provision of airport screening services could be as follows: 
- “Users have to pay for the provision of airport screening services: this will ensure a sound 
and economically sustainable delivery of screening”,  
                                                 
133
 Respondent from CATSA, interview conducted on 16/03/2012. 
 
 213 
- “Providing screening services is not the role of the government, it is the role of the private 
sector” 
- “Since screening benefits air transport end users, they have to assume its cost”; 
- “In a market-oriented perspective, airport screening is funded through user charges and 
not through general taxation”. 
The “security shift” created by the design and the content of two new instruments (the 
establishment of CATSA and the implementation of the ATSC) is ambivalent. It is both a 
market-oriented move, which would be in line with the Canadian referential, and a public sector 
move, which would certainly not be in line with the referential. One could conclude that in 
theory, the overarching architecture of the system (CATSA and parliamentary appropriations) 
was unexpected and unaligned with the Canadian referential, but that its internal elements (ATSC 
and bidding processes) remained strongly market-oriented. Nevertheless, in practice, such a 
security shift by the government of Canada has dramatically affected the four largest Canadian 
airports and their business, creating a high level of ambiguity within the Canadian referential. 
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B – The Cost and Efficiency of Canada’s Airport Security Services Provision 
and its Impact of the Four largest Airports 
1. First Line of Criticism: The High Costs of Airport Screening in Canada in 
Addition to Other Costs  
1.1. The Level of the ATSC and the Nature of the Provision of Airport 
Security Services  
At the inception of the instrument in 2001, the various rates of the ATSC were established as 
follows, including the goods and services tax (GST) or the federal portion of the harmonized 
sales tax (HST) (ICAO 2012d): one-way domestic travel, $12.00; round-trip domestic travel, 
$24.00; for transborder flights to the continental United States, or to the Islands of St. Pierre and 
Miquelon, $12.00; and for travel to other international destinations, a flat rate of $24.00. The 
government, responding to several calls from industry stakeholders and the Standing Committee 
on Transport (House of Commons 2002a), decreased the ATSC in the following years. Not even 
a year after its implementation, it became known as one of the most expensive security charge in 
the world. As of 1 January 2012, the various rates of the ATSC were slightly reduced (from $7.48 
up to $ 25.91) (ICAO 2012d), but they are still deemed to be “the highest in the world by a 
significant amount” in the recently released Standing Senate Committee on Transport and 
Communications’ report on air transport. It is true that generally, Canada’s ATSC is usually 
higher than security charges at European hub airports: $17.20 at Amsterdam-Schiphol, $16.90 at 
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Paris-Charles de Gaulle, $1.60 plus $8.70 at Frankfurt, etc. (ICAO 2012d)
134
. If it is difficult to 
establish comparisons because Canadian airports are integrating non-screening security costs in 
their cost base for charges, the picture is still clear: for fewer services, Canada appears to charge 
more. 
 A more meaningful comparison would be to benchmark the cost of screening services in 
Canada and in the United States. Indeed, airports in these two countries are competing against 
each other, and the additional cost of screening on airfares is part of the equation that consumers 
consider before deciding to depart from one airport or another. In the United States, the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) aviation security activities funding is provided 
through specific appropriations, which provide for screening of all passengers and baggage, 
deployment of on-site law enforcement, continuation of a uniform set of background 
requirements for airport and airline personnel, and deployment of explosives detection 
technology
135
. The revenue stream that generates these appropriations for aviation security is 
twofold. First, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act mandated that TSA impose a flat fee 
of $2.50 per segment and no more than $5 per one-way trip on passengers to pay for the costs of 
providing specified civil aviation security services: such charges covered 26% of the total cost of 
providing security services in 2011. Second, the remaining is covered by the general revenue (i.e. 
by the American taxpayer). Finally, it is worth noting that the average cost for TSA to screen a 
passenger and accompanying is of about USD 9.00 (Senate 2012b). 
                                                 
134
 According to the President and CEO of the Tourism Industry Association of Canada (TIAC): “Canada's 
air security tax is by far the highest in the world, 300% higher, for example, than its American equivalent. 
In the United States the air security fee is only $2.50 per segment to a maximum of $5 one way, or $7.65 
Canadian. In Australia the fee is $8 Canadian and in France it's $10 Canadian. Israel, which is recognized 
as having the most secure air transportation system in the world, charges just $12, and that's for two-way 
travel” (House of Commons 2002b). 
135
 They do not provide for air marshals. 
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 Many stakeholders of the Canadian civil aviation sector are doing similar comparisons. 
The two following excerpts represent the perception of a number of interviewees on that issue. 
First, according to a representative of a foreign network carrier operating in Canada: “All 
countries charge security fees; and if we get back to do they have the right to charge these fees, 
yes, absolutely, they have the right. But the level is excessive, and it is hard to find where the fees 
go. They go the general coffers, and it is impossible to audit where they go. They are overly 
excessive; it should not cost $15 to screen a passenger.” Then, another stakeholder mentioned 
that: “The ATSC is high because the government wants to recover the full cost of providing 
airport security. If you compare to the US, the portion paid by the passenger in Canada is higher, 
but I don’t think that the costs of providing airport security are significantly different. It is just 
that in Canada we recover it all. But if we are charging the full cost, and if our competitors are 
not, then we have a problem. We should be more aware of that.
136”  
The implementation of a charge in order to recover the costs of providing screening and 
other security services at airports has led to a major (and still unsolved) debate over the real 
nature of air transport security. Considering that the terrorist threat is an external situation to air 
transport (terrorism seeks to disrupt the working of the economy and society), there is a case for 
the general public who benefits from security to pay at least a substantial part of the costs of 
achieving security from terrorist threats through taxes (Waters and Zhang 2004). Many 
interviewees used that argument to denounce the ATSC instrument. For a senior executive 
manager of GTAA: “we believe that aviation security is a national concern, and that it should be 
paid by the national revenue. We recognize that the government prefers a user-pay mechanism, 
                                                 
136
 Respondent from of a foreign network carrier operating in Canada, interview conducted on 15/03/2012. 
 217 
but we are concerned by the amount of money that is collected and not reinvested.
 137” According 
to an international air transport industry representative: “My key position and ICAO position is 
that security is a state responsibility. I think that the industry pays for security on top of what is 
basically requested and which should be provided and paid for by the state. Other modes of 
transport do not pay for their own security, and its normal, and it should be the same for air 
transport.
138” For a senior executive manager of a foreign airline with major operations in 
Canada: “C’est une distorsion de concurrence par rapport aux autres modes de transports. Dans le 
cas de l’aérien on l’impose au passager, alors que le transport ferroviaire et le transport maritime 
comportent aussi des risques, mais que les voyageurs ne les paient pas. Pourquoi est-ce qu’on 
taxe le passager sur le niveau de sécurité que le gouvernement veut mettre? Quand même, 
aujourd’hui, c’est un peu le parcours du combattant si on veut passer la sécurité.139” For these 
stakeholders, airport security is a national security matter, and as such it should be funded by 
taxpayers and not by air transport end-users.  
 Nevertheless, the debate is more complicated than it seems, and many interviews have 
adopted a different point of view with regard to airport security charges. For a senior executive 
manager of a second foreign airline with major operations in Canada: “At the end of the day 
somebody has to pay for it, and if airlines have to pay they will put the cost on the consumer. But 
security is provided on the behalf of the passenger, the passenger has to pay for it. And the model 
is good because it is transparent: the passenger knows what he is paying for for airport security, 
even if he doesn’t like paying for it!140”. This point view was echoed by a senior officer of 
Transport Canada: “Again, every dollar makes a difference in theory, but in practice I also think 
                                                 
137
 Respondent from the GTAA, interview conducted on 16/03/2012. 
138
 Respondent from an international trade association of airlines, interview conducted on 06/03/2012. 
139
 Respondent from a foreign network carrier operating in Canada, interview conducted on 14/03/2012. 
140
 Respondent from a foreign network carrier operating in Canada, interview conducted on 19/03/2012. 
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that passengers are taking in consideration what happened on 9/11, and they know that there is a 
fee for that service. And airlines are very happy to put security tax on a separate line on the ticket, 
saying it is not them which are charging for it. But the system does cost money.
141”  
 The debate over the nature of airport security services provisions – a public good or a 
private good – is a lively debate with dramatic implications in terms of funding. If many 
interviewees referred to this debate, the majority of them still considered that whatever the 
philosophical stance over the nature of the security good, end-users would have to assume a 
portion of its costs: what is therefore at stake is not the taxation-type instrument but rather its 
content (in terms of levels of charges and transparency). 
1.2. A General Issue: The Lack of Transparency in the Allocation of 
Security Costs  
Between the two sides of the nature of security services debates, almost all interviewees share a 
common perception toward the content of the ATSC instrument, which is perceived as being non-
transparent, from establishing the costs to be recovered to collecting and transferring the money 
from the end-user to the screening company. This issue of transparency of the content of 
instrument has become a real phenomenon which is part of how stakeholders perceive the “user-
pay” model for the provision of airport security services such as screening. Within each branch of 
air transport (airports, airlines, and associations), the majority of interviewees raised this issue. At 
the airport level, a GTAA official mentioned that “I would be more inclined to support it if it 
would go to airport security, but instead it goes to general revenue”, and a senior executive from 
Vancouver International airport added that “One struggle for airport is that the ATSC goes to 
                                                 
141
 Respondent from Transport Canada, interview conducted on 13/03/2012. 
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general revenue, and we don’t see the benefit of this money. At YVR, if we have about 15 
million passengers paying a $5 fee, it is about $75M. Where does all that money go, especially 
when the federal government is cutting CATSA budget?
142”. At the Canadian airline level, an 
interviewee from a trade association explained that “le DSPTA, et ça, ça va consolider des 
revenus, et je ne pense pas qu’on peut savoir combien est collecté par le gouvernement versus 
combien est mis dans la sûreté. Parce qu’il faut bien comprendre que c’est pas l’ACSTA qui 
collecte l’argent, l’argent va au gouvernement, au fond consolidé. L’ACTSA n’a rien à faire sur 
le montant qui est collecté, il n’y a pas de liens entre ce qui est collecté et ce qui est reversé à 
l’ACSTA143”. At the foreign airline operating in Canada level, the same concerns were echoed by 
a representative from an airline operating transborder flights: “I have no problem with the user-
pay model if the fee is going in the pot of money for security. But it goes to the general revenue, 
and there is the general perception that the money used for other ends, and that is just another 
convenient hidden tax for the government. Transport Canada says that the cost of security is 
greater than the total amount collected from the fee, and this may be true, but if there was an 
audit that would show that, if an audit shows that the money collected equals the costs of 
security, the perception will change.
 144” These excerpts clearly illustrate a significant ambiguity 
with regard to the content of the policy instrument related to the user pay algorithm for airport 
security. Almost all stakeholders recognize that users have to fund airport security services 
provision through user charges, and most of them accept this provided that the taxation-type 
instrument would have a transparent content. This is this notion of transparency, which should be 
part of the instrument, which is at stake.  
                                                 
142
 Respondent from the GTAA, interview conducted on 02/04/2012. 
143
 Respondent from a Canadian airlines trade association, interview conducted on 01/03/2012. 
144
 Respondent from a foreign airline operating transborder flights, interview conducted on 11/04/2012. 
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A typical example of the lack of transparency of such taxation-type instrument lies in its 
name. Charges are by definition cost-related in order to recover the cost of providing a specific 
service. The ATSC aims to recover the cost of providing airport screening services (i.e. a cost-
related charge), but it also aims at funding Transport Canada and at funding the RCMP’s air 
marshals (i.e. a tax to fund government operations). The fact the ATSC goes directly to general 
revenues is extremely confusing. Referred to as a “security charge”, the ATSC appears to be 
understood by most actors as a tax whose aim is to raise federal government revenues in its 
entirety. Nevertheless, the government language creates more ambiguity, making the real nature 
of the ATSC very unclear, and the wording chosen by the government further accentuates its 
ambiguous nature. The confusion is further increased by the translation the English “Air 
Travelers Security Charge (ATSC)” into the “Droit pour la sécurité des passagers du transport 
aérien (DSPTA)” in French (“charge” should be translated by “redevance” to refer to the cost-
relatedness principle, using the word “droit” does not carry such meaning and refers to tax)145. 
Secondly, the cost-basis for the ATSC is not transparent and users are not consulted. 
Interviewees from Transport Canada explained that a portion of the ATSC would be transferred 
not only for security but also safety programs: if a portion of the security charge is dedicated to 
safety, then the key charging principle of cost-relatedness becomes obsolete. In addition, charges 
are used to fund the provision of specific services, while taxes are used to fund a department’s 
programs. The RCMP does not publish how much it spends for air marshals and other air 
transport security services: there is no transparency with regard to recovering the costs of that 
                                                 
145
 The phrase “Droit pour la sécurité des passagers du transport aérien” is also extremely confusing: the 
translation confuses the words “safety” with “security”. Safety refers to the efforts that are taken to ensure 
airplanes are free from factors that may lead to injury or loss. It corresponds to the French word 
“sécurité”. “Security” does not relate to aircraft but rather to preventing people from engaging in unlawful 
interference with civil aviation. “Security” encompasses intelligence gathering, pre-boarding procedures 
and airport security personnel, etc. It corresponds to the French word “sûreté”. 
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service through the ATSC. Finally, an interview with a CATSA official dramatically reinforced 
this perception. When questioned about the cost basis of the ATSC and the consultation of 
CATSA in the determination of these cost, an official of the organization had the following 
response: “Obviously, our revenues come from parliamentary appropriation, and ATSC is paid 
by travelers. But how it is managed, the Department of Finance is in a better position to 
comment. The Government sets our budget, and we manage our activities within this budget. And 
for the consultation, we are not consulted, this is a tax issue.
 146” It is extremely surprising to see 
security experts referring to the ATSC as a “tax” issue rather than a “charge”. It is even more 
surprising when these experts are from CATSA, the organization which is at the core of the cost-
setting process of airport screening services. 
1.3. The Four Largest Airports: Security Costs… On Top of All Other 
Costs  
Airport security charges vary widely across Canadian airports. At each of the four largest 
airports, the cost of providing services and the cost-recovery practices are different. For instance, 
with regards to policing and security charges, YVR charges between $1.40 and $2.07 per 
enplaned passenger, while ADM integrates airside security charges within landing charges and 
terminal security charges within general terminal charges. Similarly, U.S pre-clearance varies 
widely: from $4.20 per departing enplaned passenger at Calgary to $8.70 per departing enplaned 
passenger at Vancouver
147
 (ICAO 2012d). 
                                                 
146
 Respondent from CATSA, interview conducted on 16/03/2012. 
147
 With respect to medium-size airports, Ottawa McDonald-Cartier International Airport charges $1.68 
per landed seat based on the seating capacity of the aircraft, while Halifax-Stanfield International Airport 
charges $3.43 per passenger seats on the departing aircraft (ICAO 2012d). Again, in a similar way to the 
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 Within Transport Canada’s tight security regulatory framework, each airport authority 
determines the level of services it provides and the cost-recovery practices associated to security 
services provision. This is the norm for all security charges but one: the air travellers security 
charge, which is established by the Government of Canada. The four largest airports have argued 
that this system has created an unnecessary additional financial burden on their shoulders. More 
specifically, the four largest airport authorities argue that since they have the highest level of 
passengers, they generate most of the fund that is supposed to go to screening, and they 
subsequently proportionally receive fewer services than they are paying for. Consequently, the 
four largest airport authorities argue that a uniform ATSC does not reflect the actual costs of 
providing the service and adds an unnecessary burden that should be reduced. The following 
excerpt clearly illustrates how the four airport authorities perceive this argument. According to a 
senior executive manager of one of the four airports: “How much money is made from these 
airports? We are giving the majority of the funds, but we don’t receive what we are paying for. 
How much does Gander contributes? And how much does it cost there in terms of screeners? 
And equipment? In the end, our passengers are paying for screening in Gander!
 148” According to 
another: “CATSA n’est responsable que des dix mètres où il y a le screening. Nous avons 
suggéré de le faire car c’était moins cher, plus efficient, et meilleur pour les employés, on voulait 
bonifier l’approche. Ça a été rejeté par le gouvernement du Canada car ils pensent qu’ils peuvent 
faire mieux que nous, et [… ils pensent] que les gros aéroports peuvent le faire, mais pas les 
petits, et ils veulent une approche pancanadienne.
 149
 " 
                                                                                                                                                              
largest airports, the cost of providing U.S pre-clearance services and the cost-recovery practices varies 
widely. 
148
 Respondent from one of the largest Canadian airports, interview conducted on 04/04/2012. 
149
 Respondent from another Canadian airport, interview conducted on 23/03/2012. 
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 The argument made by interviewees from the four largest airports is also in line with 
ICAO’s policies on charges in Doc 9082. Doc 9082 states that charges should be transparent and 
cost-related; that users should not be charged for facilities they do not use; and that only those 
facilities used for international air services should be included in the cost basis for charges 
(Section II, paragraphs 2 i), ii) and iii) refer), which makes cross subsidies from profitable to non-
profitable airports at the margins of complying with such policies.  
From the high cost of the ATSC, and the questionable cost-relatedness and transparency 
of this charge, and from the cross subsidization of the four largest airports to the smaller ones, the 
airport officials from Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver and Calgary and their users have developed 
a strong criticism of the ATSC by relating it to the high costs of Canadian airports. They have 
developed an argument that is very much in line with the argument they make about the general 
costs of Canada’s largest airports and how they conflict with the algorithms of the Canadian 
referential. A typical example is this response from a senior executive manager of YVR 
elaborating on airport rent: “the problem is not the rent only, it is the accumulation: the crown, 
fuel taxes, CATSA fees, and all these.
150” A senior manager from a Canadian air transport trade 
association had the exact same reaction when interrogated about the rent: “First, there are the 
ground leases of airports; it is a very significant drain. […] This would be tolerable if it was the 
only thing, but it is not. You need to add the HST, the excise tax on fuel. We also have the 
ATSC, which is among the highest in the world.
151” This is similar to the argument made by 
other stakeholders of the Canadian civil aviation sector who argued about the rent and other 
levies: the high air travellers security charge is an additional layer of levy that undermines the 
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 Respondent from YVR, interview conducted on 27/03/2012. 
151
 Respondent from a Canadian air transport trade association, interview conducted on 08/03/2012. 
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competitiveness of Canada’s largest airports and is therefore detrimental to the four largest 
airport authorities, and also their communities and to the Canadian airline industry as a whole.  
 The following excerpts are representative of perceptions of managers from both Canada’s 
airport and airport users. First, an Air Canada official explained that: “The problem in Canada is 
that the rent is not the only source of revenue the government is extracting. When you add the 
AIF, the security fees, which covers much more than the actual cost of security, fuel taxes, and 
general taxes, they far exceed the level of extraction that you find in other jurisdictions. It is far 
more expensive to operate in Canadian terminals than elsewhere, and we are deeply concerned 
about the costs.
 152” This was completed by another Canadian airline representative: “I think that 
10 to 15% of Canadians going to the US to travel use an American airport. Plattsburg even 
advertises itself as Montréal International Airport. And if you use an American airport, you can 
save $200 per ticket, so it’s a lot of money. And the saving are the costs of Nav Canada, CATSA, 
the AIF and the rents.
153” Finally, a senior officer of a trade association summarized the situation 
as follows: “And this is a matter of competitiveness with the US. If there is a difference of $20 in 
security fees, and I am not even talking about all other fees charged at Canadian airports that is 
part of the decision that passengers makes in the end.
 154” The security shift in Canada has thus 
led to the creation of a new charge for airport end-users. But stakeholders of the Canadian airport 
sector have integrated the cost of this charge to their overall perception of the norms and 
algorithms of the Canadian referential. This referential is structured by a “user-pay” philosophy, 
which has been extended to security over the past decade. But the way this “user-pay” system for 
airport security has been implemented has led stakeholders to consider that it is not in line with 
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 Respondent from Air Canada, interview conducted on 11/04/2012. 
153
 Respondent from CanJet, interview conducted on 29/02/2012. 
154
 Respondent from IATA, interview conducted on 06/03/2012. 
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the global parameters of the referential (e.g. no cost-relation, high level of the charge, confusion 
between user-pay charges and taxes, etc.), indicating a possible third cognitive dissonance within 
the referential. 
2. Second Line of Criticism: The Efficiency of the Administration of Screening  
2.1. The ‘Shared Governance’ Model: Managing CATSA through the 
Inputs of Its Stakeholders? 
With the establishment of Nav Canada, the government of Canada created a unique mode of 
governance for its ANSP. By inviting Nav Canada’s stakeholders to manage the ANSP entity 
through the participation of the Board of Directors, the government implemented a ‘shared 
governance’ model for ANS provision (Aucoin 2006, 117). Government representatives, but also 
members appointed by the airline industry and the unions participate in the ‘stakeholder board’ in 
which interested parties have to reach a significant level of agreement in order to govern the 
corporation (Poole and Butler 2002). This shared governance with airline representatives sitting 
on Nav Canada’s board is a unique feature that explains the success of and the satisfaction 
towards Nav Canada (Heaver and Waters 2005, 792). Conversely, the government established the 
Canadian Air Transport Security Authority as a hybrid Crown Corporation. It has to strictly 
implement government policies while it maintains a certain level of autonomy. With respect to 
the CATSA instrument, its degree of autonomy is demonstrated in the appointment to its Board 
of Directors. The Board is composed of eleven directors appointed by airport and airlines 
representatives, the board itself, and the government which appoints 6 of the members (Bourgault 
and Thomas 2003; Zaidi 2008). If the ANSP ‘shared governance’ model or a ‘stakeholder board’ 
shows the strong entrenchment of a market-oriented sectoral referential for air transport and its 
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emphasis on a user-pay philosophy (in that case a user-pay/user say philosophy), in the case of 
CATSA most stakeholders consider that there is no effective representation of the air transport 
and airport industry interests. Indeed, the following excerpts, from officers whose organizations 
are involved in appointing industry’s directors, highlight this impression. According to one: 
“Airlines have no influence, they are not consulted. Key decisions on investments and charges 
are not made by the board, but by Transport Canada and the government. […] A review is 
necessary. The system is funded by airlines, by the passenger, and not by the government itself.
 
155” According to another person: “There have been some good things and some bad things with 
CATSA. But not the board, no. Appointing a member does not mean you are heard… the reality 
is that it only makes you aware of what is happening.
 156” Finally: “Au sein de l’ACTSA, les 
compagnies ont droit à deux membres sur le CA, et les aéroports deux membres, et il y a des 
consultations, mais pas sur ce le financement, [...] alors c’est plate que le gouvernement se 
finance de cette manière là.
 157” 
2.2. Consultation with Stakeholders: The (non)Integration of Canada’s 
Civil Aviation Actors in Airport Screening and Security 
If CATSA’s board of directors does not play the role of an efficient chamber of consultation in a 
‘shared governance’ perspective, there are other ways to include and consult providers and users 
of air transport services. In a top-down approach, it is possible to consult with airport operators 
and airport users on the level of the ATSC and on other elements decided at the government level 
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 Respondent from an organization appointing a representative on the board of CATSA, interview 
conducted on 06/03/2012. 
156
 Respondent from an organization appointing a representative on the board of CATSA, interview 
conducted on 14/03/2012. 
157
 Respondent from an organization appointing a representative on the board of CATSA, interview 
conducted on 01/03/2012. 
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and not at the CATSA level. This would not only be in line with the parameters of the referential, 
but also with international policies which state that when security costs are recovered from the 
users, consultations take place before any security costs are assumed by airports, air carriers or 
other entities (ICAO 2012c). The ATSC instrument is officially based on cost-recovery principles 
(the idea is that ATSC proceeds would be roughly equivalent to expenses for air travel security 
over time) and should thus be subject to consultation. But it appears from the interviews that 
there is no consultation process in place. It is the Department of Finance which sets the ATSC 
level, and it does it by itself. Transport Canada
158
 is not consulted neither is CATSA
159
. As there 
are no intra-governmental consultations, and as airport operators and airport users are not 
consulted, these stakeholders are significantly frustrated. It is indeed obvious that the ‘shared 
governance’ is far from being true for screening in Canada. Not a single interviewee from the 
industry (the four airports, their users, and the security providers) expressed satisfaction with the 
consultation process, simply because it does not exist. The four largest airport operators are 
facing huge facilitation challenges while any additional cost to airfares significantly impacts their 
business. The fact that their inputs are not even requested by the government influences how they 
perceive CATSA and screening within the market-oriented referential: like airport charges and 
rent, stakeholders acknowledge that the “user-pay” philosophy is a core algorithm. But the ‘user-
pay algorithm should be accompanied by a “user-say” process to be integrated in the content of 
the policy instruments that regulate this aspect of the airport sector. 
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 According to a Transport Canada senior executive officer, interview conducted on 19/03/2012: “Non, 
Transports Canada n’est pas consulté. C’est une question de projections, harmonisées avec l’inflation, la 
croissance, c’est géré au ministère des finances” 
159
 According to a CATSA official, interview conducted on 16/03/2012: “The Government sets our 
budget, and we manage our activities within this budget. And for the consultation, we are not consulted, 
this is a tax issue.” 
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In a bottom-up perspective, users and stakeholders can also be consulted on facilitation, 
screening processes, and the general local implementation of federal regulations on aviation 
security. This would require a dialogue between all stakeholders. Nevertheless, this has not been 
the practice since the creation of CATSA. All dialogues at local airports between stakeholders 
interested in screening are centralized at the CATSA level. Any suggestion, complaint or request 
has to be addressed to CATSA, which will then provide a response directly: a given airport 
operator cannot engage directly with its screeners. An airport screening and security services 
provider explains that: “Nous, on nous demande de gérer l’opérationnel, et CATSA gère le 
relationnel avec tous les autres intervenants. Si je reçois un courriel d’un gestionnaire d’aéroport 
parce que mes files d’attentes sont trop longues, je le transfère à CATSA, et ce sont eux qui 
gèrent. Alors que je pense qu’il existe une place pour nous à chaque aéroport, et que ce n’est pas 
mauvais qu’on soit assis à la table avec les autres intervenants.160” This perception is shared by a 
representative of one of the four airports: “With CATSA, we have direct relations, because we 
personally built these relations, but they are not formal. Specific to screening, CATSA receives 
orders from Transport Canada, so there is no impact we could have on that. [...] On the business 
side, we don’t have any relations with [the private screening firm]. Our operation team has 
interaction on the front-line level, but not with respect to business relations.
161” Another 
stakeholder added: “Si on a des idées on les donne à l’ACSTA, mais je ne peux pas dire qu’il y 
ait un véritable processus de consultation. On n’est jamais invité. Alors que si on veut savoir ce 
qui fonctionne et ce qui ne fonctionne pas, il faut voir avec les gens qui sont sur le terrain. Alors 
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 Respondent from an airport screening and security services provider, interview conducted on 
27/03/2012. 
161
 Respondent from one of the four largest Canadian airports, interview conducted on 04/04/2012. 
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je sais que l’ACSTA envisage de créer un sous-comité avec les contractants et les aéroports, mais 
ils ont aussi les mains liés.
 162” 
 This situation has created frustrations among the four largest commercial airports. Since 
airport operators were established as autonomous private entities, and since they face major 
facilitation challenges which impact their business activities, the representatives of these airports 
seem to consider that, in a market-oriented perspective, they should have a greater say in 
screening. And this perception is shared by the users of these airports, as shown in the following 
excerpts. First, according to an airport industry representative: “But there is a push from the 
largest airports, they would want to take the responsibility of screening, and it makes sense. 
Airports are the only entities that are concerned with the flow of passengers from their entry to 
their exit to the territory of the airport. By giving them the control, there is a great deal of 
efficiency, economies of scales, and much improved facilitation process that could be gained. 
And it would be good for screeners as well; it would allow them to have better professional 
prospects and move up to the system. There is a very valid argument for contracting out 
screening to airports.
163” Second, according to one of the most significant users of the four largest 
airports: “CATSA […] adds complexity, and from a passenger flow perspective, they are 
completely out of way. I am not enthusiastic with CATSA. There would be some logic in having 
the airport authorities responsible for all aspects of security, including contracting screening, with 
Transport Canada in charge of the oversight. There are potential economies of scale and more 
efficiency.
 164” 
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 Respondent from an airport screening and security services provider, interview conducted on 
27/03/2012. 
163
 Respondent from the CAC, interview conducted on 12/04/2012. 
164
 Respondent from one of the largest Canadian airline, interview conducted on 11/04/2012. 
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Again, facilitation and passenger flows management is crucial for the smooth operations 
of Canada’s four largest airports: an efficient facilitation process permits the increase of non-
aeronautical revenues and improves the passenger experience (ACPR 2010, 76). In a market-
oriented perspective, the four largest airport operators, as well as their users and even the security 
services providers, consider that they should be consulted on the organization of airport 
screening. The fact that they are not has created tensions within the Canadian referential. 
3. A Cognitive Dissonance?  
The provision of airport security screening services at the four largest airports is puzzling in that 
it seems to indicate a cognitive dissonnace in the Canadian referential for air transport. Indeed, it 
highlights the fact that some prominent actors within the referential do not interpret its algorithms 
in the same manner, and this leads to a different perception of what Canada’s air transport policy 
should be. It constitutes an apparent cognitive dissonance for airports because they consider that 
since passenger flows and facilitation are crucial for their business operations and air transport 
operations, they should have a greater say in the process. It also constitutes an apparent cognitive 
dissonance for both the four aiports and their users, who appear to be puzzled by a “user-pay” 
model that does not appear to be in line with the four key charging principles of non-
discrimination (with respect to other modes of transport), cost-relatedness, transparency, and 
consultation with users/stakeholders that are internationally agreed upon (ICAO 2012c). The very 
notion of user-pay, which is at the heart of the algorithm, has been challenged, because it is not 
implemented in a market-oriented perspective as the security charge is much higher than the cost 
of providing security services (contrary to the situation in many other countries). 
The dissonance in the algorithm lies in the high costs of airport security screening and on 
the efficiency of the Canadian model for airport screening services provisions, which would be 
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far too expensive and inefficient, thus far from market-oriented mechanisms. Nevertheless, if 
most actors from the industry (and also a strong minority of actors from the regulators) identify 
these elements, a more subtle analysis of the interviews reveals results that are somehow 
different. Actors have very strong feelings about a few elements, and they talk a lot about these 
elements, but when they reflect on the general airport screening system, at a higher level, many of 
them soften their position. For instance, when referring to consultation and integration of the 
stakeholders’ perspectives by CATSA, an interviewee involved in airport screening at one of the 
largest Canadian airport noted that: “CATSA, ils sont pris au milieu de tous les autres 
intervenants. CATSA c’est comme la viande dans le sandwich. Tout le monde est un expert de la 
sécurité : les politiciens à Ottawa, les gestionnaires d’aéroports, les compagnies aériennes, les 
journalistes, et eux ils ont la job ingrate parce que tout leur tombe dessus de tous les côtés.
165” 
The metaphor highlights that aviation and airport security is a lively topic, and everybody has an 
idea about it and is able to talk and articulate a position on it. Consequently, it is difficult to find 
consensual positions and evaluations about Canada’s airport screening policy. Thus, aviation 
security in general, and more specifically CATSA, is the easy target of every stakeholder in the 
Canadian civil aviation sector.  
Such situation also appears to be the case for the ATSC. According to an interviewee of 
the airport sector: “It is easy to complain about it [the ATSC], because it is part of the broader 
club sandwich of fees and charges, and it is an easy target. Airports have complained about it, we 
are not innocent about that. Pointing to it is easy, but it does not represent the reality. What it 
does represent is the addition of too many fees, charges, and costs.
 166” 
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 Respondent from the a private security and screening services provider, interview conducted on 
27/03/2012. 
166
 Respondent from the CAC, interview conducted on 12/04/2012. 
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What does this interviewee mean when referring to the “reality”? Is there a real cognitive 
dissonance in the referential with regard to airport security screening? The argument that will be 
developed in the next section is that there is not a cognitive dissonance per se in the referential 
with regard to airport screening. Some elements are at stake, but these elements can be easily 
changed, and thus do not threaten the stability of the referential. Rather, if actors refer to these 
elements, it is to put forward other cognitive dissonances (e.g. on rent, costs and charges or on 
market access). These airport security elements are used to highlight a more general cognitive 
dissonance over other parameters of the Canadian referential. 
Theoretically, the CATSA and ATSC instruments are part of the broader “public service” 
and “user-pay” algorithms that relate to security within the referential. The next section 
demonstrates that it is the content of such instruments that is specifically at stake. Furthermore, it 
shows that the elements at stake can easily be solved because the disagreement between actors 
does not originate from a different understanding of the algorithms and their meaning for public 
policy instrumentation. The ambiguity is rather due to the content of the policy instruments, 
which is perceived as being incomplete. Conclusively, there is no cognitive dissonance as regards 
airport security and screening. 
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C –Safeguarding the Implementation of the Referential Parameters on 
Security 
1. CATSA as a Recognized Actor whose Efficiency could be Improved 
1.1. The Elements of Success: Training of Screeners and Uniformity of 
Practices 
Since the Air India bombing, training has been a major element of Canada’s airport screening 
policy. After the September 11 events, CATSA was seen as a way to improve the training of 
screeners in order to make them more effective in their work (Lyon 2006, 400). Indeed, private 
airport screening services providers are diversified and spread out across Canada. For instance, 
G4S, which provides airport screening services at YVR, is headquartered in Ontario. GARDA, 
which provides airport screening services at Toronto-Pearson, is headquartered in Quebec. 
Securitas, which provides airport screening services at Montréal-Trudeau, is headquartered in 
Ontario. Subsequently, since each provincial jurisdiction has its own legislation for private 
policing, there are no national standards for personnel selection and training in Canada (Rigakos 
2002). This makes the harmonization of screening standards and procedures in Canada complex 
and challenging(Burbidge 2005, 76). 
 The quality of screening in Canada since the inception of CATSA has been praised by 
stakeholders of the Canadian civil aviation sector. According to an interview from a Canadian air 
transport trade association: “the level of services provided by CATSA is good. Originally we 
were against CATSA, but they are good, they do an outstanding job in training or oversight.
167” 
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 Respondent from a Canadian air transport trade association, interview conducted on 08/03/2012. 
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According to another stakeholder: “Ce qui est arrivé, c’est qu’ils ont créé l’ACSTA, qui est 
devenue une agence fédérale. Je pense que c’est une bonne idée, parce qu’ils ont énormément 
investi dans la formation, dans les nouvelles technologies, alors par rapport à avant 2001, c’est 
vraiment le jour et la nuit. L’ACSTA a aussi beaucoup augmenté les salaires, il y a eu beaucoup 
de bonnes choses, et c’était nécessaire de centraliser, ils ont vraiment amélioré la formation et 
l’équipement.168” Overall, the fact that CATSA has been instrumental in improving the skills of 
screeners through training has barely been challenged in the literature or during the interviews. 
What have been fiercely denounced by a number of stakeholders are the overall costs and the 
inclusion of airports and aircraft operator stakeholders, but not the training mission granted to and 
successes encountered by CATSA.  
Furthermore, one of the objectives of CATSA at its inception was to ensure uniform and 
standardized screening processes, practices and regulations across Canada. Similarly to screeners 
training, since each province has its own legislation for private policing, it may be challenging to 
ensure a standardized implementation of airport screening practices throughout Canada (Rigakos 
2002; Burbidge 2005). Granting CATSA with the authority to grant screening contracts was seen 
as a way to overcome these difficulties, and is seen by many within the federal government as a 
market-oriented policy, in that it still relies on market mechanisms. The following interview 
excerpt is very enlightening: a senior public servant describes the last wave of airport screening 
contracts awarding by CATSA: “in November new contractors took over screening at major 
Canadian airports. And we set up very clear accountability lines, we have them accountable and 
we have very consistent discussions with them to make sure they understand the culture we want 
to foster and we want to achieve. The contracts are very good, and it is always a good opportunity 
                                                 
168
 Respondent from a Canadian air transport trade association, interview conducted on 01/03/2012. 
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to go back on the market: we establish rules and practices, we measure performance, and we 
identify areas to improve.
169” And stakeholders from the private sector have no problems 
recognizing that fact. According to one of them: “sans CATSA il n’y aurait pas d’uniformité. […] 
Je trouve ça correct que ce soit un organisme central qui gère tout.
 170”  
 Indeed, private sector stakeholders (in that case airports, airport users and private security 
providers) do not challenge the federal government’s emphasis on consistency. The core issue for 
the industry is not consistency, but the costs it engenders and how it penalizes the four largest 
airport operators and their users. The first line of criticism is the scope and target of the CATSA 
instrument, through granting CATSA authority over 89 airports. Consistency is beneficial for the 
largest airports, but imposing the same criteria at Toronto-Pearson and Dryden Regional Airport 
(Ontario) is questionable. To use the example raised by a former aide to a Minister of Transport: 
“From a public policy point of view, the existence of CATSA cannot be justified. CATSA now, it 
is 89 screening points. I tried to kill 70 of these points. It doesn’t make any sense to impose the 
same burden to the smallest and biggest airports. But they are implanted because of the notion of 
equity between the territories, even in territories where we don’t need them, such as Dryden, 
Ontario.
171” And according to a senior executive officer of one of Canada’s largest airports: “you 
see CATSA officers coming here right after auditing an airport with no traffic and no passengers 
and then explaining us how we should do this and that: they do not realize that we are in two 
different worlds, and that standards have to be different, or rather adapted, to different 
realities.
172” The objective of consistency in screening is thus well accepted, but under the 
conditions the that busiest airports with large traffic flows would be required to comply with 
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 Respondent from CATSA, interview conducted on 16/03/2012. 
170
 Respondent from a security and screening services provider, interview conducted on 27/03/2012. 
171
 Respondent from the office of a former Minister of Transport, interview conducted on 28/02/2012. 
172
 Respondent from the Canadian airport sector, interview conducted on 27/03/2012. 
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consistent standards adapted to their reality and that regional and local airports with limited 
traffic would be required to comply with consistent standards adapted to their own reality. The 
argument of the industry is thus as follows: screening consistency must be adapted to facilitation 
challenges reality. 
1.2. The Elements of Dissensions: The Duplication of Costs 
Research has shown that devolving security responsibilities to private security services providers 
does not automatically leads to costs-savings and efficiency in terms of value for money. More 
specifically, private employees (such as screeners) are “cheaper” than public employees because 
of less advantageous wages and benefits and more job vulnerability
173
 (Manning 2005, 7).  
 In the case of airport screening in Canada, all stakeholders from the four largest airport 
authorities, their users, and private security services provider contractors have the same position: 
currently, there is an enormous duplication of costs engendered by the organization of the 
screening system. Several interviewees refer to the “layer metaphor” to explain the organization 
of screening. According to an airport representative: “Security is all about the onion layer 
approach. And CATSA is an important layer in the process. So are airports, so are airlines, etc. It 
is like an onion. CATSA brings a national program and standards from coast to coast. Also, 
CATSA is able to react to security threats on a national level, and this is very important.
 174” The 
issue with the layers is that each of them performs, at some point, functions and activities also 
performed by other layers, thus leading to an inefficient duplication of costs. The following 
excerpt explains this duplication of costs: “la duplication des coûts est aberrante. Il y a trop de 
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 Private employees (screeners) are more vulnerable to firing and being replaced with younger and less 
well paid officers. 
174
 Respondent from the Canadian airport sector, interview conducted on 16/04/2012. 
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layers dans le système dont on n’a pas besoin. Moi j’ai une équipe de contrôle de la qualité, qui 
contrôle ce que font les équipes, qui mesurent, et qui en plus les corrigent. Mais CATSA a aussi 
ses équipes de contrôle de la qualité, les oversight officers, sauf qu’eux ne font que mesurer et 
n’interviennent pas. Vous imaginez la duplication des coûts? CATSA a aussi une grosse équipe 
de relation de travail, mais ce sont pour les employés des contractants! Pas ceux de CATSA!
 175”  
 Most stakeholders share this perception, and a certain number of them raised similar 
examples during the interviews. What is the issue is again, not CATSA per se, but the duplication 
of costs it engenders. This is perhaps the clearest indication that there is not a real cognitive 
dissonance within the Canadian referential regarding security. What constitutes the core of a 
cognitive dissonance is that it clashes with the parameters of the referential. In such situation, 
actors cannot make sense of these parameters of the referential anymore. They will then go into 
action until a change occurs. Actors of the Canadian civil aviation sectors have been mobilized 
with regard to the high airport cost structure and to the access to airport infrastructure. But such 
mobilization has not emerged with regard to eliminating the CATSA “layer” from the airport 
security “onion”. The following excerpt is extracted from an interview of a senior executive 
manager of the airport side of the civil aviation sector clearly highlights that the four airport 
operators, despite public discourses against the current organization of the screening system, are 
ready to live with it: “CATSA itself is a very good screening agency, they are leading the way in 
terms of facilitation. But there is a push from the largest airports, they would want to take the 
responsibility of screening, and it makes sense. […] But this is not going to happen anytime soon, 
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 Respondent from a security and screening services provider, interview conducted on 27/03/2012. 
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CATSA just signed 5-year contracts with its contractors, so they won’t change the system. But 
we will see what is going to happen in the future. But don’t expect any change soon. 176” 
2. Further Aligning Airport Security Screening with the Referential: 
Implementing Safeguards 
2.1. Safeguards: At the Core of a Market-Oriented Referential for Air 
Transport 
The continuing trend of the past decade towards liberalization of air transport has fostered an 
environment in which states have deregulated air transport and withdrawn from service provision, 
leaving this domain to private stakeholders. In many cases, states have adapted the concept of 
liberalization to their specific conditions by implementing safeguard measures. For instance, 
ICAO’s policies on charges in Doc 9082 (Section II, paragraph 2 iv) refers) mentions safeguards 
for privatization of airport services, for charges aggregation, or for prefunding through charges
177
. 
Safeguards are therefore in line with a market-oriented referential for air transport. Furthermore, 
it is the existence of safeguards and their adequate implementation that support the sustainability 
of this referential and its parameters. For instance, implementing safeguards with regard to 
charging strengthens the “user-pay” algorithm, by ensuring a “user-say” component and 
preventing any charging abuses. With regard to screening, CATSA and the ATSC, it appears that 
dissensions are caused not by a cognitive dissonance or disagreements over the parameters of the 
referential, but by the absence of implementation of appropriate safeguards.  
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 Respondent from the Canadian airport sectors, interview conducted on 12/04/2012. 
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 Safeguards are as follows  (Section I, paragraph 23 refers): economic oversight of charges, transparent 
accounting, consultation (and to the greatest extent possible) agreement with users, and application for a 
limited period of time (ICAO 2012c). 
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2.2. Safeguards for Airport Screening in Canada 
Stakeholders of the four largest Canadian airports have raised transparency as being a major 
concern with regard to the establishment and the allocation of the security charge. A fairly recent 
example of this perceived lack of transparency can be found in the last federal budget. Traffic at 
Canadian airports is forecasted to grow, implying that there will be more travelers and goods to 
screen. Over the 2013-2015 triennium, traffic will increase by 4% and CATSA will need the 
resources to accompany this growth. If the federal government decided to increase the Air 
Travellers Security Charge, it also surprisingly decided to cut the budget of CATSA over the 
same period. Finance Minister Jim Flaherty’s budget calls for a $19.4 million cut in CATSA’s 
spending in 2012-13, $32.4 million by 2013-14 and $59.7 million by 2014-15 (Thompson 2012). 
These cuts were associated with further cuts in Transport Canada’s operating budget, amounting 
to about 10% of the Department’s budget. At the same time, the government is increasing its 
revenue through the ATSC instrument while cutting its expenses through reducing appropriations 
to CATSA and Transport Canada. It is explicitly mentioned in its 2012 budget that “the 
Government is committed to balance air travel security expenses with Air Travellers Security 
Charge revenues over time. Totals may not add due to rounding” (Department of Finance 2012). 
It therefore gives the impression that the government is breaching the key charging principles of 
cost-relatedness and transparency as set out in ICAO’s policies on charges in Doc 9082. If this 
has been denounced by the representatives of airports and their users, it is important to note that 
even senior public servants dealing with transportation have questioned such a move. According 
to one of them: “Tout ce que je peux dire, c’est qu’engager un dialogue sur l’ATSC serait 
probablement une bonne idée. [Les coupes à CATSA et l’augmentation des revenues par 
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l’ATSC], C’est évidemment le paradoxe que j’encourage mes collègues de l’industrie de 
communiquer au gouvernement.
 178” 
 Moreover, the path followed by the money collected from the ATSC is a serious 
hindrance to the transparency of the allocation of security costs. During an interview with a 
former senior advisor of Transport Canada, the interviewee even took the time to draw a figure 
representing where money is taken and where it goes in order to show that why the money is 
collected, where it therefore should go, and where it actually ends (cf. Annex G). In the 
perspective of the cognitive analysis of public policies, this drawing is extremely interesting. It 
shows that actors are operating within the parameters of the referential, using the notions of taxes 
and charges and what they should be used for in a “user-pay” system, and that they attempt not to 
change the system, but to adapt it to the exigencies of the referential. In this case, the interviewee 
demonstrates that in his mind, it is not the ATSC or CATSA that are at fault, but the way the 
government proceeds with the funds. He thus proposed to make the system more accountable and 
more transparent by allocating the ATSC to CATSA (and partly to Transport Canada) and the 
rent to Transport Canada, instead of sending it to the consolidated revenue fund. Many other 
people that were interviewed for the purpose of this dissertation largely share such position. Such 
changes to the content of the instruments can be made without modifying the parameters of the 
referential or challenging its algorithms. Conversely, they would strengthen the basis of the 
Canadian referential for air transport. Transparency and cost-relatedness in determining and 
allocating the cost basis for security thus appear as essential safeguards for administrating and 
funding airport screening in Canada.  
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 Respondent from Transport Canada, interview conducted on 13/04/2012. 
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Consultation with stakeholders also constitutes an important safeguard for stakeholders of 
the Canadian air transport sector, according to whom the system is working but its efficiency can 
be improved if airport operators and security providers have a greater say in the system. 
According to a senior executive manager of the GTAA: “The system is largely effective, but 
airports should have a greater say in it. We do not have enough control on CATSA, and we lack 
the lever for that.
179” Beyond the traditional claims from airports to directly control screening in 
order to monitor facilitation on their facilities, it appears that the four largest airport authorities’ 
senior managers know that CATSA will endure over time, and they are ready to make the system 
evolve simply by requesting a more institutionalized and efficient consultation process with 
actors of airport screening. The objective is not to change the parameters of the referential, but 
simply to modify some processes in order to adjust them to the market-oriented philosophy of the 
system (through which the four largest airport operators, as well as their users and even the 
security services providers, consider they should be consulted on the organization of airport 
screening). Further, this perception of developing consultations in order to strengthen the current 
model is shared by security screening services providers. According to an interviewee: “il va 
falloir dire stop et inclure les parties prenantes, consulter, et faire évoluer le modèle. Quand on 
fait des revues ministérielles, et que rien ne change… En bout de ligne, on veut tous un modèle 
de sécurité où le niveau de sécurité est élevé et où son coût est bas, et si on veut tous ça alors on 
peut en discuter et aller vers cet objectif là.
 180” Almost all stakeholders share a common 
objective of a top-quality screening that does not impact too drastically efficient facilitation and 
does not cost too much: consultation is subsequently seen as a safeguard necessary for parties to 
achieve this objective within the parameters of the referential. 
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 Respondent from the GTAA, interview conducted on 02/04/2012. 
180
 Respondent from a security and screening services providers, interview conducted on 27/03/2012. 
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D – Conclusion: Avoiding a Cognitive Dissonance and the Future of the 
Canadian Referential 
Contrary to the previous chapters on airport rent and access to airport infrastructure for foreign 
air carriers where cognitive dissonances were identified, this chapter demonstrated that the long-
lasting conflict over the administration and the funding of security and screening services 
provision at Canada’s largest has not led to a cognitive dissonance. Indeed, the disagreements 
between actors do not originate from a different understanding of the algorithms and their 
meaning for public policy instrumentation. The ambiguity is rather due to the content of the 
policy instruments, which is perceived as being incomplete. In the previous cases, what was at 
stake was rather the meaning of the algorithm in terms of instrumentation. 
 Nevertheless, this outcome is theoretically major, because it demonstrates that focusing on 
algorithms is the best entry to give an account of conflicts in a stable referential. In the case of 
security and screening, actors share the same understanding of the ‘user-pay” algorithms and its 
related instruments: what is at stake is simply an orientation in the content of the instrument that 
can easily be modified in order to ease the tensions. In the perspective of improving the cognitive 
analysis of public policy, this shows that studying algorithms and instruments indicate not only 
the source of the tensions, but also their degree and the potentiality to solve them easily. 
Empirically, almost all industry stakeholders appear to demand changes that can be implemented 
without changing neither the parameters of the referential nor the current architecture of the 
security screening services provision system. It should be noted that a number of public servants 
also request the same changes. What these actors are seeking is in fact no more than the 
application of the key charging principles of transparency, cost-relatedness and consultation with 
 243 
users. These principles are all put forward by ICAO’s policies on charges in Doc 9082, and 
ensuring compliance with regard to the ATSC and the funding of CATSA should not be a major 
issue. Indeed, such changes are fully congruent with the parameters of the referential for air 
transport and its market-orientation, because they would strengthen its “user-pay” philosophy as 
well as its market-oriented perspective. Does this mean that such changes are likely to happen in 
a near future? On the one hand, it would be agreeable to all actors, including policy-makers. 
Canada, along with other participating states, officially endorsed at the Sixth Worldwide Air 
Transport Conference in March 2013 the full implementation of the provisions in Doc 9082 for 
cost recovery of security measures and functions at airports so that security charges are 
reasonable and cost-effective (ICAO 2013d). And implementing such changes is not difficult, as 
it is only needed to integrate the safeguards into the taxation-type instrument. This does not 
require any new law, public funding, or organization. On the other hand, the funding and the 
administration of airport security and screening is not a priority, as excellently highlighted by the 
following excerpt: “personne ne parle de ça le matin au Tim Horton. Au Tim Horton le matin, les 
gens parlent de la gamme de hockey de la veille, qu’ils payent trop de taxe. Mais les compagnies 
aériennes […], c’est pas ça qu’on entend le matin au Tim Horton181.” And since the dispute is not 
threatening the stability of the referential, it may therefore persist over time. 
In conclusion, this chapter demonstrated that actors of a referential may disagree on the 
specific orientation of a policy instrument, but that they may in the same time very well agree on 
the related algorithms. In that case, the disagreement may persist over time, but it does not 
threaten the stability of the referential, and is therefore a rhetorical conflict. This chapter shows 
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 Respondent from a Canadian airline, interview conducted on 23/02/2012. 
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that a combined focus on algorithms and policy instruments’ content is a fruitful approach to 
understand and analyzing long-lasting conflicts within unchallenged referential.  
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Chapter VI: Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, it seeks to evaluate and put in perspective the dynamics 
of the long-lasting conflicts between key policy actors of the Canadian airport sector, who agree 
on almost everything and share the same core representations about their sector. Despite the 
inherent weaknesses of the traditional ideas-focused approaches in giving an account of such 
situation, it is argued that the theoretical framework used in this dissertation is promising. The 
process under which long-lasting conflicts are structured and understood by actors relates to the 
causal relations they draw (the “algorithm”) between the vision they have of their sectors and the 
content of the policy instruments actually implemented to achieve such vision. Key is the focus 
on both algorithms and policy instruments’ content. Second, a brief exploration of the policy 
implications related to this dissertation is presented alongside further avenues for research. 
 
A. The Dynamics of Long-Lasting Conflicts within an Unchallenged 
Referential 
1. Theoretical and Empirical Premises  
The premises of this dissertation lie in the cognitive analysis of public policy’s notion of 
referential. It is demonstrated that, with a global market-oriented referential, it was possible to 
identify a sectoral market-oriented referential for airports and air transport in Canada. Such a 
sectoral referential emerged in the 1980s with several policy shifts introduced by then-Transport 
Minister Lloyd Axworthy. It really took shape under the Conservative government of Brian 
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Mulroney through the actions of a group of experts (the so-called “UBC school”) which theorized 
the deregulation of air transport and demonstrated that it was ineluctable. The final market-
orientation of air transport policy was finally achieved in the 1990s with the commercialization of 
airports as well as the commercialization of the provision of air navigation and security and 
screening services.  
The dissertation identified the core parameters of the sectoral referential for the Canadian 
air transport sector, congruently with the global, market-oriented referential, which have been 
characterized as follows: 
- Values (the most general and fundamental aspect of the referential): market-
oriented, consumer-oriented provision of air transport services (including 
transportation, infrastructure, and navigation) sustained by a “user-pay” 
philosophy; 
- Norms (principles of action): autonomy of air transport facilities and services 
providers through the privatization of air carriers and the privatization 
(commercialization) of airports – light-handed economic regulation, and opening 
of markets: airports are empowered to organize their own development; 
- Algorithms (causal relations): ‘If the provision of air transport services is market-
oriented and market-driven, then the sector will be efficient’; ‘If the air transport 
infrastructure are privatized/commercialized, it will be funded though user 
charges’, ‘Since airports and airlines are private entities, they enter into 
commercially-oriented relationships with no federal interference’; 
- Images (simplified/concentrated representations of the situation): the market of air 
transport, airports as aerotropolises. 
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The cognitive analysis of public policy would not predict the occurrence of long-lasting conflicts 
between key actors who are not challenging the core parameters of a referential. With different 
concepts, the tenants of the other ideas-focused approaches of policy analysis (such the advocacy 
coalition framework approach or the paradigm approach) would similarly not expect that long 
lasting conflicts would pollute an advocacy framework or a paradigm with no actors challenging 
the core elements of these framework or paradigm. In that sense, the Canadian airport sector was 
highly puzzling, since long-lasting conflicts over the airport rent, the access to airport 
infrastructure and the funding and administration of airport screening have been part of the 
sector’s pictures, while none of the key actors involved has challenged the main policy 
orientations and policy instruments. It must be reminded that these conflicts are significant: they 
involve an important source of income that is disputed to the federal government, they led 
Canada to lose its Middle East military support base during the Afghan war, and they challenge 
how critical security functions at airports are funded and administrated.  
In this dissertation, I therefore proposed to refine the analysis of such conflicts by 
focusing on a combination of the algorithms of a sectoral referential and the related content of 
policy instruments. Such focus was deemed necessary to give a full account of these conflicts, 
which are much broader than simple instrument-setting or instrument-design related conflicts. 
The dissertation demonstrated that it is the representation of the instruments and their meanings 
that are cognitively dissonant with the causal relationships carried by the algorithms. Such focus 
was also deemed necessary to strengthen the explanatory power of the cognitive analysis of 
public policy. The analysis of the algorithms and the related content of used policy instruments 
was really fruitful: it resulted in a comprehensive analysis of the conflicts, their nature, the 
possible ways to solve them, and it also considerably expanded the explanatory power of the 
cognitive analysis of public policy as developed by Muller and Jobert.  
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 Beyond contributing to the public policy literature in general, this dissertation also 
contributes specifically to the Canadian public policy literature. Canada has experienced a strong 
regionalism that has affected its policy-making (Banting 1987; Bakvis and Skogstad 2008) and 
makes a convergence between different interests complex (Boychuk 1998; Ladner 2005). This 
dissertation demonstrated that this was true with respect to Canada’s international air policy: 
there is a real clash between Central and Western Canada and their respective key actors over 
access to the largest hub airports. But the impact of regionalism has not been verified with respect 
to airport rent and charges and airport security and screening. For instance, one could imagine 
that the impact of the Canadian federalism and regionalism on Canada’s policing policy (D. E. 
Smith 1994) could also be similar for airport security and screening policy. Conversely, 
stakeholders of the latter policy are speaking with one voice from coast to coast on this matter.  
Furthermore, the fact that there has been no major difference between the Conservative 
and Liberal airport policy is highly interesting. A certain number of Canadian policy scholars 
have rather shown that political parties do influence policies to some extent, for instance 
concerning federalism and the welfare state (Jeffrey 2006), international aid policy (Brown 
2012), environmental and climate change policy (H. Smith 2008), citizenship and immigration 
policy (Chapnick 2011; Black 2012), etc. With respect to Canada’s airport policy, this 
dissertation demonstrated that there has been remarkable policy continuity between Liberal and 
Conservative governments, with no major policy change in spite of the intense discontent from 
key stakeholders of the Canadian air transport sector. Because of its focus, between the agency 
and the actor, the cognitive analysis of public policy is a powerful theoretical model when it 
comes to giving accurate accounts of the complexity of the Canadian polity and its policy 
dynamics. Its wider use can provide original and unique contributions to the Canadian public 
policy literature. 
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The remainder of this section briefly summarizes the research results for each of the three 
case studies and puts them in perspective with respect to the theoretical claims made in this 
dissertation. 
2. Conflict over Airport rent and Other Charges: A First Research Outcome 
Chapter 3 focused on the airport ground lease rents and the user charges at the largest Canadian 
airports. Taking into account the numerous conflicts over the rent the largest airport operators 
have to pay to the federal government, the chapter established that the “user-pay” model for 
funding Canada’s largest airports is a core algorithm of the Canadian referential for air transport. 
Key actors of the Canadian airport sector agree on this algorithm and share the same 
understanding of its causal relations. They also adhere to such algorithm because it is congruent 
with the market-orientation of the sectoral referential. It was demonstrated that the source of the 
tensions and disputes in the referential originated from the content of policy instruments by the 
federal government that was not perceived to be in line with the algorithm. The content of the 
related taxation-type instrument (i.e. the airport rent) is criticized by all actors except the ones in 
the public service, because it is perceived as being in contradiction with the “user-pay” algorithm: 
its scale and its allocation are impeding the competitiveness of airport operators and their users 
while the “user-say” component of the “user-pay” model has not been effective. It was 
demonstrated that a careful look at other policy instruments related to the “user-pay” algorithm 
was also a source of deep tension in the sectoral referential. 
In line with the expectations presented in the introductory chapters, a focus on algorithm 
and the content of related policy instruments has allowed to demonstrate that the source of long-
lasting conflicts within an unchallenged referential can be identified and its degree can be 
assessed. In the case of the continuing dispute over the rent and user charges, the “user-pay” 
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algorithm is unchallenged, but the content of policy instruments is at stake because some actors 
have a slightly different understanding of that referential. For instance, the four largest airport 
operators consider that the formulas and the high rate of the rent has become market-unfriendly, 
while the airlines believe that the policy instrument should integrate a “user-say” component. An 
analysis in terms of cognitive analysis of public policy with a specific focus on algorithms and 
related content of policy instrument has thus been extremely successful in giving an account of a 
long-lasting conflict within an unchallenged referential. Such successful outcome was reiterated 
with respect to explaining momentous conflicts over the access to Canada’s largest airports. 
To conclude, it is worth noting that while many other countries have embraced a market-
driven global and sectoral referential, Canada is an exception with respect to both airport rent and 
the level of charges. In all countries in which commercialization of airports has taken place, 
governments have been able to generate money, for instance through upfront payment of the 
airport facility being divested (for instance Australia) or through the return on the shares it has 
continued holding (for instance France, Belgium, or the UK until 2003)
182
. In such cases, the 
compensation is correlated to the value of the assets at stake or their normal return to their 
shareholders. In Canada, there is no correlation between the government extraction of money 
from the four largest airport operators, but in addition their user charges, which reflect this 
extraction, are much higher than other comparable airports, as shown in the benchmarks. 
Therefore, one could think that more market-oriented mechanisms to remunerate the federal 
government, provided that it should still be remunerated for assets it has not touched in decades, 
                                                 
182
 The only other example of rent could be the concession fees that some private airport concessionaires 
are required to pay to governments in Latin America, but in the latter case airport operators are usually 
foreign for-profit consortia.  
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could somehow align the Canadian case with other comparable countries and ease the tensions in 
the sectoral referential. 
3. Conflict over Access to Canada’s Largest Airports: A Second Research 
Outcome 
Chapter 4 focused on the access to the four largest airports that are granted to transborder and 
foreign air carriers by the federal government. There have been momentous dissensions between 
key actors of the airport sector over the issue of granting access to foreign air carriers to some or 
all of the four Canadian largest airports, and such dissensions have led to one of the most 
important commercial air transport-related dispute in recent history. Nevertheless, there has been 
no policy shift to solve the conflict.  The chapter demonstrated that the conflict originated in a 
different understanding of what the algorithm related to access to airport infrastructure implies in 
terms of the content of the policy instruments by the federal government. The government used to 
designate the airports that air carriers were allowed to access to and used to define the fares, 
schedules and frequencies. Nevertheless, the emergence of a market-oriented referential resulted 
in a new conception of airport access: the largest airport operators have become responsible for 
marketing their platforms and attracting new services in order to grow their business and their 
networks. The content of the ASA instrument has nonetheless been perceived on many occasions 
as contradicting such “airport marketing algorithm”. Chapter 4 precisely demonstrated that while 
all key actors agree on the key objectives of the airport access policy, the tensions lied in the 
different understanding of such policy with regard to the actors concerned. On the one hand, the 
Canadian flag and its largest hub perceive that the content of the ASA instrument must be 
tailored to help them to grow first and foremost. On the other hand the other largest airports and a 
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certain number of foreign air carriers operating in Canada perceive that the content of the ASA is 
biased in favor of a limited number of actors.  
The analysis clearly showed that the cognitive dissonance over airport access in Canada 
originated from this algorithm and the ASA instrument. This is in line with the expectations 
presented in the introductory chapters: a specific focus on algorithms and the content of related 
policy instruments has allowed us to demonstrate that the source of long-lasting conflicts within 
an unchallenged referential can be identified and its degree can be assessed. In the case of the 
continuing dispute over the access to Canada’s largest airport, the disagreement over the degree 
to which airports can fully market themselves is at the source of the conflicts, while all key actors 
are still in agreement over the key objectives associated with the market-oriented referential. The 
analysis in terms of cognitive analysis of public policy with a specific focus on algorithms and 
related policy instruments’ content has thus been successful to explain the conflicts over airport 
rent and access to airport platforms.  
To conclude, the situation in Canada with respect to largest hub access somehow differs 
from other comparable countries. ICAO has documented the impressive growing number of 
liberal air services agreements (ICAO 2013c) which has made the opening of the skies a norm. 
Tensions over granting access to fast growing Gulf carriers have arisen in almost all countries 
where they would compete with national flag legacy carriers. In Europe, Air France, KLM and 
Lufthansa have recently complained to the European Commission against Gulf airlines getting 
more traffic rights to European airports (Dutheil 2014). In the United States, international carriers 
are openly reluctant to see Gulf carriers getting more traffic rights to US hubs (CAPA 2014). .But 
governments on both sides of the Atlantic have continued expanding access to their airports for 
gulf carriers, even if the pace is probably much slower than these carriers would request and 
much faster than American and European legacy carriers would want. But disagreements on the 
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liberalization pace never came close to the Canadian situation where drastic retaliatory measures 
such as the expulsion from the Camp Mirage base and the imposition of visas were taken. 
4. Conflict over Administrating and Funding Airport Security and Screening: 
A Last Research Outcome 
Chapter 5 focused on the administration and the funding of the provision of security and 
screening services at Canada’s largest airports. The content of policy instruments by which the 
government of Canada organizes the funding and the administration of airport security and 
screening has been at stake for more than a decade. Many actors of the airport sector have 
perceived that it not only increases the costs of Canada’s largest airports and undermines their 
ability to grow their business, but that it also contradicts the market-oriented philosophy that has 
shaped and framed the Canadian airport sector. The chapter indicated that all actors do agree on 
the following algorithms: “security and screening oversight at Canada’s largest airports is a core 
State function” and the “user-pay” model is the best for airport services funding, including 
security, and for ensuring the sustainability of the Canadian air transport sector. Nevertheless, 
key actors do not understand the subsequent content of policy instruments in the same manner, 
leading to different interpretations of what Canada’s airport security policy should be. 
Interestingly, the case of airport security and screening funding and administration is 
different in degree from the other cases. Indeed, despite vocal disputes for more than a decade, 
the positions of the actors are not divergent. Since there is no major cognitive dissonance related 
to security and screening, the disputes and tensions could easily be resolved by minor changes in 
the content of the policy instruments. This outcome is theoretically significant, because it 
demonstrates that focusing on algorithms is the best entry to give an account of conflicts in a 
stable referential. In the case of security and screening, actors share the same understanding of 
 254 
the ‘user-pay” algorithms and its related instruments: what is at stake is simply an orientation in 
the content of the instrument that can easily be modified and will ease tensions. In the perspective 
of improving the cognitive analysis of public policy, this shows that studying algorithms and 
instruments can indicate not only the source of the tensions, but also their degree and the 
potentiality to solve them easily.  
Finally, it is worth noting that while most other countries have embraced a market-driven 
global and sectoral referential, Canada is an exception with respect to airport security and 
screening. In Europe, the provision of screening services has been devolved to airport operators 
and private providers directly, but passenger-based security charges are much lower than in the 
Canadian case. In fact, the level of security charges in Canada only compares with the most 
expensive African airports (ICAO 2012d). The organizational structure with a federal agency 
overseeing screening is also unique: only the US would compare, but the American 
Transportation Security Agency oversees and delivers services, is partly funded through 
government appropriations, and again the level of security charges does not compare with 
Canada (Senate 2012b). 
5. Research Outcome: the Impact on the Cognitive Analysis of Public Policy 
The outcome of this research empowers the cognitive analysis of public policy as originally 
formulated by Muller and Jobert. The three broad theoretical families – the paradigm approach, 
the advocacy coalition framework approach, and the cognitive analysis approach – within the 
ideas-focused approaches all present important weaknesses in their ability to give an exhaustive 
approach of unsolved long-lasting conflicts between prominent actors in an unchallenged 
referential. This dissertation empirically demonstrated that the cognitive analysis of public policy 
has all the necessary tools to successfully explain such situations provided that it is refocused on 
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the study of algorithms and that a study of the content of the related policy instrument is 
performed. Therefore, with such renewed focus, the cognitive analysis of public policy can 
explain how momentous disputes can or cannot lead to policy changes. 
 This dissertation also demonstrates that the amended cognitive analysis of public policy is 
adaptable to a large variety of policy and institutional setting. Formulated in France and diffused 
in Europe and in Quebec, the cognitive analysis gives an excellent account of the three cases in 
spite of their variance: the case on airport access is reminiscent of many regional and federal 
battles in Canada, while the cases on the rent and the provision of screening services do not 
involve any kind of Canadian regionalism. Therefore, this dissertation also makes the case for a 
broader diffusion of the cognitive analysis of public policy with a specific focus on the concept of 
algorithm.  
Finally, it is also necessary to take into consideration the limitations of such an amended 
version of the cognitive analysis of public policy. In order to get meaningful and representative 
inputs on how stakeholders believe their sector is, how it relates to broader economic and policy 
principles in Canada and abroad, and how the policies in place affect both the sector and the 
perception of the sector, a significant number of interviews is required. It may therefore be 
challenging to conduct research using such a framework in a comparative perspective if the 
number of cases to be compared is high. Another limitation of the cognitive analysis of public 
policy as reframed in this dissertation is that it is grounded in a critical epistemology. Its premises 
are that the replicability of the research undertaken in this dissertation is not guaranteed because 
of the ever-changing context within which both the policy sector and the research occurs, and the 
scientific objectivity of the research analysis is challengeable because it remains dependent on the 
perspective that is brought by the researcher to the study. In the case of this dissertation, I have 
been looking at air transport in Canada in an academic perspective, but at the same time I have 
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been a practitioner of civil aviation and air transport in various contexts. Nonetheless, the 
significant theoretical results that are put forward in this dissertation do meet the expectations of 
high quality qualitative research, as they meet the trustworthiness criteria of credibility, 
transferability, dependability, confirmability, and generalizability in the sense of Guba and 
Lincoln (Guba and Lincoln 1994). 
B. Policy Implications 
Is it expected that there will be policy changes in the referential in order to cope with such 
conflicts? Some evidence supports the claim that no major policy change is likely to occur. 
Indeed, the dissertation demonstrated that the source of the conflicts is limited to the 
interpretation of some algorithms. Moreover, actors are in agreement with the key elements of the 
referential (the norms, values and images of the referential). Therefore, none of the actors are 
requesting a drastic policy change. What can nevertheless happen are adjustments to the content 
of specific policy instruments. As regards the content of the airport rent instrument in relation to 
the “user-pay” algorithm, there have been many calls to at least reduce the lease rents, including 
from within the Canadian state apparatus. It is not expected that the government will suddenly 
renounce to such a source of revenue, but it is plausible that the ground rent formula is revised so 
that it does not hinder the growth of the largest Canadian airports and it reduces the cost of air 
transport in Canada. Since the Standing Senate Committee on Transport and Communications 
recently endorsed such a proposal, it indicates that politicians may be ready to move on that 
issue. As regards the content of the ASA instrument in relation to the “global marketing of 
airports” algorithm, a more coherent approach could solve the tensions. The federal government 
would have to make its priorities clearer (favoring the growth of the national flag carrier, giving 
equal opportunities to the largest airport operators, achieve a middle ground between these two 
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positions, etc.) in order for key actors to have pragmatic expectations. It does not mean that all 
actors with fully agree with such priorities, but they will be able to act accordingly.  
 With regards to the funding and administration of the provision of airport security and 
screening services, it is expected that this issue can be easily solved, because all actors appear to 
potentially agree on how to solve the issue. Airports and airlines actors are requesting a 
meaningful implementation of ICAO’s policies on security charges in Doc 9082, which were 
recently endorsed by Canada at the Sixth Worldwide Air Transport Conference in March 2013 
with respect to the full implementation of the provisions in Doc 9082 for cost recovery of 
security measures and functions at airports so that security charges are reasonable and cost-
effective (ICAO 2013d). Therefore, it is expected that some adjustments to the content of the 
policy instruments can solve the tensions in the referential, but it is unlikely that such tensions 
will cause a complete revamp of Canada’s airport policy. 
 Finally, if policy prescriptions were to be made to policy-makers and industry leaders, one 
could imagine that a drastic reduction of the ground rent paid by the largest airport operators 
would have a positive impact on airport charges and would lower the costs of operating to/from 
the largest Canadian airports. Similarly, a drastic reduction in the ATSC would certainly be 
beneficial to air transport. The massive cross-subsidies from the largest airports to other 
platforms is an additional burden that decreases the competitiveness of air transport in Canada, 
and therefore the economic benefits that it can bring. Solutions do exist: site-specific ATSC, 
devolution of the provision of security and screening to airport operators directly, etc. Finally 
with regards to market access, it seems that the policy aims at favoring Air Canada and its hub, 
but it is not sustainable to do it at the expense of Western airports and it is grounded on false 
premises. The main threat to Air Canada and its hubs are not Middle Eastern carriers, even 
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though they have a competitive advantage that may be unfair, but it is rather the very high costs 
of operating to/from Canada in addition to the geographic constrains of the Canadian air market.  
C. Future Avenues for Research 
The Canadian airport sector appeared ideal to study how key policy actors who agree on almost 
everything and have the same goals for their sector may still have specific disagreements that 
have led to long-lasting conflicts that appear unsolvable. Therefore, the dissertation focused on 
Canada’s major airport operators, namely Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver and Calgary.  
One possible avenue that could be undertaken to expand the use and reinforce the 
relevance of the theoretical framework of this dissertation would be to expand the number of 
cases under study by analyzing other groups of airports. The four largest airports are the only 
Canadian airports in position of being aerotropolises and playing major global and/or regional 
hubs. But there are three other groups of airports that are also part of the Canadian civil aviation 
system: major regional airports
183
, local airports, and remote and northern airports. Provided that 
there are long-lasting conflicts between key actors of these subgroups over the content of policy 
instruments, it is expected that the source of such conflicts would be in different understanding of 
algorithms of the referential. Another avenue consists of expanding the framework to other policy 
areas. Financial regulation quickly comes to mind due to a somewhat similar dynamic of conflicts 
between the proponents and the opponents of the installation of a pan-Canadian securities 
regulator (La Presse Canadienne 2013). Interestingly, both opponents and proponents are in 
agreement with the key regulation philosophy but are in disagreement over the instrument to 
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 These airports are all NAS airports (excepted the four largest, which form a cohesive subgroup): 
Edmonton, Ottawa, Winnipeg, Victoria, Halifax, Saskatoon, Kelowna, Québec City, Regina, St. John’s, 
Thunder Bay, London, Moncton, Saint John, Gander, Charlottetown, Fredericton, Prince George. 
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enforce such regulations (provincial regulators? federal agency? coordination instruments? etc.). 
It will also be fruitful to explore these avenues in other countries. If the cognitive analysis of 
public policy has been an important theoretical framework in France and has been used in 
Québec and in Canada, it would be really interesting to see such theoretical framework deployed 




Annex A. Empirical Evidence for Case Selection 
 
 
National Airport System 




local governments or 









Kelowna, Québec City, 
Regina, St. John’s, 
Thunder Bay 
London, Moncton, 




All other airports, 
aerodromes or 
airfields 
70% of traffic 
90% of the rent collected by 
federal government 
84% of aeronautical revenue 
(NAS only) 
Main hubs/bases for Air 
Canada, Jazz, WestJet and Air 
Transat 
24% of traffic 
10% of the rent lease collected by the federal 
government 
16% of aeronautical revenue (NAS only) 
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1. Jazz (on behalf of Air Canada) Route Maps  
 
 
(Source: http://www.airlineroutemaps.com/Canada/Air_Canada_Jazz.shtml, Consulted 27/01/2012) 
 
2. Air Canada U.S.A Route Map 
 
(Source: http://www.airlineroutemaps.com/Canada/Air_Canada_usa.shtml, Consulted 27/01/2012) 
3. WestJet Route Maps from Calgary (left) and from Toronto (right) 
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(Source: http://www.airlineroutemaps.com/Canada/WestJet_YYC.shtml, Consulted 27/01/2012) 
 
4. European Routes operated by Air Transat 
 
(Source: http://www.airtransat.ca/FR/Info/vols-pas-chers-europe.aspx?ExitID=CHEAPFLIGHTSEUROPETS, Consulted 27/01/2012)   
 263 
Annex C. A Comparison of Governance models of LAAs and 
CAAs 
 
Elements LAAs CAAs 
Enable 
Legislation 
Airport Transfer (Miscellaneous Matters) 
Act 
Canada Corporations Act 
Regional Airports Authorities Act (Alberta 
Airport Transfer (Miscellaneous 
Matters) Act 
Canada Corporations Act 
Corporate 
structure 
Non-share capital corporation (not-for-
profit) incorporated under Part II of 
Canada Corporations Act or pursuant to 
provincial legislation 
Non-share capital corporation (not-for-
profit) incorporated under Part II of the 






No fixed formula, other than Directors be 
appointed by a process acceptable to 
municipalities and Federal Government. 
Board is to be composed of representatives 
of local business and community interests; 
collectively, board is supposed to have 
skills in specified disciplines (e.g., air 
transportation, commerce, law, and 
engineering). Directors must not be elected 
officials or government employees. Alberta 
legislation requires Board to have between 
9 and 15 directors (Calgary authorised to 
have 17 directors to accommodate 
appointment of two directors by Federal 
Government); Calgary and Edmonton have 
agreed to Public Accountability Principles 
CAA model retains basic principles 
applicable to LAAs. In addition, Public 
Accountability Principles establish 
specific requirements for CAAs, Board 
to include: at least one director to 
represent the interests of business, 
organised labour and consumers; up to 
3 directors nominated by Federal 
Government; one director nominated 
by the province; a majority of directors 
to be nominated by local/regional 
governments; board itself may 




No requirement for federal nominee(s); 
however Calgary, Edmonton, Montréal and 
Vancouver now each have two federal 
appointees on their Boards 
Federal Government ordinarily 
nominates 2 directors but reserve the 
right to also nominate an additional 
director to any CAA during a period of 





No formal provision for provincial 
nominee 
Provincial government may nominate 
one director 
 
Source: Table 6-1. Governance models of LAAs and CAAs (integral transcription) (Tretheway and Andriulaitis 
2008, 142)   
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Source: Rapport global-sectoriel selon l’approche des référentiels de politiques publiques (Nahrath 2010, 17) 
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ICAO Doc 9626 page 4.1-9 
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Annex F. Screenshot of a Google Search: “Commercial 
Aviation Policy in Canada” 
 
 






Annex G. Actor’s Perception of where charges and levies go 
The figure represents where money is taken and where it goes. The first column represents the 
different sources of revenues, and the points represent where the money goes. The lines show 










 Aéroports de Montréal, senior executive manager 
Aéroports de Montréal, senior executive manager 
Greater Toronto Airport Authority, senior executive manager 
Greater Toronto Airport Authority, senior executive manager 
Greater Toronto Airport Authority, senior manager 
YVR, senior executive manager 
YVR, senior executive manager 
YVR, senior officer 




Air Canada, senior executive manager 1 
Air Canada, senior executive manager 2 
Air Transat, senior executive manager 
CanJet, senior executive manager 
Sunwing Airlines, senior executive manager 
WestJet, spokesperson 




Air China – Canada, senior officer 
Air France-KLM – Canada, senior executive manager 
Alaska Airlines – Canada, former senior executive manager 
Etihad Airways – Canada, senior executive manager 
Lufthansa – Canada, senior executive manager 
Qatar Airways – Canada, senior executive manager 




 GARDA, senior executive manager 
 
Government of Canada  
 
 CATSA, senior officer 
CATSA, former legal officer 
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Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Negotiations and Agreements, senior 
officer 
Transport Canada, Aviation Security, senior executive officer 
Transport Canada, International Air Policy, senior executive officer 
Transport Canada, National Airports and ANS Policy, senior executive officer 1 
Transport Canada, National Airports and ANS Policy, senior executive officer 2 
 Transport Canada, Airport and Port Programs, senior manager 





Air Transport Bureau, senior officer 1  
Air Transport Bureau, senior officer 2  




Canadian Airports Council, former senior executive manager 
Canadian Airports Council, senior executive manager 
Canadian Airports Council, senior executive manager 
Canadian Airports Council, vice-chair of a committee 
Canadian Transportation Research Forum, senior officer 
Hotel Association of Canada, senior executive manager 
IATA North America, senior officer 
National Airlines Council of Canada (NACC), senior manager  
National Airlines Council of Canada (NACC), member of the board of directors 
The Air Transport Association of Canada (ATAC), senior manager 
The Air Transport Association of Canada (ATAC), member of the board of directors 
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Annex I. Abbreviations and Acronyms 
 
ACI  Airports Council International  
 
ACF  Advocacy coalition framework 
 
ANSPs Air navigation services providers 
 
ASA  Air Service Agreement 
 
ATRS  Air Transport Research Society 
 
CAAs  Canadian Airport Authorities 
 
CAC  Canadian Airports Council 
 
CATSA Canadian Air Transport Security Authority 
 
CSIS  Canadian Security Intelligence Service 
 
Doc 9082 ICAO’s Policies on Charges for Airports and Air Navigation Services 
 
Doc 9562 Airport Economics Manual 
 
IATA  International Air Transport Association 
 
ICAO  International Civil Aviation Organization 
 
LAAs  Local Airport Authorities 
 
NACC  National Airlines Council of Canada 
 
NAP  National Airport Policy 
 
NAS  National Airports System 
 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
 
RPK  Revenue Passenger Kilometers 
 
SARPs Standard and Recommended Practices 
 
TIAC  Tourism Industry Association of Canada 
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TC  Transport Canada 
 
TSA  Transportation Security Administration 
 
UAE  United Arab Emirates 
 272 
Bibliography 
Abeyratne, Ruwantissa. 2007. “The Legal Effect of ICAO Decisions and Empowerment of ICAO 
by Contracting States.” Annals of Air and Space Law 32: 517–28. 
ACI. 2011. ACI Airport Economics Survey 2011. Montréal: Airports Council International. 
ACPR. 2010. “Planning Considerations.” In Airport Passenger Terminal Planning and Design 
(Volume 1: Guidebook), Airport Collaborative Research Program Report No 25, 34–79. 
Washington DC: Transportation Research Board. 
Airports Task Force. 1986. The Future of Canadian Airport Management. Report of the Airports 
Task Force. Ottawa: Transport Canada. 
Air Transport News. 2012. Turkish Airlines Announces a Commercial Cooperation Agreement 
with Air Canada. On line: http://www.airtransportnews.aero/article.pl?&id=36865 [Accessed 
July 1, 2012]. 
Albo, Gregory. 2002. “Neoliberalism, the State, and the Left: A Canandian Perspective.” Monthly 
Review 54 (1): 46–55. 
ALPA. 2007. “Pilots Protest Railroad Subsidies.” ALPA News Release 07.050. 
http://www.alpa.org/portals/alpa/pressroom/pressreleases/2007/2007-10-12_07.050.htm. 
American Bar Association. 2010. “Air Transportation.” 2009 Annual Review of Antitrust Law 
Developments, 401–10. 
ATAC. 1999. 1999 Annual Report. The Future Belongs to Aviation. Ottawa: The Air Transport 
Association of Canada. 
ATRS. 2011. Global Airport Performance Benchmarking. Global Standards for Airport 
Excellence. Vancouver: Air Transport Research Society. 
Aucoin, Peter. 1995. The New Public Management: Canada in Comparative Perspective. 
Montréal: Institute for Research on Public Policy. 
———. 2006. “Accountability and Coordination with Independent Foundations: A Canadian 
Case.” In Autonomy and Regulation. Coping with Agencies in the Modern State, edited by Tom 
Christensen and Per Lægreid, 110–35. Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Auditor General of Canada. 2000. “Transport Canada—Airport Transfers: National Airports 
System.” In 2000 October Report of the Auditor General of Canada. Ottawa: Office of the 
Auditor General of Canada. 
 273 
Bakvis, Herman. 2000. “Prime Minister and Cabinet in Canada: An Autocracy in Need of 
Reform.” Journal of Canadian Studies 35 (4): 60–79. 
Bakvis, Herman, and Grace Darlene Skogstad. 2008. Canadian Federalism: Performance, 
Effectiveness, and Legitimacy. 2nd ed. Toronto: Oxford University Press. 
Banting, Keith. 1987. The Welfare State and Canadian Federalism. Montréal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press. 
Barlow, Maude, and Bruce Campbell. 1996. Straight Through the Heart: How the Liberals 
Abandoned the Just Society. Toronto: Harper-Perennial. 
Barros, Carlos P, Nicolas Peypoch, and Philippe Villard. 2011. “Productivity Changes in 
Canadian Airports and Technological Change Analysis.” Technical University of Lisbon, School 
of Economics and Management, Working Paper No. 05/2011/DE/UECE. 
Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 1991. “Agenda Dynamics and Policy Subsystems.” 
The Journal of Politics 53 (4): 1044–74. 
Béliveau-Paquin, Geneviève. 2008. “La Place Des Acteurs Politiques Dans Les Processus de 
Politiques Culturelles Municipales : Une Autre Conception de La Médiation Culturelle.” Lien 
Social et Politiques 2008 (60): 75–89. 
Bellamy, Matthew J. 2005. Profiting the Crown: Canada’s Polymer Corporation, 1942-1990. 
Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
Bemelmans-Videc, Marie-Louise, Ray C. Rist, and Evert Oskar Vedung. 1998. Carrots, Sticks, 
and Sermons: Policy Instruments and Their Evaluation. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction 
Publishers. 
Bernatchez, Jean. 2010. “La valorisation commerciale de la recherche universitaire. Principes, 
modalités et enjeux d’éthique publique.” Éthique publique, Responsabilité sociale et éthique de la 
recherche, 12 (1): 55–78. 
Bernier, Luc, Stéphane Paquin, and Guy Lachapelle. 2011. L’analyse des politiques publiques. 
Montréal: Presses de l’Université de Montréal. 
Bernstein, Stéphanie, Urwana Coiquaud, Marie-Josée Dupuis, Laurence Léa Fontaine, Lucie 
Morissette, Esther Paquet, and Guylaine Vallée. 2009. “Les Transformations Du Travail et de 
L’entreprise : Qu’attendre Des Politiques Publiques?” Administration Publique Du Canada 52 
(2): 177–201. 
Bezes, Philippe. 2000. “Les Hauts Fonctionnaires Croient-Ils À Leurs Mythes ? L’apport Des 
Approches Cognitives À L’analyse Des Engagements Dans Les Politiques de Réforme de l’État. 
Quelques Exemples Français (1988-1997).” Revue Française de Science Politique 50 (2): 307–
32. 
 274 
———. 2007. “The Hidden Politics of Administrative Reform: Cutting French Civil Service 
Wages with a Low-Profile Instrument.” Governance 20 (1): 23–56. 
Bisignani, Giovanni. 2011. “Aviation and Montréal. Speech given at the Montréal Council on 
Foreign Relations, 20 January 2011.” http://www.iata.org/pressroom/speeches/Pages/2011-01-20-
01.aspx. 
Black, David. 2012. “Between Indifference and Idiosyncrasy: The Conservatives and Canadian 
Aid to Africa.” In Struggling for Effectiveness: CIDA and Canadian Foreign Aid, by Stephen 
Brown, 246–68. Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
Blank, Stephen, and Barry E. Prentice. 2012. “Widening Competition in North American Freight 
Transport: The Impact of Cabotage.” Macdonald-Laurier Institute Commentary/Commentaire, 
no. April. 
Bongrand, Philippe, and Pascale Laborier. 2005. “L’entretien Dans L’analyse Des Politiques 
Publiques: Un Impensé Méthodologique?” Revue Française de Science Politique 55 (1): 73–111. 
Bourgault, Jacques, and Paul G Thomas. 2003. Gouvernance À l’Administration Canadienne de 
La Sûreté Du Transport Aérien (ACSTA). Ottawa: ACSTA. 
Bouriaud, Laura, and Delia Bancu. 2008. “Hermeneutics of Science-Policy Interface in Two 
Different Governance Processes.” In Environmental and Forest Governance: The Role of 
Discourses and Expertise. Proceedings of the International Conference, Göttingen 2007, by 
Michael Böcher, Lukas Giessen, and Daniela Kleimschmit. Göttingen: Universitätsverlag 
Göttingen. 
Bourque, Mélanie, and Gaëlle Leruste. 2010. “La Transformation Des Idées Sur La Privatisation 
Du Système de Santé Québécois Depuis 1970.” Politique et Sociétés 29 (2): 105–29. 
Bowen, John. 2000. “Airline Hubs in Southeast Asia: National Economic Development and 
Nodal Accessibility.” Journal of Transport Geography 8 (1): 25–41. 
Boychuk, Gerard William. 1998. Patchworks of Purpose: The Development of Provincial Social 
Assistance Regimes in Canada. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bradford, Neil. 1999. “The Policy Influence of Economic Ideas: Interests, Institutions and 
Innovation in Canada.” Studies in Political Economy 59: 17–60. 
Braun 1998 cited by Schiller, Frank. 2008. “Ideas for Governance Systems - Methodological 
Aspects and Theoretical Perspectives.” In Environmental and Forest Governance: The Role of 
Discourses and Expertise: Proceedings of the International Conference, Göttingen, 2007, edited 
by Michael Böcher, 11–40. Göttingen: Universitätsverlag Göttingen. 
Braun, Dietmar, and Andreas Busch. 1999. “Why Ideas Matter.” In Public Policy and Political 
Ideas, by Dietmar Braun and Andreas Busch, 1–8. Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 275 
Brodeur, Jean-Paul. 1992. “Undercover Policing in Canada: Wanting What Is Wrong.” Crime, 
Law and Social Change 18 (1-2): 105–36. 
Brooks, Mary R., and Barry E. Prentice. 2001. “Airport Devolution: The Canadian Experience.” 
In Paper Presented at the World Council of Transportation Research. Seoul, Korea: July 2001. 
Brown, Stephen. 2012. “Aid Effectiveness and the Framing of New Canadian Aid Initiatives.” In 
Struggling for Effectiveness: CIDA and Canadian Foreign Aid, by Stephen Brown, 79–107. 
Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
Burbidge, Scott. 2005. “The Governance Deficit: Reflections on the Future of Public and Private 
Policing in Canada.” Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice 47 (1): 63–86. 
Burghouwt, Guillaume. 2007. “Air Transport Networks.” In Airline Network Development in 
Europe and Its Implications for Airport Planning, 7–36. Aldershot (UK): Ashgate Publishing. 
Campbell, Murray. 2001. “Chronology of a Nightmare.” The Globe and Mail, no. 12 September: 
N6. 
Campion-Smith, Bruce. 2009a. “Airline Frustrated by Ottawa Rebuffs; Refusal to Let Emirates 
Boost Canadian Service at Odds with Harper’s Trade Stance.” The Toronto Star, no. 28 February: 
A9. 
———. 2009b. “Arab Airline Slams Ottawa, Alleges ‘Slanderous’ Tactics; Documents Reveal 
Bitter Spat Over Access to Canadian Skies.” The Toronto Star, no. 25 July: A1. 
———. 2011. “Province Wants Spat with U.A.E. Settled; Dispute Costing Ontario Companies 
Contracts.” The Toronto Star, no. 26 January: A8. 
Canadian Transportation Agency. 2007. Report on Air Relations Between Canada and Other 
Countries - United Arab Emirates. On line: https://www.otc-cta.gc.ca/eng/united-arab-emirates 
[Accessed July 1, 2012]. 
CAPA. 2014. Airline Invasion of the US: Gulf Airlines Extend into the West, Chinese Airlines 
Grow in the East. CAPA Centre for Aviation. Accessed July 22. 
http://centreforaviation.com/analysis/airline-invasion-of-the-us-gulf-airlines-extend-into-the-
west-chinese-airlines-grow-in-the-east-178749. 
Carney, Michael, Paul Stephan Dempsey, Richard Janda, Triant Flouris, and Armand de Mestral. 
2005. “Policy Choices for Canada.” In The McGill/Concordia Report on International Aviation 
Policy for Canada, 277–90. Montréal: McGill University, Center for Research on Air & Space 
Law. 
Carney, Michael, and Isabelle Dostaler. 2006. “Airline Ownership and Control: A Corporate 
Governance Perspective.” Journal of Air Transport Management 12 (2): 63–75. 
 276 
CATSA Act Review Secretariat. 2006. Flight Plan: Managing the Risks in Aviation Security. 
Report of the Advisory Panel. Ottawa: CATSA Act Review Secretariat. 
Chapnick, Adam. 2011. “A ‘Conservative’ National Story? The Evolution of Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada’s Discover Canada.” American Review of Canadian Studies 41 (1): 20–36. 
Charlier, Jean-Emile, and Hamidou Nacuzon Sall. 2008. “Accommoder La Modernité: Le Cas 
Du Sénégal.” In XXIVèmes Journées de l’Association Tiers-Monde“ Economie de La 
Connaissance et Développement”, Tenu À l’UFR de Sciences Économiques et Gestion de 
l’Université Gaston Berger, Saint-Louis, Sénégal. 
Chase, Steven, Jane Taber, and Brent Jang. 2010. “UAE Rift Exposes Division in Harper Caucus; 
Mackay, Ritz Cut Out of Negotiations Over Airspace and Landing Slots.” The Globe and Mail, 
no. 13 October. 
Cherniavsky, Ben, and Benjamin Dachis. 2007. “Excess Baggage: Measuring Air 
Transportation’s Fiscal Burden.” CD Howe Institute Commentary 242 (February). 
Chevalier, Gérard. 2008. “Rationalités, Référentiels et Cadres Idéologiques.” SociologieS 2023. 
Clancy, Peter. 2004. Micropolitics and Canadian Business: Paper, Steel and the Airlines. 
Peterborough: Broadview Press. 
CNW. 1997a. “Calgary Airport Authority Announces New Contract With Calgary Police 
Service.” Canada NewsWire 3 March (c0246). 
———. 1997b. “Calgary Airport Authority Announces Airport Improvement Fee.” Canada 
NewsWire 3 March (c0256). 
Cobb, Roger W., and Charles D. Elder. 1972. Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics 
of Agenda-Building. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
Cohen, Michael D., James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen. 1972. “A Garbage Can Model of 
Organizational Choice.” Administrative Science Quarterly 17 (1): 1–25. 
Colomb, Fabrice. 2007. La Genèse Des Politiques de L’emploi En France : Un Référentiel 
D’adaptation. Centre d’économie de la Sorbonne: Document de travail 2007.71. 
Corbett, David. 1965. Politics and the Airlines. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Curchod, Corentin, Hervé Dumez, and Alain Jeunemaître. 2004. “Une Étude de L’organisation 
Du Transport Aérien En Europe: Les Vertus de l’AQQC Pour L’exploration de La Complexité.” 
Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée 11 (1): 85–100. 
Curien, Nicolas. 1993. “Économie Des Services En Réseau : Principes et Méthodes.” 
Communications et Stratégies 10 (2): 13–30. 
 277 
Currier, Kevin. 2008. “Price Cap Regulation of Airports: A New Approach.” Economics Bulletin 
12 (8): 1–7. 
Dahlberg. 2003. “Air Rage Post-9/11.” In Passenger Behaviour, by Robert Bor, 95–117. 
Aldershot (UK): Ashgate Publishing. 
Daune-Richard, Anne-Marie. 1999. “La Notion de Référentiel Appliquée À La Garde Des Jeunes 
Enfants. Une Comparaison France-Suède.” Recherches et Prévisions 56 (1): 33–46. 
Davidson, Christopher M. 2009. Abu Dhabi: Oil and Beyond. Columbia University Press. 
Debbage, Keith, and Khaula Alkaabi. 2010. “Market Power and Vertical (Dis)integration? 
Airline Networks and Destination Development in the United States and Dubai.” In Aviation and 
Tourism: Implications for Leisure Travel, edited by Anne Graham, Andreas Papatheodorou, and 
Peter Forsyth, 147–65. Aldershot (UK): Ashgate Publishing. 
DeFede, Jim. 2003. The Day the World Came to Town: 9/11 in Gander, Newfoundland. Toronto: 
HarperCollins Publishers. 
De Mestral, Armand, and Harold Bashor. 2005. “International Relationships and Context.” In The 
McGill/Concordia Report on International Aviation Policy for Canada, 205–42. Montréal: 
McGill University, Center for Research on Air & Space Law. 
DeMont, John, and E. Kaye Fulton. 1996. “The Baddest Guy on the Block.” Maclean’s 109 (43): 
18–22. 
Dempsey, Paul Stephan. 2005. “Major Provisions in Bilateral Air Transport Agreements.” In The 
McGill/Concordia Report on International Aviation Policy for Canada, 127–76. Montréal: 
McGill University, Center for Research on Air & Space Law. 
Dempsey, Paul Stephan, Maria Buzdugan, and Yaw Nyampong. 2005. “The Evolution of 
Canadian Air Transport Policy.” In The McGill/Concordia Report on International Aviation 
Policy for Canada, 11–36. Montréal: McGill University, Center for Research on Air & Space 
Law. 
Department of Finance. 2012. Budget 2012: Jobs, Growth and Long-Term Prosperity. Ottawa: 
Department of Finance. 
DiMaggio, Paul, and Walter Powell. 1983. “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism 
and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields.” American Sociological Review 48 (2): 147–
60. 
Discazeaux, Carine, and Mario Polèse. 2007. “Comment Expliquer Le Déclin de Montréal 
Comme Centre de Transports Aériens: Une Question de Géographie Économique?” Le 
Géographe Canadien 51 (1): 22–42. 
 278 
Dobbin, Murray. 2003. “Creating the Elite Consensus.” In The Myth of the Good Corporate 
Citizen. Canada and Democracy in the Age of Globalization, 2nd ed, 152–81. Toronto: James 
Lorimer & Company Limited. 
Douglas, Mary, and Steven Ney. 1998. “Persons in the Policy Process.” In Missing Persons: A 
Critique of the Personhood in the Social Sciences, 117–35. Los Angeles: University of California 
Press. 
Downs, Anthony. 1967. Inside Bureaucracy. Boston: RAND Corporation. 
———. 1972. “Up and Down with Ecology: The Issue Attention Cycle.” Public Interest 28 (1): 
38–50. 
Draelants, Hugues, and Christian Maroy. 2007. “A Survey of Public Policy Analysis.” 
KNOWandPOL Literature Review Report Part 1. 
Dresner, Martin. 1992. “The Regulation of US-Canada Air Transportation: Past, Present and 
Future.” Canadian-American Public Policy 9: 1–34. 
Dresner, Martin, and Tae H. Oum. 1998. “The Effect of Liberalised Air Transport Bilaterais on 
Foreign Traffic Diversion: The Case of Canada.” Journal of Transport Economics and Policy 32 
(3): 317–30. 
Dresner, Martin, and Michael Tretheway. 1992. “Canada and the Changing Regime in 
International Air Transport.” In Canadian Foreign Policy and International Economic Regimes, 
by Claire Cutler and Mark W. Zacher, 189–214. Vancouver: UBC Press. 
Dubois, Jérôme. 1997. Communautés de Politiques Publiques et Projets Urbains. Paris: 
L’Harmattan. 
Dufour, Pascale, Alexandre Dobrowolsky, Jane Jenson, Denis Saint-Martin, and Deena White. 
2008. “L’investissement Social Au Canada. Émergence D’un Référentiel Global Sous Tension.” 
In Politiques Publiques et Démocratie, edited by Olivier Giraud and Philippe Warin, 179–99. 
Paris: La Découverte. 
Dutheil, Guy. 2014. “Air France-KLM et Lufthansa Pressent Bruxelles de S’attaquer Aux 
Compagnies Du Golfe.” Le Monde, no. 21 juin. 
Echevarne, Rafael. 2010. “The Impact of Attracting Low Cost Carriers to Airports.” In Aviation 
and Tourism: Implications for Leisure Travel, edited by Anne Graham, Andreas Papatheodorou, 
and Peter Forsyth, 177–92. Aldershot (UK): Ashgate Publishing. 
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. 1989. “Building Theories from Case Study Research.” The Academy of 
Management Review 14 (4): 532–50. 
Ellison, Anthony P. 2002. “Transport’s Punctuated Precession in North America.” In 
 279 
Entrepreneurs and the Transformation of the Global Economy, 7–42. Northampton: Edward 
Elgar Publishing. 
Entman, Robert M. 1993. “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm.” Journal of 
Communication 43 (4): 51–58. 
Ericson, Richard V, and Kevin D Haggerty. 1997. “Tracing Territories.” In Policing the Risk 
Society, 133–55. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Erler, Jochen. 1964. “Regulatory Procedures of ICAO as a Model for IMCO.” McGill Law 
Journal 10: 262–68. 
Faure, Alain. 2007. “Doctrine Ferroviaire et Différenciation Régionale: La Décentralisation En 
Chantier.” In Six Régions À L’épreuve Des Politiques de Transport. Décentralisation, 
Régionalisation Ferroviaire et Différenciation Territoriale, edited by Marianne Ollivier-Trigalo, 
55–71. 
Faure, Alain, Gilles Pollet, and Philippe Warin. 1995. La Construction Du Sens Dans Les 
Politiques Publiques. Débats Autour de La Notion de Référentiel. Paris: L’Harmattan. 
Fereday, Jennifer, and Eimear Muir-Cochrane. 2006. “Demonstrating Rigor Using Thematic 
Analysis: A Hybrid Approach of Inductive and Deductive Coding and Theme Development.” 
International Journal of Qualitative Methods 5 (1): 1–11. 
Finger, Matthias, and Frédéric Varone. 2006. “Governance of Network Industries: Towards 
European Regulators, Differentiated Regulations, or Self-Regulation?” In . Université de Bath. 
Fischer, Frank. 2003. Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Forsyth, Peter, David Gillen, Andreas Knorr, Otto Mayer, Hans-Martin Niemeier, and David 
Starkie. 2004. The Economic Regulation of Airports: Recent Developments in Australasia, North 
America and Europe. Aldershot (UK): Ashgate Publishing. 
Fouilleux, Ève. 2000. “Entre Production et Institutionnalisation Des Idées. La Réforme de La 
Politique Agricole Commune.” Revue Française de Science Politique 50 (2): 277–306. 
Freeze, Colin. 2010. “UAE Visas Could Cost Canadians up to $1,000; Row Over Aviation Rights 
Believed Behind High Fees.” The Globe and Mail, no. 29 December: A8. 
Gaïti, Brigitte. 2008. “La décision à l’épreuve du charisme.” Politix 82 (2): 39–67. 
Gallaway, Roger, ed. 2005. Air Liberalization and the Canadian Airports System. Interim Report 
of the Standing Committee on Transport. Ottawa: House of Commons. 
Giaume, Stéphanie. 2006. “How to Make the Canadian Airline Industry More Competitive.” In 
 280 
Economic Note - Tax Policy Series. Montréal: Institut économique de Montréal. 
Giblin, Béatrice. 2007. “Le tourisme : un théâtre géopolitique ?” Hérodote n° 127 (4): 3–24. 
Gillen, David, and William G. Morrison. 2004. “Airport Pricing, Financing and Policy: Report to 
National Transportation Act Review Committee.” In The Economic Regulation of Airports: 
Recent Developments in Australasia, North America and Europe, edited by Peter Forsyth, David 
Gillen, Andreas Knorr, Otto Mayer, Hans-Martin Niemeier, and David Starkie, 43–72. Aldershot 
(UK): Ashgate Publishing. 
Gillen, David, Tae H Oum, and Michael Tretheway. 1985a. The Structure of the Canadian 
Airline System and the Expected Impact of the Movement Toward Deregulation. Study Submitted 
to the Treasury Board of Canada. Ottawa: Treasury Board of Canada. 
———. 1985b. The Impact of Government Regulation and Ownership on Airline Performance. 
Study Submitted to Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada. Ottawa: Consumer and Corporate 
Affairs Canada. 
———. 1986a. Predatory Behavior in a Deregulated Canadian Airline Industry. Study 
Submitted to Consumer and Corporate Affairs Cananada. Ottawa: Consumer and Corporate 
Affairs Canada. 
———. 1986b. Pricing Principles for Canadian Airport. Report Submitted to the Ministerial 
Airport Task Force. Ottawa: Transport Canada. 
Gillen, David, Tae H. Oum, and Michael Tretheway. 1989. “Privatization of Air Canada: Why It 
Is Necessary in a Deregulated Environment.” Canadian Public Policy 15 (3): 285–99. 
Global News. 2012. “A Harper History of Back-to-Work Legislation.” Global News On-line: 
http://www.globalnews.ca/labour/6442649533/story.html [Accessed August 3, 2012]. 
Gough, Michael. 2004. “The Role of Non-Share Capital Corporations in Providing Essential 
Public Services in Canada.” The Philanthropist 19 (3): 182–200. 
Gouin, Rodolphe, and Jean-Baptiste Paul Harguindéguy. 2012. “The Uses of Cognition in Policy 
Analysis: A First Appraisal.” Journal of Public Administration and Governance 2 (1): Pages 1–
20. 
Graham, Anne. 2008. “Airport Competition and the Role of Airport Marketing.” In Managing 
Airports: An International Perspective, 3d edition, 229–71. London: Elsevier. 
———. 2009. “How Important Are Commercial Revenues to Today’s Airports?” Journal of Air 
Transport Management 15 (3): 106–11. 
GTAA. 2012. 2011 Annual Report: A World of Possibilities. Toronto: Greater Toronto Airport 
Authority. 
 281 
Guba, Egon B., and Yvonna S. Lincoln. 1994. “Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research.” 
In The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research, edited by Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna 
Lincoln, 105–17. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications. 
Haas, Peter M. 1992. “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination.” International Organization 46 (1): 1–35. 
Hall, Peter. 1989. The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
———. 1992. “The Movement from Keynesianism to Monetarism: Institutional Analysis and 
British Economic Policy in the 1970s.” In Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in 
Comparative Analysis, edited by Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Ann Thelen, and Frank Longstreth. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 1993. “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic 
Policymaking in Britain.” Comparative Politics 25 (3): 275–96. 
Hall, Peter, and Rosemary Taylor. 1997. “La Science Politique et Les Trois Néo-
Institutionnalismes.” Revue Française de Science Politique 47 (3-4): 469–96. 
Hassenteufel, Patrick, and Andy Smith. 2002. “Essoufflement Ou Second Souffle ? L’analyse 
Des Politiques Publiques « À La Française ».” Revue Française de Science Politique 52 (1): 53–
73. doi:10.3406/rfsp.2002.403695. 
Havel, Brian F. 2009. “Introduction: Preparing for a New Era in International Aviation.” In 
Beyond Open Skies: A New Regime for International Aviation, 1–22. Aviation Law and Policy 
Series. Dordrecht: Kluwer Law International. 
Heaver, Trevor D., and Tae H. Oum. 2000. “The Commercialization of Airports and Air 
Navigation Systems: The Canadian Experience.” Journal of Aviation Management 1 (1): 32–44. 
Heaver, Trevor D., and W. G. Waters. 2005. “Transportation Policy in Canada.” In Handbook of 
Transport Strategy, Policy and Institutions, Volume 6, edited by Kenneth J. Button and David A. 
Hensher, 779–802. Oxford: Elsevier. 
Hood, Christopher. 1986. The Tools of Government. Chatham: Chatham House Publishers. 
House of Commons. 2001a. Evidence of the Meeting No. 25 of the Standing Committee on 
Transport and Government Operations, 16 October 2001 (1st Session of the 37th Parliament). 
Ottawa: Parliament of Canada. 
———. 2001b. Evidence of the Meeting No. 24 of the Standing Committee on Transport and 
Government Operations, 4 October 2001  (1st Session of the 37th Parliament). Ottawa: 
Parliament of Canada. 
 282 
———. 2001c. Evidence of the Meeting No. 28 of the Standing Committee on Transport and 
Government Operations, 30 October 2001 (1st Session of the 37th Parliament). Ottawa: 
Parliament of Canada. 
———. 2002a. First Report of the Standing Committee on Transport (2d Session of the 37th 
Parliament). Ottawa: Parliament of Canada. 
———. 2002b. Evidence of the Meeting No. 6 of the Standing Committee on Transport and 
Government Operations, 10 December 2002 16, 2001 (2st Session of the 37th Parliament). 
Ottawa: Parliament of Canada. 
Howlett, Michael. 1997. “Issue-Attention and Punctuated Equilibria Models Reconsidered: An 
Empirical Examination of the Dynamics of Agenda-Setting in Canada.” Canadian Journal of 
Political Science 30 (1): 3–29. 
———. 2000. “Managing the ‘Hollow State’: Procedural Policy Instruments and Modern 
Governance.” Canadian Public Administration 43 (4): 412–31. 
ICAO. 1948. Airport Economics (Cir 3 -AT/1). Montréal: International Civil Aviation 
Organization. 
———. 2004. Manual on the Regulation of International Air Transport (Doc 9626). 2d edition. 
Montréal: International Civil Aviation Organization. 
———. 2006. Convention on International Civil Aviation (Doc 7300). 9th edition. Montréal: 
International Civil Aviation Organization. 
———. 2011a. “Case Study - United States.” In Case Studies on Commercialization, 
Privatization and Economic Oversight of Airports and Air Navigation Services Providers 
(ANSPs), http://www.icao.int/icao/en/atb/eap/Databases/CaseStudies/United%20States.pdf. 
Montréal: International Civil Aviation Organization. 
———. 2011b. Security – Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful 
Interference (Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation). 9th edition. Montréal: 
International Civil Aviation Organization. 
———. 2011c. Facilitation Manual (Doc 9957). Montréal: International Civil Aviation 
Organization. 
———. 2012a. Manual on the Privatization in the Provision of Airports and Air Navigation 
Services (Doc 9980). Montréal: International Civil Aviation Organization. 
———. 2012b. Privatization in the Provision of Airports and Air Navigation Services (Cir 331-
AT/190). Montréal: International Civil Aviation Organization. 
———. 2012c. ICAO’s Policies on Charges for Airports and Air Navigation Services (Doc 
 283 
9082). 9th edition. Montréal: International Civil Aviation Organization. 
———. 2012d. Tariffs for Airports and Air Navigation Services (Doc 7100). Montréal: 
International Civil Aviation Organization. 
———. 2012e. Report on the Eleventh Meeting of the Air Transport Regulation Panel 
(ATRP/11). Montréal: International Civil Aviation Organization. 
———. 2013a. Airport Economics Manual (Doc 9562). 3d edition. Montréal: International Civil 
Aviation Organization. 
———. 2013b. Case Studies on Commercialization, Privatization and Economic Oversight of 
Airports and Air Navigation Services Providers (ANSPs). Montréal: International Civil Aviation 
Organization. 
———. 2013c. “Expanding Market Access for International Air Transport.” In Sixth Worldwide 
Air Transport Conference, Working Paper ATConf/6-WP/13. Montréal: International Civil 
Aviation Organization. 
———. 2013d. Report of the Sixth Worldwide Air Transport Conference - ATConf/6 (Doc 
10009). Montréal: International Civil Aviation Organization. 
Infanger, John F. 2009. “One on One: CAC’s Jim Facette; Canada’s Airports Are Faring Well 
Enough; It’s Ottawa That Presents Some Challenges.” Airport Business, no. August: 26. 
InterVISTAS. 2009. The Elimination of Airport Rent: Return on Investment. Final Report 
Prepared for the Canadian Airports Council. Vancouver: InterVISTAS Consulting Group. 
———. 2010. Economic Impact Study for Emirates Airline – Additional Flights Between Dubai 
and Canada. Vancouver: InterVISTAS Consulting Group. 
Inwood, Gregory J. 2005. Continentalizing Canada. The Politics and Legacy of the Macdonald 
Royal Commission. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Jalbert, Pierre. 1988. “Recension : L’État En Action: Politiques Publiques et Corporatismes de 
Bruno Jobert et Pierre Muller.” Revue Canadienne de Science Politique 21 (3): 658–60. 
Janda, Richard, Triant Flouris, and Tae H. Oum. 2005. “International Air Transport Policy Issues 
for Canada: Views from the Air Currents Conference of January 2004.” Canadian Journal of 
Administrative Sciences 22 (1): 73–91. 
Jang, Brent. 2009. “Emirates to Bring Airbus A380 to Toronto.” The Globe and Mail, no. 17 
March: B10. 
———. 2010a. “An Ominous Flight Pattern; the High Costs Levied by Ottawa on Airports Have 
Made Crossing the Border to Get a Plane a Cheaper Alternative.” The Globe and Mail, no. 27 
 284 
November: B6. 
———. 2010b. “UAE Offers to Extend Forces’ Stay in Exchange for More Canadian Flights.” 
The Globe and Mail, no. 24 February. 
———. 2011a. “IATA Chief Takes Aim at Ottawa’s Air Taxes.” The Globe and Mail, no. 10 
May: B11. 
———. 2011b. “The Dogfight Over Canadian Skies; Emirates Airline’s Push for More Landing 
Rights Has Hackles Raised at Air Canada, Lufthansa and Other Old-Guard Airlines.” The Globe 
and Mail, no. 15 February: B7. 
Jeffrey, Brooke. 2000. Hard Right Turn: The New Face of Neo-Conservatism in Canada. 
HarperCollins Publishers. 
———. 2006. “From Collaborative Federalism to the New Unilateralism: Implications for the 
Welfare State.” In Continuity and Change in Canadian Politics, by Hans Michelman and Cristine 
DeClercy, 117–45. Toronto: Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Jobert, Bruno. 1992. “Représentations Sociales, Controverses et Débats Dans La Conduite Des 
Politiques Publiques.” Revue Française de Science Politique 42 (2): 219–34. 
———. 1994. Le Tournant Néo-Libéral En Europe. Paris: L’Harmattan. 
Jobert, Bruno, and Pierre Muller. 1987. L’État En Action. Politiques Publiques et Corporatismes. 
Paris: Presses universitaires de France. 
Jones, Alan, and James Guthrie. 2008. “Governing Modernised Air Navigation Service 
Providers.” presented at the The EGPA Study Group on Governance of Public Sector 
Organisations, Rotterdam. http://soc.kuleuven.be/io/egpa/org/2008Rot/papers/Jones_Guthrie.pdf. 
Jones, Charles O. 1970. An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy. Belmont (CA): 
Wadsworth. 
Kasarda, John D. 2010. “The Way Forward.” In Global Airport Cities, 15–36. Twickenham: 
Insight Media. 
Kernaghan, Kenneth, Sandford F. Borins, and D. Brian Marson. 2005. “Restructuring and Re-
Engineering.” In The New Public Organization, edited by Kenneth Kernaghan, Sandford Borins, 
and D. Brian Marson, 3d ed, 92–122. Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada. 
King, Desmond. 2007. “The American State and Social Engineering: Policy Instruments in 
Affirmative Action.” Governance 20 (1): 109–26. 
Kingdon, John W. 1984. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. Boston: Little Brown. 
 285 
King, Gary, Robert Owen Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. “Increasing the Number of 
Observations.” In Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, edited 
by Gary King, Robert O Keohane, and Sidney Verba, 208–30. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Knoepfel, Peter, Corinne Larrue, Frederic Varone, and Michael Hill. 2011. Public Policy 
Analysis. Bristol: The Policy Press. 
Knorr, Andreas, and Alexander Eisenkopf. 2007. “How Sustainable Is Emirates’ Business 
Model?” Aerlines Magazine, no. 38: 1–4. 
Kuhn, Thomas S. 1972. La structure des révolutions scientifiques. Paris: Flammarion. 
Ladner, Kiera L. 2005. “Up the Creek: Fishing for a New Constitutional Order.” Canadian 
Journal of Political Science 38 (4): 923–53. 
Landry, Réjean. 1991. “Recension : Politiques Publiques de Yves Meny; Jean-Claude Thoenig; 
Les Politiques Publiques de Pierre Muller.” Revue Canadienne de Science Politique 24 (2): 403–
4. 
Langley, Ann. 1999. “Strategies for Theorizing from Process Data.” The Academy of 
Management Review 24 (4): 691–710. 
La Presse Canadienne. 2012. “Les Revenus d’Aéroports de Montréal Ont Décollé En 2011.” Fil 
Voyage, Affaires Du Jeudi 15 Mars 2012, La Presse Canadienne. 
———. 2013. “Valeurs Mobilières - Flaherty Croit Que Le Québec Finira Par Se Rallier À 
Ottawa.” Le Devoir, no. 26 janvier: B1. 
Lascoumes, Pierre, and Patrick Le Galès. 2005. “Introduction : L’action Publique Saisie Par Ses 
Instruments.” In Gouverner Par Les Instruments, 11–44. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po. 
———. 2007. “Introduction: Understanding Public Policy through Its InstrumentsFrom the 
Nature of Instruments to the Sociology of Public Policy Instrumentation.” Governance 20 (1): 1–
21. 
Lasswell, Harold. 1956. The Decision Process. Seven Categories of Functional Analysis. College 
Park: Bureau of Governmental Research  College of Business and Public Administration  
University of Maryland. 
Lazar, Fred. 2000. “Why an Air Canada Monopoly Is Bad for the Air Business.” Canadian 
Business Economics 8 (1): 3–4. 
———. 2007. The Potential Economic Impacts of Reducing the Federal Government’s Ground 
Rents for Toronto Pearson International Airport and Reducing the Federal Excise Tax on 
Aviation. Ottawa: The Air Transport Association of Canada. 
 286 
———. 2010. The Economic Impacts of the Member Carriers of the National Airlines Council of 
Canada. Ottawa: National Airlines Council of Canada. 
———. 2011. A Tale of Four Cities. Canada and the UAE. On line: 
http://www.aircanada.com/en/about/media/facts/documents/canada_uae_en.pdf [Accessed 
September 1, 2011]. 
Leclerc, Richard. 2004. “L’émergence de La Politique Aérienne Internationale Du Canada de 
1994 : Une Innovation Pour Le Déploiement de Routes Transpacifiques.” Canadian Foreign 
Policy/La Politique Étrangère Du Canada 11 (2): 111–29. 
Lee-Young, Joanne. 2009. “Emirates Airlines Strives to Expand Canadian Service; Dubai-Based 
Carrier Seeks Approval for Vancouver and Calgary Fights.” The Vancouver Sun, no. 8 March: 
B6. 
Lemieux, Vincent. 2002. L’étude des politiques publiques: les acteurs et leur pouvoir. Québec: 
Presses Université Laval. 
Lerner, Stephen D. 1997. “Canceling the Pearson Airport Agreements: A Case Study.” Annals of 
Air and Space Law 22 (2): 147–73. 
Lewis, Ira A., and Roxanne Zolin. 2004. “The Public to Private Continuum Measure and the Role 
of Stakeholder Boards as a Proxy for Markets in the Governance of Air Navigation Services.” 
International Public Management Review 5 (2): 52–77. 
Lincoln, Yvonna S., and Egon B. Guba. 1985. Naturalistic Inquiry. Beverly Hills: SAGE 
Publications. 
Linder, Stephen, and Guy B. Peters. 1989. “Instruments of Government: Perceptions and 
Contexts.” Journal of Public Policy 9 (1): 35–58. 
List, John A., and Daniel M. Sturm. 2006. “How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from 
Environmental Policy.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 121 (4): 1249–81. 
Lovink, Johannes A. 1999. “Choosing the Right Autonomy for Operators of Privatized 
Government Services: The Case of Nav Canada.” Canadian Public Administration 42 (3): 371–
86. 
Lyon, David. 2006. “Airport Screening, Surveillance, and Social Sorting: Canadian Responses to 
9/11 in Context.” Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice 48 (3): 397–411. 
Mackenzie, David. 2010. ICAO: A History of the International Civil Aviation Organization. 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Madar, Daniel. 2000. “The State Withdraws: Reform, Trade, and Federalism in Canada.” In 
Heavy Traffic: Deregulation, Trade, and Transformation in North American Trucking, 122–65. 
 287 
Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. 
Majone, Giandomenico. 1994. “The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe.” West European 
Politics 17 (3): 77–101. 
———. 1997. “From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of Changes 
in the Mode of Governance.” Journal of Public Policy 17 (2): 139–67. 
Malcher, Alan. 1991. “The 1990’s: The Decade of International Unrest.” Police Journal 64: 209–
14. 
Manning, Peter. 2005. “Some Notes on the Relationship of Private Security to Public Policing.” 
In Présenté Au Colloque International Francophone Sur La Police et Les Citoyens, Tenu À 
Nicolet Du 30 Mai Au 2 Juin 2005. Nicolet: École nationale de police du Québec. 
Marques, Paulo Eduardo Moruzzi, and Marcos Freitas Le Moal. 2014. “Le Programme 
d’Acquisition d’Aliments (PAA) au Brésil : l’agriculture locale et familiale au cœur de l’action 
publique en vue de la sécurité alimentaire.” VertigO - la revue électronique en sciences de 
l’environnement, no. 14 (May): 1. 
Martin, Don. 2010. “Policy Invites Flight of Jobs.” Calgary Herald, no. 11 January: A6. 
McBride, Stephen. 2005. Paradigm Shift: Globalization and the Canadian State. Halifax: 
Fernwood. 
McDougall, Glen. 2004. “The Privatisation of the Canadian Air Navigation System.” In Defining 
Aerospace Policy: Essays in Honor of Francis T. Hoban, edited by Kenneth J. Button, Julianne 
Lammersen-Baum, and Roger Stough, 13–34. Aldershot (UK): Ashgate Publishing. 
McDougall, Glen, and Alasdair Roberts. 2008. “Commercializing Air Traffic Control: Have the 
Reforms Worked?” Canadian Public Administration 51 (1): 45–69. 
McGrath, Tom. 1992. History of Canadian Airports. 2nd edition. Toronto: Lugus. 
McMillan, David. 2010. “A Perspective on the Evolving Transatlantic Market for Aviation and 
the Modernization of Air Traffic Management.” In Presented at the 2010 Transatlantic 
Roundtable on Aeronautics and Space. Washington DC: The European Institute. 
Merlin, Pierre. 2002. Le Transport Aérien. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. 
Monteiro, Joseph, David Krause, and André Downs. 2002. “The Open Skies Agreement Between 
the United States of America and Canada: The Results. Does It Suggest the Need for a Wider 
Pact and More Liberal Air Pact?” In Transportation Visioning: 2002 and Beyond. Proceedings of 
the 37th Annual Conference of the Canadian Transportation Research Forum, St. John’s, May 
12-15, 2002, 319–37. Saskatoon: Canadian Transportation Research Forum. 
 288 
Monteiro, Joseph, and Gerald Robertson. 2007. “Milestones in Canadian Transportation Policy.” 
In North American Networks: Gaps and Opportunities. Proceedings of the 42nd Annual 
Conference of the Canadian Transportation Research Forum, Winnipeg, June 3-6, 2007, 565–94. 
Saskatoon: Canadian Transportation Research Forum. 
———. 2009. “Transportation News Digest.” Canadian Journal of Transportation 3 (1): 70–81. 
Morel, Stéphanie. 2002. École, territoires et identités: les politiques publiques françaises à 
l’épreuve de l’ethnicité. Editions L’Harmattan. 
Morrison, William G. 2008. “A Model of Dual-Market Airport Operations to Assess the Effect of 
Canada’s Airport Rent Formula.” LCERPA Economic Research Paper 20081 Wilfrid Laurier 
University, Waterloo (Laurier Centre for Economic Research and Policy Analysis). 
Muller, Pierre. 1984. Le technocrate et le paysan. Paris: Les éditions ouvrières. 
———. 1989. Airbus, L’ambition Européenne. Paris: L’Harmattan. 
———. 1992. “Entre Le Local et l’Europe. La Crise Du Modèle Français de Politiques 
Publiques.” Revue Française de Science Politique 42 (2): 275–97. 
———. 2000. “L’analyse Cognitive Des Politiques Publiques: Vers Une Sociologie Politique de 
L’action Publique.” Revue Française de Science Politique 50 (2): 189–207. 
———. 2005. “Esquisse D’une Théorie Du Changement Dans L’action Publique. Structures, 
Acteurs et Cadres Cognitifs.” Revue Française de Science Politique 55 (1): 155–87. 
———. 2007. Les Politiques Publiques. 7ème ed. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. 
Muller, Pierre, and Yves Surel. 1998. L’analyse Des Politiques Publiques. Paris: Montchrestien. 
NACC. 2009. “The National Airlines Council of Canada’s Views on Canada’s Blue Sky Policy.” 
In Presented at the 2009 British Columbia International Open Skies Summit, Vancouver, 24-25 
September 2009. On line: www.openskiessummit.ca/presentations/NACC.pdf [Access May 15, 
2011]. 
Nahrath, Stéphane. 1999. “The Power of Ideas in Policy Research: A Critical Assessment.” In 
Public Policy and Political Ideas, edited by Dietmar Braun and Andreas Busch, 41–60. 
Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
———. 2010. “Les Référentiels de Politiques Publiques.” In Papier Introductif À L’atelier 
« Comparative Policy Analysis : New Trends in Cognitive  Approaches » Du Groupe Politiques 
Publiques de l’ASSP, Présenté Au Congrès Annuel de l’Association Suisse de Science Politique, 
7 & 8 Janvier 2010, Université  de Genève. 
Nav Canada. 2008. Customer Guide to Charges. Ottawa: Nav Canada. 
 289 
Nguyen, Linda. 2007. “Airport Wants ‘Fair Deal’ from Ottawa.” The Toronto Star. 
Nielsen, Erik, ed. 1985. Real Property: A Study Team Report to the Task Force on Program 
Review. Ottawa: Program Review Task Force. 
Niskanen, Willam. 1971. Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Chicago: Aldine 
Transaction. 
Nizard, Lucien. 1975. Changement Social et Appareil d’État : Du 5ème Au 6ème Plan. Grenoble: 
CERAT. 
O’Connell, John F. 2011a. “An Examination of the World’s Most Profitable Airline in 2009/10: 
The Emirates Business Model.” In Air Transport in the 21st Century: Key Strategic 
Developments, edited by John F. O’Connell and George Williams. Aldershot (UK): Ashgate 
Publishing, Ltd. 
———. 2011b. “The Rise of the Arabian Gulf Carriers: An Insight into the Business Model of 
Emirates Airline.” Journal of Air Transport Management 17 (6): 339–46. 
OECD. 2000. “Regulatory Reform in Network Industries: Past Experience and Current Issues.” 
OECD Economic Outlook 67 (1): 151–71. 
Oliver, Pamela E., and Hank Johnston. 2000. “What a Good Idea! Ideologies and Frames in 
Social Movement Research.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 5 (1): 37–54. 
Olson, Mancur. 1978. Logique de L’action Collective. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. 
Osborne, Stephen P., and Kate McLaughin. 2002. “The New Public Management in Context.” In 
New Public Management: Current Trends and Future Prospects, edited by Kate McLaughin, 
Stephen P. Osborne, and Erwan Ferlie, 7–14. New York: Routledge. 
Ostrom, Elinor. 2007. “Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional Analysis 
and Development Framework.” In Theories of the Policy Process, edited by Paul Sabatier, 2d 
edition, 21–64. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Oxford Business Group, ed. 2010. The Report: Qatar 2010. London: Oxford Business Group. 
Paquin, Stéphane. 2005. Économie Politique Internationale. Paris: Montchrestien. 
Patton, Michael Quinn. 2002. Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods. 3d edition. 
Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications. 
Paulhiac, Florence, and Vincent Kaufmann. 2006. “Transports Urbains À Montréal : Évolutions 
Des Référentiels et Enjeux D’une Politique Durable.” Revue D’économie Régionale et Urbaine 
2006 (1): 49–80. 
 290 
Pearce, Brian. 2012. “The State of Air Transport Markets and the Airline Industry After the Great 
Recession.” Journal of Air Transport Management 21: 3–9. 
Peters, Guy B. 1986. American Public Policy: Promise and Performance. 2nd edition. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Plasse, Micheline. 1991. “La Politique D’internationalisation de Montréal : Une Politique En 
Devenir.” Politique 19: 37–65. 
Poole, Robert W., and Viggo Butler. 2002. Nav Canada: A Model for Commercializing Public 
Enterprises. Winnipeg: Frontier Centre for Public Policy, September, Policy Series No. 11. 
Porter, Isabelle. 2009. “Le TGV, Une Menace Pour L’avion ?” Le Devoir, no. 17 octobre: A6. 
Price, Jeffrey C., and Jeffrey S. Forrest. 2008. “Policies and Procedures: The Development of 
Aviation Security Practices.” In Practical Aviation Security: Predicting and Preventing Future 
Threats, 83–118. Oxford: Elsevier. 
Raguraman, K. 1997. “Airlines as Instruments for Nation Building and National Identity: Case 
Study of Malaysia and Singapore.” Journal of Transport Geography 5 (4): 239–56. 
Rebello, François. 2009. “Le Train Manqué.” La Presse, no. 4 août: A11. 
Reigner, Hélène. 2004. “La Territorialisation de L’enjeu « Sécurité Routière » : Vers Un 
Basculement de Référentiel ?” Espaces et Sociétés 118 (3): 23–41. 
Reiss, Brett. 2007. “Maximising Non-Aviation Revenue for Airports: Developing Airport Cities 
to Optimise Real Estate and Capitalise on Land Development Opportunities.” Journal of Airport 
Management 1 (3): 284–93. 
Reynolds-Feighan, Aisling. 2010. “Characterisation of Airline Networks: A North American and 
European Comparison.” Journal of Air Transport Management 16 (3): 109–20. 
Rigakos, George. 2002. In Search of Security: The Roles of Public Police and Private Agencies. 
Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada. 
Rimsa, Kostas. 2011. “The Horsemen.” In Inside Canadian Intelligence: Exposing the New 
Realities of Espionage and International Terrorism, edited by Dwight Hamilton, 2d edition, 51–
62. Toronto: Dundurn. 
Roach, Kent. 2003. September 11: Consequences for Canada. Montréal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press. 
Ruffilli, Dean. 2012. Canada’s Blue Sky Air Policy. HillNote no. 2012-05-E. Ottawa: Library of 
Parliament. 
 291 
Rumpala, Yannick. 2008. “La Quête Du Sens. Repenser La Question de L’interprétation Dans 
L’analyse Des Politiques Publiques.” Articulo - Journal of Urban Research 4. 
Sabatier, Paul. 2006. “Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF).” In Dictionnaire Des Politiques 
Publiques, edited by Laurie Boussaguet, Sophie Jacquot, and Pauline Ravinet, 2d edition, 42–51. 
Paris: Presses de Sciences Po. 
———. 2007. Theories of the Policy Process. 2d edition. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Sabatier, Paul, and Hank Jenkins-Smith. 1999. “The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An 
Assessment.” In Theories of the Policy Process, 211–36. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Saint-Martin, Denis. 1998. “The New Managerialism and the Policy Influence of Consultants in 
Government: An Historical–Institutionalist Analysis of Britain, Canada and France.” Governance 
11 (3): 319–56. 
———. 2002. “Apprentissage Social et Changement Institutionnel : La Politique de 
« L’investissement Dans L’enfance » Au Canada et En Grande-Bretagne.” Politique et Sociétés 
21 (3): 41–67. 
Salter, Mark B. 2006. “The Global Visa Regime and the Political Technologies of the 
International Self: Borders, Bodies, Biopolitics.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 31 (2): 
167–89. 
———. 2007. “Governmentalities of an Airport: Heterotopia and Confession.” International 
Political Sociology 1 (1): 49–66. 
———. 2008a. “Political Science Perspectives on Transportation Security.” Journal of 
Transportation Security 1 (1): 29–35. 
———. 2008b. “Securitization and Desecuritization: A Dramaturgical Analysis of the Canadian 
Air Transport Security Authority.” Journal of International Relations and Development 11 (4): 
321–49. 
Savas, Emanuel S. 2000. Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships. New York: Seven 
Bridge Press. 
Savoie, Donald J. 1999. Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Political Power in 
Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
———. 2004. “Searching for Accountability in a Government without Boundaries.” Canadian 
Public Administration 47 (1): 1–26. 
Scharpenseel, Moritz Ferdinand. 2001. “Consequences of E.U. Airline Deregulation in the 
Context of the Global Aviation Market.” Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 
22: 91. 
 292 
Schneider, Anne, and Helen Ingram. 1990. “Behavioral Assumptions of Policy Tools.” The 
Journal of Politics 52 (2): 510–29. 
Sclar, Elliot, and Management Consulting Group HDR. 2003. Pitfalls of Air Traffic Control 
Privatization. Report commissioned by: National Air Traffic Controllers Association. 
http://www.natca.net/assets/Documents/mediacenter/PDFPitfallsofATCPrivatization. 
Scott, Peter Dale. 2007. “The 9/11 Commission Report and Vice President Cheney.” In The Road 
to 9/11: Wealth, Empire, and the Future of America, 194–211. Los Angeles: University of 
California Press. 
Senate. 2012a. The Future of Canadian Air Travel: Toll Booth or Spark Plug? Report on the 
Future Growth and Global Competitiveness of Canada’s Airport. Ottawa: Parliament of Canada. 
———. 2012b. “Transportation Security Administration.” In Senate Report 112-074 - 
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, 2012, 64–82. Washington DC: Congress 
of the United States. 
Shalom, François. 2012. “Qatar Airways CEO Blasts Ottawa on Landing Slots.” The Gazette, no. 
April 3: B3. 
Shearing, Clifford, and Philip C. Stenning. 1981. “Modern Private Security: Its Growth and 
Implications.” Crime and Justice 3: 193–245. 
Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1989. “Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice 
Approach.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 1 (2): 131–47. 
Shibata, K. 1994. “Airline Privatization in Eastern Europe and Ex-USSR.” Logistics and 
Transportation Review 30 (2): 167–88. 
Simon, Herbert A. 1997. Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in 
Administrative Organizations. 4th edition. New York: Free Press. 
Singh, L. K. 2008. “Air Travel Ticketing and Processes.” In Foreign Exchange Management And 
Air Ticketing, 294–317. Delhi: ISHA Books. 
Sisson, Mary. 2011. “Air India Flight 182 Bombing.” In The SAGE Encyclopedia of Terrorism, 
by Gus Martin, 2d edition, 18–19. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications. 
Sloan, Elinor. 2005. “Homeland Security.” In Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era. 
Montréal: McGill-Queen’s Press. 
Smiley, Donald V. 1987. The Federal Condition in Canada. Scarborough: McGraw-Hill 
Ryerson. 
Smith, Andy. 1999. “Public Policy Analysis in Contemporary France: Academic Approaches, 
 293 
Questions and Debates.” Public Administration 77 (1): 111–31. 
Smith, David E. 1994. “The Police and Political Science in Canada.” In Police Powers in 
Canada: The Evolution and Practice of Authority, by R. C. Macleod and David Schneiderman, 
184–208. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Smith, Heather. 2008. “Political Parties and Canadian Climate Change Policy.” International 
Journal 64 (1): 47–66. 
Smyrl, Marc et al. 2005. “Vers Un Retour Du Politique Dans Le Néo-Instutionnalisme.” Pôle Sud 
23 (2): 115–30. 
Soroka, Stuart. 2006. “Agenda-Setting and Issue Definition.” In Critical Policy Studies, edited by 
Michael Orsini and Miriam Smith, 185–210. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. 
Steinmo, Sven. 2006. “Néo-Institutionnalismes.” In Dictionnaire Des Politiques Publiques, 
edited by Laurie Boussaguet, Sophie Jacquot, and Pauline Ravinet, 2ème édition, 293–300. Paris: 
Presses de Sciences Po. 
Steinmo, Sven, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth. 1992. Structuring Politics: Historical 
Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Stevenson, Garth. 1987. The Politics of Canada’s Airlines From Diefenbaker to Mulroney. 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Sull, Donald N., Sumantra Ghoshal, and Felipe Monteiro. 2005. “The Hub of the World.” 
Business Strategy Review 16 (1): 35–40. 
Surel, Yves. 2000a. “The Role of Cognitive and Normative Frames in Policy-Making.” Journal 
of European Public Policy 7 (4): 495–512. 
———. 2000b. “L’intégration Européenne Vue Par L’approche Cognitive et Normative Des 
Politiques Publiques.” Revue Française de Science Politique 50 (2): 235–54. 
Surridge, Grant. 2008. “Etihad’s Big Plans, Deep Pockets; Abu Dhabi-Backed Airline Keen to 
Add Toronto Flights.” The National Post, no. 20 September: FP3. 
The Canadian Press. 2007. “Ottawa Boosts Spending to Get Via Rail Back on Track.” The Globe 
and Mail, no. 11 October. 
Thelle, Martin H, Torben T Pedersen, and Frederik Harhoff. 2012. “Airport Responses.” In 
Airport Competition in Europe, 80–100. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Economics. 
Thompson, Elizabeth. 2012. “Airport Security Agency Quiet on Where Cuts Will Land.” 
iPolitics, no. 2 May. http://www.ipolitics.ca/2012/05/02/airport-security-agency-quiet-on-where-
cuts-will-land/. 
 294 
Transport Canada. 1994. National Airports Policy. Ottawa: Transport Canada. 
———. 1999. Local Airport Authority Lease Review - Consultation Report. Ottawa: Transport 
Canada. 
———. 2006a. Blue Sky. Canada’s New International Air Policy. Ottawa: Transport Canada. 
———. 2006b. Canada’s Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative. Ottawa: Transport 
Canada. 
———. 2010. Transportation in Canada in 2010. Ottawa: Transport Canada. 
Tretheway, Michael, and Robert Andriulaitis. 2008. “Airport Policy in Canada: Limitations of the 
Not-for-Profit Governance Model.” In Aviation Infrastructure Performance. A Study in 
Comparative Political Economy, edited by Clifford Winston and Ginés de Rus, 136–57. 
Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
Tupper, Allan, and G. Bruce Doern. 1988. Privatization, Public Policy and Public Corporations 
in Canada. Montréal: Institute for Research on Public Policy. 
Tyler, Tony. 2012. “Remarks of Tony Tyler at the Montréal Council on Foreign Relations, 6 
March 2012.” http://www.iata.org/pressroom/speeches/Pages/2012-03-06-01.aspx. 
Valo, Sidney. 2001. “The Continuing Evolution in Canadian Airport Privatization.” Annals of Air 
and Space Law 26: 225–36. 
Varlet, Jean. 1997. “La Déréglementation Du Transport Aérien et Ses Conséquences Sur Les 
Réseaux et Sur Les Aéroports.” Annales de Géographie 106 (593): 205–17. 
Verhoest, Koen, Geert Bouckaert, and Guy B. Peters. 2007. “Janus-Faced Reorganization: 
Specialization and Coordination in Four OECD Countries in the Period 1980—2005.” 
International Review of Administrative Sciences 73 (3): 325–48. 
Villard, Philippe. 2009. “Compte-Rendu : Les Politiques Publiques, de Pierre Muller.” Politique 
et Sociétés 28 (3): 218–20. 
———. 2011a. “Changing Frames of Reference and Regulatory Structures: French Airport 
Policy in Transition.” Journal of Public Policy 31 (1): 73–93. 
———. 2011b. “The Economic Regulation of a European Hub Airport: An Iron Triangle?” 
Public Works Management & Policy 16 (4): 300–319. 
Villard, Philippe, and Julian de la Camara. 2011. “Commercialization/Privatization Database 
Provides Case Studies for States, Airports, ANSPs, Policy-Makers and Analysts.” ICAO Journal 
66 (6): 33–34. 
 295 
———. 2012. “Case Studies on Commercialization, Privatization and Economic Oversight of 
Airports and Air Navigation Services Providers. A Tool for Policy-Makers, Policy Analysts, and 
Practitioners.” Journal of Airport Management 6 (2): 133–40. 
Waters, W. G. 1977. “Investment Criteria and the Expansion of Major Airports in Canada.” 
Canadian Public Policy 3 (1): 23–35. 
———. 2006. “Canada’s Statement on National Transport Policy.” In Competition as a Driver of 
Change. Proceedings of the 41st Annual Conference of the Canadian Transportation Research 
Forum, Quebec City, May 28-31, 2006, 793–807. Saskatoon: Canadian Transportation Research 
Forum. 
Waters, W. G., and Chunyan Yu. 2003. “Air Security Fees and Highway Safety.” In Crossing 
Borders: Trade, Travel Security and Communications. Proceedings of the 38th Annual 
Conference of the Canadian Transportation Research Forum, Ottawa, May 11-14, 2003, 676–90. 
Saskatoon: Canadian Transportation Research Forum. 
Waters, W. G., and Anming Zhang. 2004. “Air Transport Security: Costs, Externalities and Who 
Should Pay?” In Proceedings of the Air Transport Research Society World Conference [CD-
ROM]: July 1-3, Istanbul, Turkey. Vancouver: Air Transport Research Society. 
Weber, Max. 1971. Économie et société. Paris: Plon. 
Weible, Christopher M. 2007. “An Advocacy Coalition Framework Approach to Stakeholder 
Analysis: Understanding the Political Context of California Marine Protected Area Policy.” 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 17 (1): 95–117. 
Williamson, Robert. 1995. “Security Firm’s Bankruptcy Opens up Airport Contracts: Revenue 
Canada Pulls Plug Over $11.4-Million in Deductions Taxes.” The Globe and Mail, no. 3 April: 
B3. 
Wilson, Benet. 2007. “CAC Says Government Rail Subsidies Unfair To Canadian Airports.” 
Aviation Daily 370 (12): 5. 
Woll, Cornelia. 2005. “Vers Des Compétences Externes : L’activisme de La Commission 
Européenne En Matière D’aviation Internationale.” Politique Européenne 17 (3): 137–58. 
Yanow, Dvora. 2000. Conducting Interpretive Policy Analysis. London: SAGE Publications. 
———. 2007. “Interpretation in Policy Analysis: On Methods and Practice.” Critical Policy 
Studies 1 (1): 110–22. 
Young, Douglas. 1994. Nouvelles Orientations Pour Les Transports : Allocution Du Ministre 
Des Transports Douglas Young Au Dîner de La Journée Nationale Des Transports, Thunder Bay 
(Ontario), Le Vendredi 3 Juin 1994. Ottawa: Transports Canada. 
 296 
Zaidi, Kamaal. 2008. “Aviation Security in Canada and the United States: Promoting Security 
and Commerce in a Multi-Layered Regime within a Federal Regulatory Framework.” Annals of 
Air and Space Law 34: 71–110. 
Zembri, Pierre. 2005. “Structure Des Réseaux de Transport et Déréglementation.” Flux 62 (4): 
21–30. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
